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This thesis deals with three components of an organism’s interactions with its environment: 
learning, decision making, and emotions. In a series of 5 studies, I detail relationships between 
these processes, and investigate the representation and computations whereby they are 
achieved. In the first experiment I show how subjective wellbeing is influenced by one’s own 
rewards and expectations, but also those of other people. Furthermore, I find that parameter 
estimates of empathy predict decision-making in a distinct test of economic generosity. In my 
second study, I ask how stressful experiences modulate subsequent learning, detailing a specific 
impairment in action-learning under stress which also manifests itself in altered pupillary 
responses. In the third, I use a hierarchical model of learning to show that subjective uncertainty 
in aversive contexts predicts several dimensions of acute stress responses. Furthermore, I find 
that individuals who show greater uncertainty-tuning in their stress responses are better at 
predicting the presence of threat. In the final pair of studies I ask how decision variables for 
value-based choice are represented in the brain. I describe the combination of quality and 
quantity into value estimates in humans, revealing a central role for the Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex in value integration using functional magnetic resonance imaging. I next characterize the 
neural code for value in non-human primate frontal cortex, using single-neuron data from 
collaborators. These two studies provide convergent evidence that the value code may be more 
diverse and non-linear than previously reported, potentially conferring the ability to incorporate 
uncertainty signals directly in the activity of value coding neurons. 
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 Chapter 1: General introduction 
1.1 Preliminaries 
The job of the brain is to find a good mapping between the sensory inputs it receives and the 
actions it produces 1. In this chapter we will discuss the reasons why this is a difficult problem, 
and introduce some of the terminology we need to describe the challenge and the brain’s 
attempts to solve it. We will draw upon efforts in machine learning, where artificial agents tackle 
analogous problems; from economics, which aims to predict the behaviour of individuals; and 
from tennis, in which players try to avoid being aced. 
The stage in the transformation of perception to action upon which this thesis is focussed is that 
of value-based decision making.  Loosely defined, this is the business of selecting actions that 
maximise evolutionary fitness, facilitating reproductive success (and its necessary corollary, at 
least temporary survival). We note that actually estimating the objective value in the true sense – 
the impact upon an organism’s rate of gene transmission – is typically impossible. Instead, we 
borrow from decades of psychology in operationalizing rewards as things that animals will 
repeat actions to obtain, and punishments as things which animals seek to avoid 2. By 
quantifying the relative effort expended in the pursuit and avoidance of different stimuli, we 
arrive at the notion of subjective value, or utility, a number we can use to describe how desirable 
a given outcome is to an organism at a particular moment. There is considerable debate about 
whether the brain actually represents value 3,4 a question to which we will return. Regardless, 
value is a very useful concept, as reflected by its prevalence in psychology, economics, and 
computer science 5,6. 
This thesis is concerned with three interlinked processes by which organisms interact with 
valuable stimuli: learning, decision-making, and emotion (Figure 1.1). We start with a brief 
justification of this characterisation, before touching upon the algorithms and neurobiology 
thought to underpin each of these processes, highlighting the difference between approaches 
derived from reinforcement learning and from a Bayesian perspective and discussing how each 
has contributed to our understanding of the brain. 
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Figure 1.1 | Framework for this thesis An organism seeking to maximise value takes decisions, 
learns from the results, and experiences emotion along the way. The experiments presented 
here pertain to the relationships between these processes. 
 
1.1.1 Deciding, learning, feeling 
Figure 1.1 shows how the experiments in this thesis concern the interplay of learning, decisions, 
and emotional processes. It contains several simplifications. The first is the neat cyclical nature, 
which implies a repetitive serial process. In reality, the relationships between these three 
elements are probably bidirectional and dynamic. The arrows I have chosen reflect the topics I 
will deal with here, and omit, for instance, the influence of current emotional state upon 
decision-making, which is well-documented 7. Secondly, the use of single arrows understates the 
degree to which multiple learning and decisional systems act in concert. As we shall see, there is 
abundant evidence for multiple learning mechanisms in the brain, which provide inputs to 
decisional-processes which evolve in parallel in numerous frames of reference 8. Whether there 
are similarly numerous links between decisional and emotional systems remains to be seen.   
To what extent is each of these components necessary? Learning is clearly essential if an 
organism is to interact successfully with the world; even plants are endowed with some ability to 
modulate their behaviour on the basis of experience 9. But why do we need a separate system 
for making decisions? Impressively capable neural networks do not display a clear segregation of 
learning and decisional systems, instead learning a direct mapping from inputs to actions 10,11. 
One conceptual reason why it might be useful to think about decisions as being somewhat 
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separate from learning is alluded to above; we have multiple learning systems, which advocate 
distinct courses of actions when confronted with a given decision. A distinct system for making 
decisions is able to draw upon numerous sources of evidence, knitting together the outputs of 
different learning systems to produce a decision 12. Furthermore, such a system can be used to 
flexibly link up inputs and outputs, so that knowledge about the climate of different Latin 
American countries can be combined with experience of different confectionary brands to allow 
us to choose a particular bar of chocolate, or integrated with airline prices to decide where to go 
on holiday.  
What is less clear is why learning and decision-making need be associated with fluctuations in 
emotional state, a problem intimately related to that of consciousness itself. Such philosophy is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but we hope that by delineating the properties and features of 
the relationship between emotions and the environment we might glean something of their 
function 13. Towards the end of this chapter, we highlight recent attempts to understand the 
function of emotion through a characterization of its causes and consequences. 
1.2 Value and decisions 
In this section we will briefly expand upon the notions of value and utility, and the way that 
humans combine information to make choices. In doing so, we will define the target for learning 
– the information we think that organisms should acquire in order to make good decisions. 
Much of the language of this section will come from economics, which seeks to predict peoples’ 
choices by estimating the subjective value associated with different options; in the following 
sections we shall turn to the lexis of machine and statistical learning, which describe how such 
values might be assigned. 
1.2.1 Economics and decision-making 
Given the central role of money in society, it is unsurprising that the first concerted efforts to 
understand valuation focused upon financial decisions. The starting point was on a distinctly un-
biological question: given an offer of a gamble of specified magnitude and probability, how did 
people behave? Despite the seemingly abstruse relationship to the problems that the brain 
evolved to solve, answering this question has proved surprisingly occupying in both economic 
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and biological sciences. Blaise Pascal in the 17th century defined an Expected Value (EV) term 
which described a strictly linear relationship between objective and subjective value: 𝐸𝑉 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	 ∗ 	𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒  
Equation 1.1 
However, this linear description was declared insufficient by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738, who noted 
that ‘a ducat is worth more to a pauper than a Prince’. Bernoulli borrowed a problem from his 
brother, Nicolas, to illustrate this point. The ‘St Petersburg’ paradox describes a hypothetical 
gamble in which a coin is repeatedly flipped. The pot starts at two ducats. Each time the coin 
comes up heads, we double the amount in the pot. When the coin eventually comes up tails, you 
receive the quantity in the pot. How many ducats would you pay to play this game? 
According a Pascallian notion of value, we should be happy to pay any amount. This is because 
the EV of the series is the weighted sum of the probabilities of each outcome. We therefore sum 
to the point of a vanishingly small chance of obtaining an astronomical large amount of money: 
𝐸𝑉 = 12 ∗ 2 + 14 ∗ 4 + 18 ∗ 8…~0 ∗ ~∞ 
Equation 1.2 
Resulting in an infinite sum. Although laboratory experiments on behaviour in infinite St 
Petersburg games is sparse (possibly because the prospect of having to pay participants an 
infinite sum does not wash with investigators clutching hard-won grants)  finite-sum versions of 
the game illustrate that people are risk-averse, paying far less than they ‘ought’ to part with 
money in exchange for small chances of great sums of money 14. This is consistent with 
Bernoulli’s own conclusion, that paupers value ducats more than princes, suggesting that the 
relationship between subjective utility and value is concave; increasing gains in wealth return 
decreasing increases in utility. This idea was developed further by Kahneman and Tversky, who 
described a series of deviations from utility theory which could be accounted for by modifying 
the utility function such that it was concave for gains but convex for losses, explaining the 
observation that people appear risk-averse for gains but risk-seeking for losses 5, whilst 
acknowledging non-linear assessments of probability and the power of contextual effects upon 
choice 15.  
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Adding to the nuanced account of choice provided by Kahneman, Tversky and others 16 was the 
observation that people frequently made choices along axes unpredicted by a purely economic 
model. People possess a variety of well-characterized social preferences which violate economic 
dicta, such as for fairness and equality 17,18 19-21. Monkeys display similar preferences 22. Indeed, 
some have proposed that such preferences are essential for the formation of large societies 23. 
Recent work has identified the neural basis of socially-derived value (see below and 24) and, as 
we report in Chapter 2, preferences for equality are also expressed in fluctuations in 
participants’ emotional state. 
By the end of 20th century, therefore, economics and psychology had established that people 
possessed internal value functions that were consistently different from those prescribed by 
probability alone; that attitudes towards gains were not symmetric with those towards losses; 
and that, in a variety of situations, peoples’ valuations were sensitive to contextual and framing 
effects.  
1.2.2 Neural representations of value 
The economic dissection of value presented above poses an obvious question: is this variable, 
subjective utility, represented in the brain? Somewhat unsurprisingly, the answer is yes. Setting 
aside for a second the thorny issue of discriminating between representations of value and its 
correlates 25, it is clear that when presented with different options, neural responses in a variety 
of brain regions 26 tend to reflect subjective utility rather than objective Pascallian value 27-29.  
Pausing at this point, we might wish to bring the discussion back onto more ethological ground. 
Is the utility so painstakingly defined by economists the same metric we use to make decisions 
about biologically relevant variables such as food, water, and sex? The answer is probably yes, 
with caveats. Several authors have observed that to make decisions between incommensurable 
objects, we need a common scale along which different kinds of reward can be compared 30 4,31. 
Early work identified the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), ventral striatum, and 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) as the most promising locus of an abstract value signal 30 26,31, 
although more detailed attempts to parse the stimulus-specificity of signals in each region 
suggest that the OFC value signal may be stimulus-dependent 32. More abstract stimuli such as 
the value of a humorous joke 33 or a beautiful face 34 also appear to activate this network of 
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brain regions, as do modulations of value by social context 35. Parallel work in non-human 
primates has described single cells in the PFC and elsewhere that integrate information about 
probability, magnitude, effort, and delay in a manner suggestive of a subjective utility signal 36-39. 
The prevailing view over the last decade, as captured by the term ‘neuroeconomics’, is thus that 
the brain does indeed calculate values for different offers in a common metric 40,41. As we shall 
see, this aligns very well with accounts of reinforcement learning, which suggest that agents 
should store value estimates associated with certain states, and use these value estimates to 
decide what to do. 
1.2.3 Mechanisms for making value-based decisions 
We have only touched upon the mechanisms whereby animals actually make decisions. It may 
seem natural from the account above to suppose that the brain calculates the value of different 
options, and then compares them. This has been the dominant viewpoint in economics, and by 
extension neuroeconomics, for some time 40. However, recent work suggests that this view is too 
simplistic, at least when describing choices involving the integration of multiple pieces of 
information. When comparing options that differ in both probability and magnitude, behavioural 
and neural evidence suggest that people compare options on a by-attribute basis, before 
making a choice that is biased towards the attribute that is the most discriminative 
{hunt:2014gq}. For example, house-buying choices proceed as a comparison of prices, size, 
neighbourhood crime statistics etc., rather than by a summation over all of these terms followed 
by a comparison step 42. This finding, underpinned by a neural network model of competition 
through mutual inhibition 43,44, suggests that the ingredients of a choice are more important 
than previously acknowledged, at least in neuroscience 3. A complementary ethological 
perspective emphasises the continuous nature of action-selection, suggesting that serial 
processing models invoking valuation stages followed by choice and action provide an 
impoverished perspective on decision-making 8.  
This also poses a question to which we will return in due course: whilst economics posits that a 
single representation of value is sufficient to underpin all value-guided choice, neural 
perspectives emphasise that representations should be subservient to computations 45,46. To 
solve a task where you’re estimating how much you’d be happy to pay for a food item, using an 
integrated value representation might be effective 30, but choices between complicated offers 
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differing along multiple dimensions might be more effectively represented using an attribute-
based code44. Finally, and as we shall see, the value estimates used to compare options might be 
simultaneously sampled from multiple learning systems. Whilst economics places great 
emphasis upon consistency, the brain suffers from no such constraints, marching instead to the 
drum of evolution. From this perspective, we might expect regions of the brain performing 
different value-based computations to harbour distinct representations of value. Having planted 
the seeds of this idea, we will leave them until Chapters 5 and 6 to germinate. 
1.2.4 Summary and relevance 
Economic approaches to understanding choice suggest the existence of a value function, along 
which options are compared. The decisions made by humans appear to obey some internal 
estimate of value, rather than that prescribed by probability theory. Neural correlates of this 
internal estimate are commonly identified in the brain, particularly in the prefrontal cortices and 
basal ganglia. However, we emphasise that not all value-based decisions are made on the basis 
of an integrated value signal, a subject to which we will return in later sections.  We now turn to 
the question of how organisms come to associate value with the objects and actions between 
which they make decisions; how an individual comes to prefer an apple to an orange, or a top-
spin backhand to a slice. 
Several experiments in this thesis rely upon the notion of expected value and utility. In Chapter 
2 I present an experiment in which subjects make choices between certain outcomes and 
gambles, which we document in terms of their expected value. In Chapter 5 I present a brain 
imaging study examining the integration of quality and quantity in the formation of value 
signals, using economic tools to estimate the quality of different stimuli, and in Chapter 6 I 
analyse single-neuron responses to cues of different probability and magnitude in an attempt to 
characterise the representation of value in a variety of prefrontal brain regions. 
1.3 Learning from experience 
Bernoulli’s prince and pauper both assign value to ducats, and the common market determines 
the value of everything else in terms of ducats. For most of history, assigning value to objects 
has not been so straightforward. A monkey coming to a new tree festooned with an unfamiliar 
fruit must learn the value of this new fruit, to be able to compare it to her old favourites. As we 
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shall see, monkeys and other animals are thought to rely upon several different algorithms to 
achieve this.  
1.3.1 Predicting rewards 
We spend a great deal of time pursuing things that are not intrinsically (biologically) rewarding. 
Stimuli that act as surrogate rewards are known as secondary rewards, to distinguish them from 
the primary rewards that have direct biological relevance. Money, bicycles, and books all come 
into this category. Learning to value things that are predictive of reward appears to be a powerful 
mechanism for eventually attaining it.   
 Pavlov’s classic experiments demonstrated that animals are highly sensitive to the contingency 
between neutral and valuable stimuli. Pavlovian, or classical, conditioning describes the 
association between a conditioned stimulus (CS), and an unconditioned stimulus (US). Over time, 
the physiological responses associated with the latter come to be elicited by the former. These 
can include paying more attention to the item in question, approaching it, or even attempting to 
eat it. This process inspired the hugely influential Rescorla-Wagner model, which captures 
several fundamental aspects of learning in humans and other animals. 
1.3.1.1 The Rescorla-Wagner model of conditioning 
The Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model describes how classical conditioning occurs. It rests upon the 
idea that animals learn when an experience deviates from their expectations; that is, it is 
surprising. This idea has had a profound influence upon our understanding of learning, with a 
legacy that reverberates from electrophysiology to artificial intelligence. Formally, the RW model 
describes the incremental increase in strength of an association through prediction errors: 
∆𝑉? 	= 𝛼𝛽(	𝜆 − 	 𝑉?E) 
𝑉?,HIJ 	= 𝑉?,H + 	∆𝑉?	 
Equation 1.3 
Where ∆𝑉? describes the change in associative strength for stimulus A, 𝜆 is the maximum 
associative strength, and 𝑉?E is the current associative strength of A and all the other stimuli in 
the environment (lumped together as X). In words, the Rescorla-Wagner rule tells us that 
associations are driven by the difference between the true association between CS and US and 
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the animal’s current expectation of that association. This produces a learning curve which 
decreases in slope as learning proceeds (Figure 1.2). The terms 𝛼 and 𝛽 control the rate of 
acquisition, and are usually interpreted to be properties of the stimulus, although they can also 
reflect knowledge of the environment’s volatility 47. 
 
Figure 1.2 | Rescorla-Wagner captures classical conditioning (A) Acquisition curves for a task 
in which participants learned whether a card is rewarded or not. Blocks of trials are plotted 
against participants’ ratings of reward probability. Adapted from 48 (B) The Rescorla-Wagner 
model produces decelerating learning curves, as observed in behaviour. Numbers correspond to 
learning rate * prediction error (∆𝑽𝑨) on each trial – see equation 1.3.    
 
The RW model captures the intuition that we alter our beliefs in response to surprising events. It 
also explains several well-established phenomena. The first is Kamin blocking 49 in which the 
presence of established conditioned stimuli that perfectly predict a given US block the 
conditioning of new CS’s. This is accounted for by the fact that the update term in equation 1.3 
includes the prediction not only from the stimulus in question, but all stimuli in the environment; 
if another stimulus predicts the reward, the prediction error will be zero, and new associations 
will not be formed. The RW model also explains over-expectation 50, in which the compound 
presentation of two highly rewarded CS’s (generating a very high expectation of reward) 
followed by the provision of a single dose of US leads to a decrease in the value of each CS 
(because the received reward is less than predicted), an effect found to depend upon the 
orbitofrontal cortex 51.  
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The curves produced by the RW model elegantly capture the acquisition rates displayed by 
animals learning CS-US relationships (Figure 1.2). The Rescorla-Wagner rule has thus provided a 
capable and influential account of how animals build a primitive model of the world, associating 
stimuli with their predictors. 
1.3.1.2 Temporal-Difference Learning 
Although the RW model enjoyed great success explaining trial-by-trial learning, it failed to 
explain learning on a more granular timescale. Richard Sutton and Andrew Barto noted that the 
RW-model fails to emphasise a feature of learning that had previously been stressed in 
engineering algorithms, that of prediction 52. Both animals and artificial agents, they argued, are 
seeking to find the earliest, non-redundant predictor of a variable in which they are interested 
in, namely reward. Their account, Temporal Difference (TD) learning, extends the idea of 
prediction-error learning to continuous time, providing fine-grained predictions of within-trial 
dynamics to which RW-models are blind. Whilst RW-models describe the association between a 
predictor and an outcome, TD-learning seeks to find the earliest possible predictor of reward. 
This captured essential temporal components of learning which the RW-model was unable to 
account for, such as the importance of within-trial timings for CS-US associations 52. The TD 
model also introduced the notion of a stimulus trace, which allowed predictive signals that 
occurred some time ago to be linked with the occurrence of reward at a later date. 
 They envisaged that an agent’s predictions of future reward are encapsulated in a state value, 
which captures all of the (time-discounted) rewards that the agent expects to receive in 
subsequent states: 
𝑉H = 	 𝛾NOJPNQJ 𝑟HIN 
Equation 1.4 
Here 𝑉H is the value of the current state. It is obtained by summing the product of reward on 
each timestep (𝑟HIN), discounted by the factor 𝛾. 𝛾 is constrained to be less than 1 and raised to 
the power of the future timestep, 𝑖, thus producing an exponentially decaying influence of future 
rewards.  
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The core insight is that this quantity, 𝑉H,	can be learned in an incremental fashion by updating 
the previous time-step’s prediction of reward to match the next time-step’s, whilst taking into 
account any reward received on that timestep: 𝑉H ← 𝑉H + 𝛼(𝑉HIJ + 𝑟HIJ − 𝑉H) 
Equation 1.5 
Where 𝑉H is updated to reflect knowledge about state 𝑉HIJ. As before, 𝛼 is a learning rate 
parameter that determines how much the state value is updated on each timestep, and 𝑟HIJ is 
immediate reward. Note that, like the Rescorla-Wagner model, TD-learning relies upon a 
prediction error to drive learning: 𝛿H = 𝑉HIJ + 𝑟HIJ − 𝑉H 
 Equation 1.6 
The only difference with the RW prediction error being the presence of the term 𝑉HIJ, which 
reflects the notion that value updates should reflect not only the reward received by 
transitioning into a given state, but also all of the future reward associated with the new state. 
For instance, if you are the second son of the Tudor King of England, the death of your older 
brother may be associated with some small reward – his horse, and perhaps his wife. Far more 
significant is the value of the state in which you now find yourself, that of heir to the throne, 
associated as it is with innumerable opportunities to extract taxes, host lavish banquets, and 
wage war upon the French. 
1.3.1.3 Reward Prediction Errors in the dopamine system 
This term, 𝛿H, is known as the Reward Prediction Error (RPE), and has come to occupy a central 
role in our understanding of learning and the brain. Fundamental to the widespread adoption of 
the RPE by the neuroscience community was the revelation in 1997 that dopamine neurons in 
the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) and Substantia Nigra pars Compacta (SNc) appeared to 
represent precisely this quantity 53. Neurons containing dopamine are densely concentrated in 
the SN/VTA, receiving inputs from a wide variety of structures 54 and projecting extensively to 
both cortical and subcortical structures, notably including the striatum and large portions of the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) 55. They thus appear well-positioned to broadcast prediction error signals 
to brain regions known to be important for representing and updating value estimates 26. 
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 In probably the most frequently reproduced panel in computational neuroscience, Schultz and 
colleagues asserted that dopamine neurons align their responses to the earliest possible 
predictor of reward, and incorporate a temporal prediction such that the failure to receive a 
reward at the expected timepoint is associated with a reduction in firing (Figure 1.3A). The 
question posed in that panel – ‘do dopamine neurons report an error in the prediction of 
reward?’ – has been answered in the affirmative by two decades of work in rodents 56,57, 
monkeys 58-62,  and humans 63-67. Notable empirical successes include the observation that 
dopamine neurons are sensitive to blocking 59, respond to cues predicting reward omission 62, 
and weight previous rewards in an exponentially decaying manner 58, all as predicted from 
theory. The recent advent of optogenetic techniques 68 has allowed direct manipulation of 
neurons, confirming that synthetic prediction errors substitute for positive  56 and negative 69 
RPEs (Figure 1.3B). Delicate dissection of the local circuitry within the SN/VTA suggests that 
inhibitory neurons containing the neurotransmitter GABA provide an expectation signal to 
dopamine neurons 57, which can be exogenously manipulated to produce dopaminergic and 
behavioural signatures of reward expectation 70 (Figure 1.3C). It should be stressed, however, 
that TD-learning does not provide a comprehensive description of the responses of 
dopaminergic cells, which display considerable variability in their responses 71 according to their 
inputs 72 and outputs 73, and the reward context in which they are assessed 74. Further evidence 
suggests that some behaviours that might naturally have been subserved by reinforcement 
learning do not depend upon dopamine at all 75,76, whilst manipulating dopamine in the absence 
of rewarding stimuli does not seem to produce learning 77. A full discussion of the range of 




Figure 1.3 | Dopamine neurons convey an RPE signal (A) Dopamine neurons fire to the 
presentation of an unexpected reward (R) (top). When a CS is associated with a reward, 
dopamine neurons shift their responses to the CS, displaying no modulation of activity at the 
receipt of reward (middle). Omission of reward leads to a dip in the firing rate of dopamine 
neurons, consistent with a negative prediction error (bottom). Adapted from Schultz et al 53 (B) 
Causal evidence that dopamine neurons provide a signal that supports learning. Steinberg et al 
trained mice on a tone-juice pairing. This produced blocking, such that training with a compound 
stimulus (tone + light) did not produce learning of a light-juice association. Blocking was 
alleviated by pairing presentation of the US with optogenetic activation of dopamine neurons in 
the VTA (blue bar). Stimulation of dopamine neurons during the ITI did not produce this effect 
(red bar), demonstrating the temporal specificity of the learning signal. Grey bar is a control 
condition with a non-functional optogenetic vector. Adapted from 56  (C) Expectation exerts a 
subtractive influence upon dopaminergic responses to reward delivery, consistent with the 
formulation of the RPE in TD-learning. Eshel et al further demonstrated that local GABAergic 
cells appear to represent this expectation, providing subtractive inhibition to dopamine cells in 
the VTA. Adapted from 70. 
 
1.3.2 From prediction to action 
The responses that Pavlov observed in his dogs were involuntary. As we have seen, TD-learning 
provides a description of how the physiological responses associated with food– such as 
salivation – might be realigned to a predictive cue. This says nothing, however, about what the 
dog might be able to do to obtain food. Outside of the laboratory, passively waiting for the 
delivery of food is not a good strategy. The brain thus needs a mechanism for learning what to 
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do, not merely what to expect. The acquisition of behaviours that lead to rewarding stimuli and 
avoid punishing ones is referred to as instrumental conditioning.  
Thorndike conducted a series of experiments in which animals had to solve problems, such as 
finding their way out of a puzzle box, to obtain a reward 80. His work, and subsequently that of 
Skinner, established that animals were able to associate actions with their effects, thus making 
them more or less likely to repeat those actions in the future. Skinner showed that animals (such 
as his star laboratory rat, Pliny) could be coaxed to perform elaborate sequences of actions 
through repeatedly rewarding component actions, a process described as shaping 81. He further 
coined a term to describe how outcomes shaped actions: reinforcement.  
Reinforcement learning describes algorithms by which organisms can select actions to maximise 
a numerically defined reward6. They have enjoyed widespread use in neuroscience and 
computer science, where novel instantiations continue to extend the power of artificial agents to 
learn and act in novel environments 11. The TD learning algorithm discussed above provides a 
reinforcement learning algorithm for the estimation of state value, and can be easily extended to 
describe how such estimates can guide action selection. Here we discuss one such instantiation, 
Q-learning, and summarise the evidence that the brain uses reinforcement learning algorithms 
to guide action selection. 
1.3.2.1 Q-Learning 
Q-learning builds upon the principles of TD-learning to describe how an organism can learn the 
value of different actions through trial and error 82. Q-learning allows an agent to derive a policy; 
a way of acting in a set of states. It deals with a particular class of problems known as Markovian 
Decision Processes (MDP). MDPs possess the Markov property: the probability distribution over 
future states depends solely upon the current state. One doesn’t need to remember what 
actions you took in the past or which states you’ve visited. This means that an agent can 
summarize how good a state is – and how good a given action in a given state is – with a single 
number. Luckily, many situations with which an organism has to contend enjoy the Markov 
property. Clever representation of the state space can also render non-Markovian decisions 
Markovian, by explicit representation of partially observable variables, a process that depends 
upon the OFC in humans 83.   
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Q-learning gives us a way of determining our policy when we are ignorant of two key pieces of 
information: the environment’s reward structure (V) and its transition structure (P), which 
determines how we move between states. Instead, we seek to maximise rewards by estimating 
the value (Q) associated with a given action and state pair and choosing accordingly.  
Watkins and Dayan 82 showed that the agent can learn this Q-value, and thus determine the 
correct policy, by iteratively updating its estimates in a manner reminiscent of temporal 
difference learning. At each timestep (t), the agent finds itself in a state (st) and takes an action 
(at) according to its current policy. It then evaluates its best estimate of the new state’s Q-values, 
and updates the Q-values of the previous step according to the highest of the new Q-values. 
Thus at time step t: 
𝑄 𝑠H, 𝑎H ← 	𝑄 𝑠H, 𝑎H + 𝛼 𝑟HIJ + 𝛾maxY 𝑄 𝑠HIJ, 𝑎 − 𝑄 𝑠H, 𝑎H ]  
Equation 1.7 
Where as before, 𝛾 is a discount function and 𝛼 is a learning rate. Happily, following this update 
rule eventually leads us to find the optimal Q values, often referred to as Q* 82. Q-learning thus 
makes a remarkable promise: simply by following a straightforward update rule and acquiring 
enough experience, an agent can learn to perform optimally in an environment about which it 
initially knows nothing. 
Convergent evidence from humans and other animals suggest that the striatum is the most 
likely substrate of this kind of action-value learning in the brain 84. Early work established that 
lesions to the basal ganglia abolished the ability to associate stimuli with responses, analogous 
to a failure to learn Q-values 85. Subsequent recording studies in animals documented a 
representation of action-values in striatal neurons 86-88, with a parallel body of work in humans 
describing BOLD correlates of action-values in the striatum 64,89. Given the links between 
dopamine and RPEs reviewed above and the dense dopaminergic projections to the striatum 90, 
it is intuitive to equate the striatum, particularly its dorsal part 91, to an action-selection system 
which receives a dopaminergic instructive signal 92. Precisely how reinforcement-learning 
algorithms such as Q-learning are implemented in the brain remains a topic of vigorous 
research, and one too large to tackle here – for a comprehensive review, see 93 and 94.  
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1.3.2.2 Using Q-learning to understand behaviour 
In addition to explaining neural responses, Q-learning has provided a useful model for 
behaviour. By providing a mechanistic account of how animals learn, Q-learning allows us to 
understand alterations of learning in terms of the processes described in reinforcement learning 
algorithms – prediction, evaluation, and updates. Model-fitting to behaviour can be used to 
understand the impact of pharmacological manipulations 95, the impact of brain stimulation 96,97, 
and understanding learned helplessness in depression 98 .  
One further insight from the application of Q-learning in behaviour is that estimates of state-
value, such as those discussed in the section on temporal difference learning, appear to affect 
behaviour in a manner not predicted from a pure Q-learning account 99. A growing body of work 
from Guitart-Masip and colleagues asserts that there is a privileged relationship between 
positive state values and action, and negative state values and inaction 100. In support of this 
claim, human participants struggle to learn an association between reward and inaction, display 
a tendency to withdraw from aversive stimuli, and dopaminergic responses to reward in the 
striatum are potentiated by action 101,102. This can be understood through an evolutionary lens: 
situations associated with potential rewards are statistically associated with action, whereas 
avoiding threat often necessitates freezing or withdrawal. In Chapter 3 we use a task designed 
to tease out the relative roles of valence and action to understand changes in learning under 
stress. 
1.3.2.3 From model-free to model-based 
 Q-learning allows the agent to derive a policy in the absence of knowledge about the reward 
structure or the transition structure of the environment.  We referred to this form of learning as 
model-free, reflecting the idea that the agent has no concept of the relationship between 
different states – there is no internal model of the world. This blunt trial-and-error learning 
clearly provides an impoverished account of cognition. As early as the 1930s, it was argued that 
animals stored internal models of their environment, and could use these to navigate to reward 
if called upon to do so 103. Crucially, these models seemed to be acquired in the absence of 
direct reinforcement. In the language of machine learning, we describe algorithms that rely 
upon some knowledge about the structure of the world as being model-based: they require the 
organism to build some internal representation of the task, such as the transition structure P to 
 27 
which we alluded earlier. They can then use this representation to guide their reinforcement 
learning by, for instance, evaluating each state on the basis of its connections to other states 104.  
Model-based systems also confer the ability to do planning – to envisage a desired state, and 
determine how to reach it. Tasks designed to probe the relative contribution of model-free and 
model-based algorithms suggest that signatures of both are simultaneously present in the 
human brain 105,106. Further investigation has suggested that the balance between the two can 
be altered by systemic manipulations of dopamine 107 and disruption of the dorsolateral PFC 108. 
Recent work also suggests that arbitration between model-based and model-free systems is 
uncertainty-based and involves frontopolar cortex 12,109. 
The distinction between blind model-free and prospective model-based systems has also been 
established in experimental psychology. Many decades of work have delineated the difference 
between habitual and goal-directed systems 110. Although this literature developed without 
specifying algorithms by which these properties came about, the theory suggested that in one 
case the association was between a stimulus and a response (habitual, or model-free), and in the 
other between a response and an outcome (goal-directed, or model-based). The litmus test for 
the distinction between the two is reinforcer devaluation111. An animal is trained to press a lever 
in order to obtain a desirable outcome, such as a food pellet. The outcome is then devalued, 
either by pairing it with an undesirable flavour (such as quinine or saline), or through feeding to 
satiety. The diagnostic test is whether the animal continues to press the lever in order to obtain 
the outcome. If the learning is habitual – the stimulus (lever) provokes the response (press)- then 
devaluation does not alter responding, as the stimulus itself is unaltered. Conversely, goal-
directed responding should be abolished if the goal is rendered undesirable. Devaluation has 
therefore provided a simple and elegant way to probe the nature of learning underlying choice. 
Careful behavioural and lesion studies identified that the contribution of habitual responding 
tends to grow throughout training 112,113, is dependent upon lateral but not medial striatum 114, 
and is potentiated by dopaminergic drugs 115. Conversely, goal-directed learning in rodents 
depends upon the integrity of the OFC and dorsomedial striatum 116-118. Importantly, 
interindividual variability in the propensity to acquire habits, as assessed via devaluation, 
correlates closely with estimates of model-based behaviour 119, supporting the assumption that 
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these two schemas describe the same distinction. In this thesis we will encounter decisions 
thought to be underpinned by values from a model-free system in which the value of actions is 
learned over many trials (Chapter 3), and a model-based system, in which information about 
quantity and quality are flexibly combined (Chapter 5). 
1.3.2.4 How far can we go with RL? 
The beauty of reinforcement learning methods is that they reduce a daunting problem to one in 
which the aim is typically to track a single value via simple update terms. This is both intuitively 
appealing and computationally feasible. However, starting from a position of informational 
efficiency, this is a wasteful approach 120. A strong line of argument from probability theory 
suggests that the brain would be better off representing beliefs as probability distributions, 
rather than single values 121. 
To illustrate why this might be a useful feature, consider a coin flip. Imagine that we have bet on 
a heads, such that Vheads=1 and Vtails=0.  We happen to know that the probability of a heads is 0.5 
– in this case we have a model of the world that allows us to precisely infer the probabilistic 
structure. We might equally have learned this via model-free RL-learning, such that VpreFlip=0.5. 
Upon the resolution of this coin flip, we experience an RPE: either positive (+0.5, if heads) or 
negative (-0.5, if tails). Thus even in situations where there is nothing left to learn, we experience 
prediction errors. As one might predict from the discussion above, tasks analogous to coin-flips 
elicit robust activation in regions of the brain rich in dopaminergic innervation when the 
outcome is revealed 65,122,123 67.  
In RL-models, therefore, we have no explicit representation of uncertainty. Each time the coin 
flip is revealed we receive a prediction error, but our representation of VpreFlip is identical to that 
of a situation in which we receive a reward of 0.5 every time! Assuming that we start with the 
assumption that the coin is unbiased – that is, our initial VpreFlip=0.5 – this also implies that after a 
1000 coin flips, we have learned precisely nothing. We are now very sure that the coin is 
unbiased, but RL does not give us the ability to represent this confidence. 
 From a neurophysiological perspective, this seems wasteful: the brain is being bathed in 
dopamine, promoting plasticity, even in situations in which there is nothing left to learn 124. 
Although suggestions have been made as to how RL models might be modified to account for 
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this 125, the general consensus is that this is a limitation of this class of models 126. To incorporate 
an explicit representation of uncertainty, we must turn to another tool: that of Bayesian 
statistics. 
1.3.3 Summary and relevance 
Animals use algorithms based upon surprise to learn the association between stimuli, actions, 
and rewards.  The Rescorla-Wagner model provides a trial-by-trial account of how stimuli come 
to be associated with rewards, whilst temporal-difference learning extends this process to find 
the earliest possible predictor of reward. Reinforcement learning algorithms, such as Q-learning, 
describe how organisms can learn to select actions to obtain rewards. Learning systems can be 
supplemented by models of the environment, permitting flexible behaviour and planning. 
However, RL models don’t permit a representation of uncertainty, which appears a substantial 
shortcoming. 
In Chapter 2 I present a prediction-error model for fluctuations in subjective happiness, and 
describe its ability to predict choices about how much money to donate to other players. In 
Chapter 3 I use a variant of Q-learning to describe learning following acute stress, detailing 
action-specific deficits in learning.  
1.4 Uncertainty in the environment, decision-making, and the brain 
It is worth pausing to underline that the type of decisions with which we are concerned here are 
those conducted under conditions of uncertainty. This encompasses the vast majority of 
(interesting) choices that an agent makes. To appreciate the pervasiveness of uncertainty, we 
can turn to the small subset of situations in which the link between sensory information and 
appropriate action is of such high fidelity that we can think of it as being uncertainty-free. The 
actions we produce in such situations are called reflexes, and they are unusual in a variety of 
ways. Firstly, there is one to one mapping between the input (such as activation of stretch 
receptors in the patella) and the output (contraction of the quadriceps and straightening of the 
leg). Secondly, they are fantastically stable over time, to the extent where they are genetically 
encoded rather than learned. The relationship between input and output is so reliable that 
evolution has baked it into the nervous system. Finally, and as a result of their simplicity, their 
execution is achieved entirely without the use of the brain at all, instead relying upon the spinal 
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cord. This might suggest that the elaborate machinery of the brain is largely dedicated to dealing 
with the (vastly preponderant) other situations, in which uncertainty abounds.  
1.4.1 Bayesian inference 
Although the brain has to deal with copious uncertainty, it usually has several sources of 
evidence on which to draw. For instance, speech comprehension doesn’t just rely upon auditory 
information; we draw upon visual information about the movement of the lips and tongue and a 
rich body of contextual cues suggesting the likely intentions of the speaker, not to mention 
extensive knowledge of the structure and semantics of language. Bayesian inference tells us that 
the statistically optimal approach when faced with multiple sources of noisy information is to 
integrate them with a weight inversely proportional to their uncertainty. This requires us to 
represent not only a point-estimate of our belief, but a probability distribution (O’Reilly et al., 
2012). As we shall see in subsequent sections, there are a variety of suggestions as to how the 
nervous system might achieve this 127. 
 
Figure 1.4 | Integrating multiple sources of evidence In Ernst & Banks (2002), individuals 
estimated the height of a bar according to noisy visual and haptic information. Integrating 
sources of evidence according to their uncertainty, here represented as the width of a 
probability density function (σ2), produces a combined estimate with a lower variance than 
either of its constituents (σ2combined < σ2visual <σ2haptic). A model implementing Bayesian integration 
of this kind was shown to be a good predictor of individuals’ performance on the task. Adapted 
from 128.  
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 A Probability Density Function (PDF) describes the probability that a given variable will take on a 
certain value. Assuming for a moment that our probability distributions are Gaussian, the mean 
of the PDF is our best guess – the most probable value of the variable. The width, or variance (σ2) 
of the distribution corresponds to the uncertainty associated with the representation of that 
variable (Figure 1.4). The combination of multiple sources of information produces a PDF in 
which the variance is smaller than that of either of the inputs (Figure 1.4), according to the 
equation: 
𝜎H\HY]	^ = 𝜎J	^𝜎^	^𝜎J	^+𝜎^	^	 
Equation 1.8 
Where 𝜎E	^ is the variance associated with the probability distribution X. This gives us a way of 
combining sources of evidence so as to arrive at the most accurate conclusions possible. 
Whereas accounts of reward-learning have been dominated by approaches derived from 
reinforcement learning, Bayesian algorithms have been more popular in the field of 
sensorimotor control. There is convincing evidence that humans combine sources of 
information in this way, when estimating the height of a bar from noisy visual and haptic 
information 128  (Figure 1.4), the position of a noise source using visual and auditory cues 129,  
and in guiding movements 130. This uncertainty-weighting of multiple information sources even 
seems to be applied when groups of individuals make decisions about a commonly observed 
perceptual event 131. This suggests that accounts of reward-guided decision-making which omit a 
representation of uncertainty might be overly simplistic. 
1.4.2 Bayesian learning  
Bayesian inference is not merely useful for combining multiple sources of current sensory input. 
It also gives us a way to optimally incorporate our evidence with prior beliefs, formed as the 
result of learning. This is clear from the formulation of Bayes’ theorem: 𝑝 𝐴 𝐵 ∝ 𝑝 𝐵 𝐴 𝑝(𝐴) 
posterior  ∝ likelihood x prior 
Equation 1.9 
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Or, to borrow a popular tennis example 132: 𝑝 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑎𝑡	𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑓	𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑎𝑡	𝑥 ∝ 𝑝 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑓	𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑎𝑡	𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑎𝑡	𝑥 𝑝(𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑎𝑡	𝑥) 
Our attempts at ball-localization are improved by taking into account not only the likelihood p perception	of	ball	at	x ball	at	x , which tells us how good our sensory evidence is, but also the 
prior distribution p(ball at x), which describes the typical distribution of tennis shots. The 
importance of having good priors is best illustrated in the return of serve. A returner has about 
350ms to position their racket before an Ivo Karlovic serve becomes an Ivo Karlovic ace. In such 
extreme circumstances, high-quality prior information is an important determinant of success. 
The process of incorporating priors and likelihoods to form a posterior is illustrated in Figure 1.5. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 | Combining priors and likelihoods in space A Bayesian tennis player trying to 
predict the likely landing location of an opponent’s shot can combine the observed trajectory 
with the prior distribution of shot placement. Adapted from 132. 
 
Priors are established by learning; they are the result of experience. Bayes’ theorem gives us an 
intuitive way to update our beliefs as a function of new evidence (the likelihood) and our existing 
beliefs (priors). Just as in sensory integration (see Figure 1.4), the two sources of information are 
represented probabilistically, and combined according the uncertainty associated with each. This 
is the mathematical equivalent of the truism ‘extraordinary claims require extraordinary 
evidence’. Outlandish evidence that conflicts with our existing beliefs must be of very high 
quality in order to substantially influence our opinion.  
Kording and Wolpert 130provided persuasive evidence of this process in a sensorimotor learning 
task in which participants had to move their finger to a target. They were unable to see their 
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finger, but received visual feedback documenting its trajectory. Feedback was laterally displaced 
on each trial by an amount drawn from a Gaussian distribution, and the quality of feedback 
provided varied from low to high quality. Kording and Wolpert showed that people learned the 
prior distribution of possible displacements, and adjusted their reaches according to a 
combination of the prior and the feedback they received during the movement, weighted by the 
uncertainty associated with the latter.   
1.4.3 Bayesian learning in volatile environments 
The reliability of a prior belief may change over time at different rates. In dynamic environments, 
old beliefs should be rapidly overwhelmed by new evidence. In very stable ones, old information 
is still valuable. For instance, if you last followed football 10 years ago, your beliefs about which 
teams are good ought to be pliable in the face of this weekend’s results. However, if you last 
lived in London 10 years ago, you can be reasonably confident that your predictions about the 
weather are likely to remain reasonably accurate. This is because of the difference in the 
volatility of the two scenarios: football is far more volatile than climate, meaning that the 
relationship between outcomes and their predictors is more likely to shift over time. A Bayesian 
learner is able to accommodate this by representing their beliefs as a probability distribution, 
with higher uncertainty reflected by a broader distribution over possible values. Behrens et al 47 
showed that humans are able to track the volatility of an environment, allowing them to learn 
quickly in volatile situations, rapidly overwriting old beliefs, but relying upon longer reward 
histories when the environment was more stable. To frame their approach in the syntax of RL, 
they found that the learning rate – 𝛼 in equation 1.8 - varied systematically with the volatility of 
the underlying statistical process, precisely as we would expect from a Bayesian learner. Indeed, 
comparing the ability of different models to account for participant behaviour demonstrated 
that an optimal Bayesian learner comprehensively outperformed an RL model, despite the latter 
being tuned to fit the data via free parameters. This Bayesian approach to learning has inspired 
several subsequent models, such as the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter 133 to which we will return in 
due course. 
1.4.4 Delineating different forms of uncertainty 
There have been several attempts to parse uncertainty into distinct forms124,134. The most 
intuitive distinction is between uncertainty that results from genuine unpredictability in the 
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environment and uncertainty that can be reduced by learning. The former is irreducible 
uncertainty: the organism cannot hope to reduce it by further learning. This is also commonly 
referred to as risk in psychology and behavioural economics. The unpredictability of a coin toss 
is a good example of irreducible uncertainty; you can study coin tosses for as long as you please, 
but your predictive accuracy is unlikely to depart from 50%*. Conversely, situations in which 
outcomes are governed by a rule that can be learned create estimation uncertainty, which is 
diminished by learning. This is a measure of ignorance about the predictive relationships in the 
environment. To return to the tennis example, learning that your opponent favours shots to 
your backhand reduces uncertainty about where the ball will land, via a reduction in estimation 
uncertainty. But what if your opponent realizes that you’ve noticed this predictability, and shifts 
his shot placement to favour your forehand? Such instability will necessitate relearning.  This is 
an example of the volatility referred to earlier. Some have suggested that this injection of 
uncertainty is best described as unexpected uncertainty, in contrast with those forms of 
uncertainty which remain relatively stable over time 124. An alternative is to regard volatility as 
merely another layer of probabilistic relationships, which instead of affecting behaviour directly, 
determine the likelihood that behaviour will change 1331. From this perspective, we can invoke a 
third kind of uncertainty, which is the uncertainty over the volatility in the environment; volatility 
uncertainty. In fact this is a form of estimation uncertainty, the only difference being that the 
value being estimated is not the probability itself, but its instability. 
These multiple forms of uncertainty rarely exist in isolation. One of the key challenges faced by a 
learner in a dynamic environment is the simultaneous estimation of each kind of uncertainty, 
the balance between which is crucial in assimilating experiences to guide future decisions. It is 
easy to acknowledge that things are unpredictable: deciding whether that is due to genuine 
stochasticity (irreducible uncertainty), lack of learning (estimation uncertainty), or because things 
are rapidly changing (volatility uncertainty) constitutes a major challenge.  One successful 
theoretical approach is to organize the different quantities to be tracked in a hierarchy, with 
                                                        
* The astute (pedantic) reader might point out that, from the perspective of Newtonian mechanics, the coin 
is in fact predictable. Here we use irreducible uncertainty to describe information that is permanently 
inaccessible to the agent; this uncertainty is, to all intents and purposes, irreducible. 
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estimates at each level associated with their relative uncertainties 133. The uncertainty 
representations in this model, the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter, naturally recapitulate the notions 
of irreducible, estimation, and volatility uncertainty described above.  
1.4.5 The Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) 
The HGF is, like the Rescorla-Wagner, a predictive model. In the version we consider, the aim is 
to predict a binary outcome (u) on the basis of being in a particular state. Practically, we will 
consider the case where there are two states (such as hearing one of two tones), and we are 
trying to predict which outcome (such as a picture of a house or a face) is likely to follow, given a 
fluctuating relationship between states and outcomes. 
  Unlike the RW-model, the HGF poses the learning problem as a problem of function 
approximation, and endows the learner with some beliefs about the likely forms of the 
approximated function. The name of the model comes from the form of these functions: they 
are a series of hierarchically arranged Gaussians, with the learning rate of Gaussians lower in 
the hierarchy determined by the value of Gaussians higher in the hierarchy. Here we sketch out 
the structure of the model and its previous implementations: for an account of its 
implementation and interpretations of each parameter, see Chapter 4. 
In the instantiation we consider, the model consists of three levels, each corresponding to a 
probability distribution (Figure 1.6A). The top two are Gaussians, whilst the bottom level is a 
binary prediction, derived from a sigmoid transformation of the second level. The ultimate aim 
of the learner is to estimate the sufficient statistics of these distributions, namely their means 
and variance (Figure 1.6B). This is achieved via a variational approximation, resulting in an 
update scheme for each level that bears a striking resemblance to the prediction error updating 
seen in RL. Importantly, the learning rate on these updates is allowed to vary as a function of 
uncertainty, leveraging the key advantage of Bayesian models over their RL counterparts (1.6C). 
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Figure 1.6 | The Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (A) Left: The generative model hypothesized to 
underlie observations (u). The hidden layers X2-3 are Gaussians, whilst X1 is a Bernoulli 
distribution defined by the value of X2. In the generative model, an observation results from X1 
on each trial. (B) Sufficient statistics parameterising each layer. The agent tracks the means (𝝁) 
and variances (𝝈) associated with the distributions in each layer. This is achieved by updates via 
prediction errors. (C) Update terms illustrating how upwards-propagating prediction errors allow 
learning at each level. Note that the learning rate at each layer is a function of uncertainty about 
the current value of the distribution (𝝈).	Adapted from 133. 
 
In order to appreciate how the HGF incorporates uncertainty into the update equations, let us 
examine in detail how updates are performed. On each timestep, the model produces a 
prediction at each level, distinguished by the presence of a circumflex (^).  This produces the 
predicted outcome on that trial: 
𝜇J(u) = 𝑠(𝜇 u^OJ ) 
Equation 1.10 
Where 𝑘 is the current trial and 𝑠 is the sigmoid transform. It is at this point that the 
uncertainties at each layer incorporate the value of the layer above: 
𝜎J(u) = 𝜇JuOJ (1 − 𝜇JuOJ ) 
Equation 1.11 
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𝜎(^u) = 𝜎(^uOJ) + 𝑒wxyz{| I} 
Equation 1.12 𝜎~(u) = 𝜎~(uOJ) + 𝜗 
Equation 1.13 
Where 𝜅, 𝜔 and 𝜗 are all subject-specific parameters.	𝜅 determines the degree of linkage 
between second and third layers. 	𝜔 is a constant contribution to the learning rate at the second 
level. 𝜗 is a fixed estimate for a meta-volatility parameter, capturing beliefs about how 
frequently volatility changes occur. As we shall see, 𝜗 is affected by chronic stress (Chapter 4).  
We are now in a position to appreciate how the HGF relates to the RL models we encountered 
earlier. The second level of the model represents the probability distribution governing the state 
à outcome relationship. The mean of this distribution (𝜇^) reflects the current estimate of that 
relationship, and is thus analogous to the expectation term in an RL model. However, whilst the 
learning rate in RL models is fixed, the learning rate of the HGF is malleable, as in the model of 
Behrens et al 47. Recall from Figure 1.6C that updates occur according to the equation: 
 𝜇(^u) = 𝜇 u^OJ + 𝜎^u (𝜇Ju − 𝑠(𝜇 u^OJ )) 
Equation 1.14 
Where 𝜇Ju − 𝑠(𝜇 u^OJ ) is the difference between the outcome and the prediction (i.e. the 
prediction error ) and  𝜎^u  is the learning rate, which is itself updated as: 
𝜎(^u) = 𝜎(^uOJ) + 𝑒wxyz{| I} + 1/𝜎J(u) 
Equation 1.15 
The current learning rate thus reflects the uncertainty in our existing estimate 𝜎(^uOJ), the 
volatility of the environment (𝑒wxyz{| I}), and the expected size of the prediction error from the 
lower level 1/𝜎J(u), such that prediction errors are downweighted if we expect them to be large 
125. This means that we learn more from a large prediction error which is unlikely given our 
current beliefs, whilst learning dwindles in scenarios in which the irreducible uncertainty is 
assessed to be high, such as the coin flip discussed earlier. 
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The HGF has been successfully applied in both statistical 135 and social 136 learning tasks. In 
Chapter 4 we will use the HGF to model learning in an aversive learning task. We will then test 
the impact of different forms of uncertainty, as estimated in the HGF, upon the evolution of 
stress responses. 
1.4.6 Representing uncertainty in the brain 
Although the behavioural evidence reviewed in section 1.4.1 strongly suggests that organisms 
use Bayesian-esque algorithms in learning and decision-making 137, the details of how the brain 
represents probability distributions are still unknown 127. We can broadly classify models of 
probabilistic representations into two kinds: summary statistic or population coding accounts 138 
(Figure 1.7). 
Work in the neuroeconomic tradition has documented numerous correlates of the summary 
statistics of distributions. The central idea is that most probability distributions have a known 
form – such as Gaussian, or Poisson – and can be parameterized by their sufficient statistics. By 
representing these summary statistics directly, we avoid the costly process of representing the 
full probability distribution. Most work has focused on the representation of the first two 
moments of reward distributions: the mean and the variance. Both MRI and single-neuron 
studies have provided evidence that risk is explicitly represented in frontal and parietal cortices 
during choice 139-145, in concert with coding in the basal forebrain 146-148. However, 
disambiguating signals relating to utility from those relating to risk has proved problematic, as 
risk itself affects utility (see section 1.2.1) 149,150. For instance, McCoy & Platt 142 report that 
neurons in the posterior cingulate are sensitive to risk. However, in their experiment value was 
held constant and monkeys systematically preferred the risky option. It is thus unclear whether 
neurons reflected the characteristics of the reward distributions or the subjective preferences of 
the animals, since both risk and preference were higher for the risky options. 
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Figure 1.7 | Theoretical and experimental work on uncertainty coding (A) Representation of 
reward uncertainty (risk) in single neurons. Single-neuron studies frequently identify single 
neurons whose activity linearly encodes uncertainty (left panel). These neurons are usually 
distinct from those encoding reward itself (right panel). Adapted from 139 (B) Human 
neuroimaging studies also report correlates of risk in structures involved in choice. Here activity 
in the ventral striatum, midbrain, and mediodorsal thalamus is plotted as a function of reward 
probability; recall that uncertainty is highest when p=0.5. Adapted from 140. (C) Probabilistic 
population codes. Ma and colleagues163 proposed a model in which populations of neurons 
represent probability distributions over some variable of interest. Each neuron has a Gaussian 
tuning curve, and neurons are arranged by their preferred stimulus i.e. the Gaussian’s mean. 
The gain of population response (g) represents the inverse of uncertainty, such that higher gain 
is decoded as slimmer posterior probability distributions (top row). Changing the gain of the 
population response corresponds to changing the variance on the resulting probability 
distribution (bottom row). Adapted from 163. (D) Bayesian inference with probabilistic population 
codes. Here two population codes (top and bottom) are combined by simple linear summation. 
The resultant code (right) has a gain which is the sum of the two component codes, leading to a 
posterior distribution with the appropriate width, as calculated using Bayes rule. Summing 
population codes thus performs optimal Bayesian inference. Adapted from163.  
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Single-neuron studies that identify separate populations of cells sensitive to value and risk in the 
OFC 139, and those that attempt to dissociate uncertainty signals from expected value 144, provide 
the strongest evidence for discrete summary statistic coding. However, subsequent work has 
called into question whether neurons in the OFC truly represent uncertainty, as opposed to 
salience. Ogawa et al 151 found that the vast majority of uncertainty-sensitive neurons also 
displayed differential responses to cues predicting the deterministic presence or absence of 
reward. They interpreted this in light of attentional models of learning 152 suggesting that such 
neurons are instead sensitive to salience, which is higher for both unpredictable and valuable 
stimuli 153.  
Neuromodulatory representations of uncertainty have also been widely posited 124,154, although 
there is something of a ravine between the popularity of these ideas and their empirical support. 
Indirect evidence from measures of pupil diameter suggest a representation of uncertainty in 
the noradrenergic system 155-157, although direct confirmation is lacking. It also seems 
reasonable to suppose that diffuse modulatory systems are better suited to broadcasting the 
result of some computation, such as the estimated uncertainty, rather than being intimately 
involved in that computation per se 158. Such neuromodulatory signals have also been posited 
on the basis of spiking neural network models of Bayesian learning 159.* 
A second account emphasises how populations, rather than single neurons, might represent 
probability distributions as opposed to point estimates 162. In the most influential of such 
models, Ma et al 163 forged a link between the kind of variability observed in neurons, Poisson 
noise, and the representation of uncertainty. The key insight is that since neurons are noisy – 
they respond to the same stimulus with differing firing rates- we can quantify the response (r) to 
a stimulus (s) as a probability distribution: p(r|s). We know from Bayes theorem that this can be 
massaged into an estimate of the probability distribution for the stimulus, given a response: 𝑝 𝑠 𝑟 	∝ 	𝑝 𝑟 𝑠 𝑝(𝑠) 
                                                        
* Some deep learning models adopt a summary statistics scheme – encoding the mean and variance of a 
Gaussian or a Bernoulli distribution – but do so using a representation distributed over many neurons 
160,161. To my knowledge, this idea is yet to receive attention in accounts of probabilistic representation in 
the brain.  
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Equation 1.16 
The Poisson distribution is defined as:  
𝑝 𝑘	𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 	 𝜆u𝑒O𝑘!  
Equation 1.17 
Where λ is the average number of events per interval, often referred to as the rate parameter. 
This can be thought of as the average firing rate evoked by a given stimulus, fi(s). Substituting in 
number of spikes (ri) for k and firing rate (fi(s)) for λ, we arrive at a precise specification of the 
term p(r|s): 
𝑝 𝑟 𝑠 = 	 𝑒O  𝑓N 𝑠 𝑟N!N  
Equation 1.18 
Omitting a normalization term for clarity, we now have a full description of the posterior 
distribution, p(s|r): 
𝑝 𝑠 𝑟 = 	 𝑒O  𝑓N 𝑠 𝑟N!N 𝑝(𝑠) 
Equation 1.19 
Which defines a population code that recovers Gaussian distributions for p(s|r), with the peak 
aligned to the most probable stimulus value and variance inversely proportional to the gain of 
the constituent responses. These codes have the pleasing property that their linear addition 
constitutes optimal Bayesian inference, producing posterior codes that reflect the contributions 
of their constituents to a degree inversely proportional to their uncertainty. However, this code 
can only use gain to communicate uncertainty if neurons are gain invariant – meaning that their 
tuning curves do not change form if the gain of the response changes 163. If the average 
population response varies over the range of stimulus values then the mechanism breaks down, 
because changes in stimulus value become indistinguishable from changes in stimulus 
uncertainty. This suggests that linear codes, such as those typically associated with value coding 
40, are unable to support probabilistic population coding as envisaged by Ma and others 127. In 
accordance with this observation, evidence for probabilistic population coding is strongest for 
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motion coding in MT 164 and representation of orientation in V1 165, both of which are known to 
rely upon Gaussian tuning.  
A second flavour of population coding suggests that variability in population activity over time 
represents uncertainty 137. At any timestep, the population encodes a point estimate of the 
value, but temporal variability in firing rates encodes uncertainty. On a single neuron level, this is 
achieved if neurons are drawing samples of their firing rate from the posterior distribution they 
seek to represent 137. This version of population coding is therefore known as the sampling 
account. It is clearly distinct from the summary statistic and probabilistic population coding 
discussed above, because it requires information about uncertainty to be represented by 
patterns over time, rather than providing an instantaneous readout by patterns of information 
over space (separate neurons). This has made it considerably more challenging to test, 
particularly in humans. Indirect evidence for sampling come from activity in the ferret visual 
cortex 166, in which the spontaneous distribution of activity over neurons comes to resemble the 
stimulus-evoked activity over neurons, which the authors suggest reflects the learning of a prior 
over stimulus distributions. Other groups have argued, however, that such patterns emerge as a 
consequence of global population dynamics, rather than reflecting the specific structure of 
activity over neurons 167. Recent work has further developed the model in terms of visual cortex, 
providing predictions of the mean and variance of firing rates that accord well with data in V1 168. 
However, such accounts depend upon the fast dynamics – and thus low autocorrelations – of 
neurons in primary sensory areas 168, suggesting that they are inappropriate for the description 
of activity in the brain areas in which we are primarily interested, such as the prefrontal cortex, 
which display much slower dynamics 169 that have clear relationships to their role in cognitive 
processes 170. 
1.4.7 Summary and relevance 
Uncertainty is an inescapable feature of an agent’s interaction with its environment, affecting 
perception, decision, and action. Bayesian statistics provides an elegant way to deal with 
uncertainty, and humans appear to rely upon Bayesian inference for sensorimotor learning and 
decision-making, combining information according to its uncertainty. Recent models have 
extended this idea to value learning, showing how the volatility in a value source can alter the 
speed at which people perform action-value learning. This has led to hierarchical models of 
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learning, such as the HGF, in which multiple forms of uncertainty – such as uncertainty 
stemming from risk, ignorance, and volatility- are separately represented and updated in a 
prediction-error framework. In Chapter 4 we use the HGF to explain fluctuations in physiological 
and subjective stress responses during aversive learning.  
Summary statistic approaches have dominated our understanding of the representation of 
probability distributions over value. However, evidence for such representations is not without 
issue, with uncertainty frequently confounded by expected value and salience. Furthermore, 
summary statistic approaches yield little understanding as to how the brain might perform 
uncertainty-modulated value learning, or incorporate uncertainty estimates into choice. 
Conversely, probabilistic population codes provide a more mechanistic account of computation 
under uncertainty, but have received little attention in value-based decision making. Existing 
knowledge about neural coding of value suggests linear coding schemes that are incompatible 
with probabilistic coding schemes, which have provided compelling characterizations of 
uncertain sensory processing. However, absence of evidence for non-linear codes is not 
evidence of absence; as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, careful dissection of value signals with 
methods sensitive to non-linearity suggest that value representations in the ACC and OFC might 
in fact be compatible with probabilistic population coding.   
1.5 Emotions: causes and consequences 
Much of the research discussed so far draws upon ideas from economics and machine learning, 
prescribing ways in which people ought to learn and behave according to normative accounts. 
An additional feature of animal decision-making is that it is sensitive to *, and produces 
fluctuations, in emotion 172.  
Although early debate raged about the relative contributions of psychological and physiological 
factors to emotion 173-175, contemporary efforts have focused upon the characterization of 
emotion’s causes and effects. In particular, the contribution of cognitive science has been to 
describe emotion as a consequence of other cognitive processes, such as the recognition of 
                                                        
* Indeed, normative methods such as reinforcement learning provide a better fit to behaviour when 
estimates of emotional responses are incorporated 171 
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threat or the receipt of reward 176.  It is this scheme which we adopt in this thesis, setting aside 
the various definitional issues that still plague the field, such as whether emotions are neatly 
divisible into a series of unique states, as argued by William James and later Paul Ekman 177, or 
whether emotional state is better described as a point in a continuous space defined by the axes 
of valence and arousal 178. We first sketch out an influential theory describing why emotions are 
best thought of as feedback mechanisms, and discuss evidence that emotions are linked to the 
internal variables we have posited in our discussion of learning and decision-making. We then 
review the evidence that emotion can affect learning, and see that one way in which this occurs 
is through shifting the balance between different learning systems. 
1.5.1 Emotion as feedback 
Baumeister and colleagues 179 reviewed evidence that consciously experienced emotions chiefly 
function to modify future behaviour as a consequence of experience. Although early thinking in 
the field suggested that emotions triggered behaviour directly, Baumeister and colleagues argue 
that the florid emotional experiences with which we are consciously familiar occur too slowly to 
be a useful cause of anything. Relying upon the sensation of fear to initiate escape from a bear 
would be a sluggish strategy. Furthermore, the argument deployed against James’ original 
theory – that the range of emotional states is too broad to be conveyed by a limited 
physiological repertoire- can be employed in reverse here, noting that the range of emotional 
states is not wide enough to provide a useful specification of action. Conversely, emotions 
develop on a timescale more suited to the modification of future behaviour by recent 
experiences. They might do this by biasing learning processes, such as improving the 
consolidation of recently formed memories 180,181, or by providing explicit memories of 
subjective states (e.g. guilt) that people then seek to pursue or avoid.  
Evidence from the latter comes from ingenious ‘mood-freezing’ experiments, in which 
participants take a sugar-pill which they are informed will render them impervious to mood 
changes for the next few hours. This reveals behaviour that is prospectively geared to elicit 
mood-changes, such as helping behaviour that seeks to alleviate sadness 182. Phrased in the 
language of previous sections, we can see that some of the effects of emotion act via model-free 
mechanisms (implicit alterations to reinforcement learning processes), and others through 
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model-based mechanisms (explicit simulation of future emotional state) *.   The latter has 
received a good deal of attention under the banner of ‘hedonic forecasting’, the study of how 
people anticipate their future emotional state 183. Such ‘premotion’ is vulnerable to systematic 
biases, many of them paralleling those observed in everyday decision-making, such as a bias 
towards salient events 184.  
In Chapter 2 we will see how participants faced with a novel social decision act in a way that 
reflects their emotional preferences, as inferred from a separate task. Although the mechanistic 
link between these two processes remains to be elucidated, this demonstrates that inter-
individual differences in preferences are linked to inter-individual differences in emotional 
processing. Importantly, previous attempts to explain such social decisions without recourse to 
emotion have failed 185, suggesting that understanding individual emotional profiles is key to 
understanding social decision-making.  Conversely, in Chapter 3 we will document an effect of 
stress upon reinforcement learning, illustrating a model-free way in which emotion can impact 
behaviour.  
1.5.2 Models of emotion 
Having acknowledged that emotions influence both ongoing learning and future behaviour, we 
arrive at an important follow-up question: how is current emotional state determined? Although 
it seems obvious that fear is an appropriate reaction when confronted by a bear, what 
mechanisms specify how I feel when I open my bank statement, or read the news, or go to the 
pub? Carver and Scheier proposed that emotions gave a continuous readout of the state of the 
sort of goal-attainment processes we encountered in earlier sections 186. Rapid progress towards 
a goal is reflected by positive emotions, whilst progress that is slower than expected produces 
negative emotions 187. Oatley and Johnson-Laird expressed a similar idea, framed in terms of the 
likelihood of attaining a goal.  Increases in this likelihood lead to positive, and decreases to 
negative, emotions 188. In fact, the idea that emotion might reflect the status of an internal 
                                                        
* This is isomorphic to devaluation procedures discussed in the context of model-based control. In both 
cases, the outcome is rendered unattractive, and the experimenter asks whether behaviour putatively 
motivated by the outcome persists. 
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learning system can be traced back to Masanao Toda’s eccentric thought experiments 
concerning the design of a fungus-eater on the planet Taros 189. 
 It is clear that this early work 186,188,189 described the generation of emotions in the same 
language that we have already encountered, that of goals, expectations, and error signals. 
However, without the organising framework of reinforcement learning, quantitative specification 
of these terms, including the question of how an organism’s goals are defined, was lacking. RL 
provides a computational framework in which such ideas can be cleanly formalised: goals are 
specified by the value function, and positive and negative prediction errors reflected 
circumstances that are better or worse than expected. Rutledge et al 122 produced the first 
quantitative model of subjective well-being, demonstrating that positive and negative prediction 
errors in a gambling task produced reliable increases and decreases in positive affect in both the 
lab and in smartphone-based experiments. Neuroimaging confirmed that prediction error 
signals in the striatum were predictive of changes in subjective well-being. Insula activity at the 
time of measurement correlated with current well-being, echoing the well-established role of the 
insula in interoceptive and emotional processing 190,191.  
Learning models therefore allow us to quantify hidden variables thought to be important for 
value-learning, and test their putative relationship to emotion. They also allow more detailed 
theorizing on the function of emotion, by asking what computational role they might serve in the 
learning processes from which they result. By characterizing the features of emotional 
processes, we can ask how they relate to the statistics of the environment. For instance, one 
characteristic of emotions is that they tend to change relatively slowly. The influence of past 
events upon subjective well-being decays exponentially, reflecting prediction errors over the last 
4-5 trials 122. This suggests that emotions might be integrating information over a longer 
timescale than envisaged by RL-type models.  
1.5.3 Function of emotion 
Eldar and colleagues proposed that fluctuations in emotion, or mood, provided a ‘momentum’ 
signal. They link the observations above – that mood changes relate to positive or negative 
prediction errors -   with the finding that mood tends to bias assessment of value, with positive 
mood associated with overvaluation and negative mood with undervaluation 192-194. They 
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suggest that this bias reflects the structure of real environments, in which changes in reward 
value are typically correlated. For instance, changes in rainfall produce correlated increases in 
the fruit-yield of trees. Thus, experiencing positive prediction errors at one fruit tree ought to 
inflate our value estimates of nearby fruit trees. Mood provides a possible mechanism whereby 
this might be achieved: because positive prediction errors create positive mood, which in turn 
leads to increased value estimates of other trees, we can generalize our learning about one tree 
to all others. In effect this gives us a way to learn about latent causes, such that changes in 
specific exemplars are correctly attributed to changes in their underlying causes, permitting 
updates to other variables dependent upon the same latent cause 195. Whether mood provides 
additional inferential power above and beyond good generalization of this kind is unclear.  
A more persuasive argument also made by Eldar et al is for generalization in the temporal 
domain. If changes in value have some underlying trajectory, biasing future prediction of reward 
in terms of past prediction errors will produce faster learning. By essentially adding a term 
describing past prediction errors into the current update, we take into account the fact that 
changes in value over time typically exhibit autocorrelation: things that are getting better tend to 
keep getting better. Interestingly, autocorrelation of value between adjacent states has proved a 
headache in neural network models of Q-learning 11, prompting elaborate architecture to 
overcome the instability that results.  
Further consideration of learning in neural networks also suggests a further possibility not 
discussed by Eldar et al. Modern techniques for training networks using back-propagation 196 
increasingly rely upon a measure of momentum, which incorporates gradients on the previous 
timestep into the current update 197. Although space precludes a detailed discussion of the 
benefits of this approach here, suffice to say that is has proved a major accelerant in the training 
of deep neural networks. The intuition is that noise in individual updates can be overcome by 
essentially averaging adjacent update terms, to discern the ‘true’ gradient by which network 
weights can be optimized (see http://www.willamette.edu/~gorr/classes/cs449/momrate.html). 
This suggests a possible role for mood in smoothing out rapid fluctuations in prediction error to 
provide a more robust estimate of environmental trajectory (whether circumstances are getting 
better or worse). 
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Current models thus use parameterizations from computational models derived from 
reinforcement learning to describe how emotion is evoked by and might shape learning 
processes. In doing so, they have the potential to explain the function of emotion, which remains 
difficult to pin down. In Chapter 2 we expand upon this approach, using RL-type models to link 
emotional and decisional processes, whilst in Chapter 3 we turn to Bayesian models to 
understanding emotional and learning dynamics under uncertainty. 
1.5.4 Emotional events can affect the balance between learning systems 
As reviewed earlier, model-based and model-free control of behaviour appear to be subserved 
by largely distinct neural circuits 93, which operate simultaneously in the human brain 12,106,109,198. 
One prominent line of research is into factors which can shift the balance between these two 
systems, which seems to be affected by psychiatric conditions such as addiction 110 and 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 199. Accumulating evidence over the past decade suggests 
that acutely stressful events can temporarily shift the balance between model-based and model-
free systems. 
 A series of studies from Schwabe have provided compelling evidence that exposure to a single 
stressful event – immersion of the hand in very cold water, referred to as the Cold Pressor Test 
(CPT) – produces a shift towards habitual learning 200, as assessed by an increased resistance to 
devaluation procedures. This effect is dependent upon both glucocorticoid and noradrenergic 
activity and involves reduced recruitment of goal-directed structures such as the medial PFC 201. 
A similar recent study using the model-based / model-free framework reached similar 
conclusions, additionally noting that the impact of stress appeared to be attenuated with 
increasing working memory capacity 202. This chimes with evidence in rodents, in which 
prolonged stress leads to synaptic remodelling consistent with reduced function of circuits 
associated with control and increased activity in model-free systems 203. 
As reviewed earlier, Pavlovian learning promotes approach to rewarding stimuli and avoidance 
of punishing stimuli regardless of instrumental contingency 102,204, resulting in an interaction 
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between valence and action in learning 99. Thus, at least three learning systems* contribute (at 
times conflicting) input into choice 100. In Chapter 3 we ask whether stress also affects Pavlovian 
contributions to instrumental learning. This is implied by the idea that stress prompts a 
reorganisation of cognition towards simpler, faster algorithms 208. Furthermore, dopamine, 
release of which increases during stress 209, appears to enhance the influence of Pavlovian value 
estimates upon choice 210,211. Finally, stress increases the impact of palatability upon food choice 
212, in precisely the manner that one would predict from an increased influence of Pavlovian 
control 100. 
1.5.5 Summary and relevance 
Emotion can be described as a feedback mechanism that affects ongoing learning and future 
decision-making. Models of emotion suggest that current emotions reflect whether progress 
towards a goal is better or worse than expected. Once conceptualization is within the framework 
of reinforcement learning, with the empirical finding that emotion reflects prediction errors. This 
has led to the idea that emotions help optimize reinforcement learning in situations where the 
reward function exhibits spatial or temporal correlations. Emotion might provide inputs both to 
model-free and model-based systems, manifesting as a bias in value estimation or a distinct 
state to be avoided or pursued. 
In Chapter 2, we extend a prediction-error account of emotion into the social domain, and 
demonstrate a clear relationship between social effects in emotion and subsequent social 
model-based decision making. In Chapter 3 we examine the ability of a negative emotion 
(stress) to affect instrumental and Pavlovian learning processes. This leads to Chapter 4, in 
which we extend prediction-error models of emotion into a Bayesian context, demonstrating 
that model estimates of uncertainty can explain variation in subjective and physiological stress 
responses and showing how experience of stress shapes expectations of environmental 
uncertainty. 
                                                        
* The possibility of episodic control, in which memories of distinct episodes are used to guide decisions, has 
been discussed 205 but received little empirical attention (but see 206 and 207) 
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2.1 Abstract 
Here we use the reinforcement learning models introduced in the previous chapter, 
demonstrating how they can contribute to our understanding of emotional state. We first relate 
fluctuations in emotional state in participants playing a gambling task to the expectations and 
prediction errors they experience, replicating previous work. We then develop the model further 
to account for the experiences of other players in the environment. This gives us the opportunity 
to examine how our emotional characterization of social preferences relates to choice in a 
separate social decision task. We find that a participant’s subjective emotional state reflects 
impact of rewards and prediction errors they themselves receive, and the rewards received by a 
social partner. Unequal outcomes, whether advantageous or disadvantageous, reduce average 
momentary happiness. Furthermore, we show that the relative impacts of advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality on momentary happiness at the individual level predict a subject’s 
generosity in a separate dictator game. These findings demonstrate a powerful social influence 
upon subjective emotional state, with emotional reactivity to inequality predictive of altruism in 
an independent task domain. This provides a quantitative account of the often elusive link 




Subjective well-being is a key index of quality of life1,2, prompting policies aimed at increasing it3. 
However, maximizing wealth is not an effective way of maximizing well-being, as the coupling 
between the two is often relatively weak4-7 (although see ref. 8). Social comparison has been 
suggested as an important mediator of the relationship between wealth and well-being, with 
relative as opposed to absolute wealth exerting a substantial influence on well-being9-11.  
Social comparison is also increasingly acknowledged as being relevant to economic behaviour, 
as described in section 1.2.1. Aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality is 
suggested to underlie altruistic behaviour12,13. However, it is unknown whether variance in the 
emotional impact of inequality on well-being relates to the hitherto poorly understood 
heterogeneity observed in altruistic behavior14. Here we address these issues at the level of the 
individual by examining the impact of social comparison on momentary subjective well-being. 
We show that, on average, the impact of inequality is to attenuate momentary happiness. 
Furthermore, the relative emotional impact of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality 
predicts altruistic behavior at the level of individuals. 
We previously quantified the relationship between rewards and momentary happiness using a 
probabilistic reward task, showing that momentary subjective well-being depends on the 
cumulative impact of recent expectations and the reinforcement prediction errors (RPEs) that 
arise from these expectations15 (see section 1.5.1). RPEs, the difference between experienced 
and expected outcomes, are thought to be encoded in the firing pattern of dopamine 
neurons16,17 (see section 1.3.1.3). In keeping with this, we observed that changes in subjective 
well-being were coupled to reward-related neural responses in the striatum, an area with rich 
dopaminergic innervation15. A dopaminergic mediation of this effect was also suggested by the 
observation that pharmacologically boosting dopamine increased well-being related to reward 
receipt18. 
Here, we exploit our previously established computational approach to study how inequality, 
and putative emotional responses to inequality, impact on one important component of well-
being. Our approach was motivated by prior observations that striatal neural responses can also 
reflect the rewards received by others19-21. This led us to predict that rewards received by 
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another person would impact participants’ momentary subjective well-being according to their 
individual social preferences. We also predicted that individual emotional reactivity to social 
outcomes might relate to heterogeneity in altruistic choice, something that has been difficult to 
explain using standard economic approaches14. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 | Experimental design (A) Four participants were introduced to each other and 
seated in separate rooms to perform three tasks. In the non-social decision task, subjects (n=47) 
chose between safe options and risky gambles with equal probabilities of two outcomes. In the 
dictator game, subjects decided how to split an endowment between themselves and another 
player. (B) The social decision task consisted of non-social and social trials. In non-social trials, 
choice outcomes (here £0) did not affect partner earnings. In social trials, subjects were told that 
they were observing choices made by their partner in the non-social decision task. When their 
partner chose to gamble, the subject received an equivalent but independent gamble. The 
subject’s outcome was revealed first (here gaining £0.95), followed by the partner’s outcome 
(here £0). After every 2-3 trials, subjects were asked to report their current level of happiness. 
 
Our results show that a subject’s subjective emotional state reflects rewards received by a social 
partner. Advantageous and disadvantageous inequality both reduce momentary happiness on 
average. Furthermore, we use computational modeling to show that the relative emotional 
impacts of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality predict a subject’s generosity in a 
 62 
separate dictator game, suggesting that variability in the emotional impact of inequality on well-
being can explain heterogeneity in altruistic behaviour. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Participants  
Forty-seven healthy subjects took part in the experiment (age range 18-39, 22 male), using two 
slightly different procedures (n=22 and n=25). Same-gendered subjects who did not know each 
other were tested in groups of four and confederates were used when one of the scheduled 
subjects was absent (Figure 2.1A). The experimenter asked subjects to introduce themselves to 
the other members of the group before seating them in four separate rooms. All subjects gave 
informed consent and the Research Ethics Committee of University College London approved all 
studies. 
2.3.2 Experimental procedure  
2.3.2.1 Solo decision task  
Stimuli were presented using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging) in MATLAB 
(MathWorks, Inc.). First, subjects completed a non-social decision task with 140 trials (Figure 
2.1B). Subjects completed instructions and a practice session before the task. On each trial, 
subjects made a choice between a safe and a risky option which was resolved after a 2.5 s delay 
period15,18,22. Subjects faced Gain trials (certain gain vs a gamble to gain a larger amount or zero), 
Mixed trials (zero vs a gamble to gain an amount or lose an amount), and Loss trials (certain loss 
vs a gamble to lose a larger amount or zero). Options presented in the task were similar to those 
used in a previous study15. Subjects had 5 s to make their decision and otherwise received the 
worst outcome from the gamble. The position of safe and risky options was left-right reversed 
every 10 trials. 
To familiarize subjects with answering questions about their subjective emotional state, during 
the non-social decision task we used the same key measure obtained in the social decision task, 
asking subjects the question “How happy are you at this moment?” at the start of the task and 
after every 10 trials. The left side of the line was marked “very unhappy” and the right side of the 
line was marked “very happy”. Subjects moved a cursor to indicate their current subjective state. 
The cursor always started at the midpoint. Subjects had a 5 s time limit to make their responses 
 63 
and the current cursor position was entered as the response if they did not respond within the 
time limit. The average decision time was 1.4 s and the average rating time was 2.0 s in the non-
social decision task. Total task earnings were not revealed to subjects during the experiment; 
subjects were told that the computer would track all of their earnings and they would be told the 
combined total for all tasks and receive those earnings at the end of the experiment. Although 
this task only included 15 happiness ratings, we fitted our pre-existing non-social happiness 
model to z-scored happiness ratings and found, as expected, that CR, EV, and RPE weights were 
on average positive (means: CR=0.83, EV=0.62, RPE=1.15; all Z>4, P<0.001). The forgetting factor 
was 0.65±0.31 (mean±SD). 
2.3.2.2 Dictator game 
Second, subjects completed a dictator game in which they were endowed with an amount of 
money and tasked with splitting the money between themselves and a named partner (Figure 
2.1B). They were told that the split was anonymous and would be added to the partner’s total 
earnings without the partner’s knowledge. Subjects had no time limit to make their decisions in 
the dictator game. The social decision task that immediately followed was with the same named 
partner. In procedure 1 (n=22), subjects were paired with only one partner, completing a single 
dictator game with an endowment of £3. In procedure 2 (n=25), subjects were paired 
sequentially with two partners, completing a dictator game with an endowment of £2 before a 
social decision task with each partner. We employed this procedure to determine if there was 
any variability in generosity within subjects that could be exploited to examine differences in 
emotional reactivity to outcomes received by the two partners. No happiness ratings were 
collected during this task. 
Generosity in the dictator game was almost identical on average between procedure 1 and 
procedure 2 (20% vs 19%; Z=0.09, P=0.93). However, generosity in the dictator game in 
procedure 2 was highly correlated between the two partners (Spearman’s ρ=0.88, P<0.001), 
suggesting that generosity in this task is stable, at least with unfamiliar partners. To further 
ascertain if subjects had any preference for one of the partners that might impact generosity, we 
asked subjects at the end of the experiment which unfamiliar partner they would prefer to have 
a conversation with. There was no difference in generosity toward preferred and non-preferred 
partners (Z= -1.09, P=0.27). Due to the high degree of similarity in generosity across repeated 
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dictator games in procedure 2, we combined data from the two partners and took the mean of 
generosity in the two dictator games. 
2.3.2.3 Social decision task 
Third, subjects completed a social decision task in which on each trial they were again presented 
with a safe and risky option (Figure 2.1B). The task consisted of non-social and social trials, with 
the order pseudo-randomized to ensure that there were never more than 2 non-social trials or 4 
social trials in a row. In non-social trials, subjects chose as in the non-social decision task and the 
outcome of decisions was added to their earnings. Subjects had 5 s to make their decision and 
otherwise received the worst outcome from the gamble. In social trials, they were told that they 
were observing the choice made by the social partner when that partner earlier completed the 
non-social decision task. If the partner chose the safe option, that outcome was added to their 
earnings. If the partner chose the gamble, independent gambles were resolved for the subject 
and the partner. The subject’s outcome was resolved first after a 2.5 s delay period. The 
partner’s outcome was resolved after an additional 2.5 s delay period. Subjects were asked after 
every 2-3 trials ‘How happy are you at this moment?’ providing the opportunity to examine the 
effect of inequality on subjective emotional state.  
Decisions in social trials were not in fact made by the partner but were made by the computer in 
a manner approximating an agent with typical economic preferences. This agent made choices 
based on the parametric prospect theory model with typical loss aversion (λ=1.35) and typical 
risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses (ρ=0.9). These parameters are similar to average 
parameter values obtained in a non-social experiment with a similar design22. 
In procedure 1, the social decision task involved 210 trials (70 non-social trials and 140 social 
trials) including 85 happiness ratings. In procedure 2, each social decision task involved 150 trials 
(50 non-social trials and 100 social trials) including 61 happiness ratings. The percentage of trials 
in which subjects chose to gamble was similar in non-social and social decision tasks (median of 
54% in both tasks) and similar to the percentage of trials in which the computer partner 
gambled (median of 55%). In the social decision task, the average decision time in the non-social 
trials was 1.6 s and the average rating time was 1.7 s. On average, subjects responded within the 
time-limit in 99% of non-social trials and 96% of rating trials.  
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2.3.3 Descriptive and model-based analyses  
Happiness ratings were z-scored so that subjects with greater variability in their ratings did not 
disproportionately contribute to results. Due to the non-normality of decisions in the dictator 
game, with 26 subjects giving either half or nothing (Figure 2.2B), we used non-parametric 
statistical tests including two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, and 
Spearman’s rank correlations. Unless otherwise stated, statistical tests included all 47 subjects. 
We modelled momentary happiness using models that assume an exponential decay in the 
influence of previous events15,18. Models were fit to ratings in individual subjects using nonlinear 
least squares implemented in the optimization toolbox in MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc.). Z-scoring 
produces ratings with a mean value of 0, eliminating the need for a constant term in the model. 
The non-social model accounted for at least 10% of the variance in ratings for 45 of 47 subjects. 
The simple-inequality model included a parameter for the magnitude of the difference in 
rewards between the two players. The guilt-envy model included parameters for the magnitude 
of advantageous inequality (guilt) and the magnitude of disadvantageous inequality (envy). 
These parameters will be negative if either type of inequality reduces well-being. We used 
Bayesian model comparison to compare models30,31. We computed Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) measures for each individual model fit and summed across subjects. BIC is a 
measure that quantifies the deviation of the model’s predictions from the data. A lower BIC 
value is therefore preferable. However, BIC also penalizes for the number of parameters, 
allowing the direct comparison of models with different numbers of parameters. Because the 
relative BIC value is important, and not the absolute BIC value, we also computed the BIC values 
relative to the winning model (Table 2.1). 
2.4 Results 
Our experimental design involved testing subjects in groups of four. Subjects (n=47) were first 
introduced to each other, then seated in separate rooms and asked to complete three different 
tasks (Figure 2.1A). The first task was a non-social decision task15,22,23 in which subjects chose 
between safe and risky options. Subjects faced Gain trials (certain gain vs a gamble to gain a 
larger amount or zero), Mixed trials (zero vs a gamble to gain an amount or lose an amount), 
and Loss trials (certain loss vs a gamble to lose a larger amount or zero). Chosen gambles were 
resolved after a brief delay and the outcomes of all trials counted toward earnings. The second 
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task was a standard economic task, the dictator game, in which a subject decided how to split an 
endowment (either £2 or £3, see Methods) with one of the other players24. Importantly, these 
allocations were private and subjects were told that the monetary split would never be revealed 
to the other player. At the end of the experiment, subjects learned their total earnings for 
completing all tasks and were not told if, or how much, any other player had contributed to that 
total. This design feature, whereby allocations are private, is important because generosity 
might otherwise reflect a concern for what other players will think of them25. Generosity was 
estimated based on behavior in the dictator game as the percentage of the endowment that 
subjects allocated to their social partner. This quantity varied between 0% and 50%, consistent 
with previous research26. The third and final task involved social and non-social decision trials, 
where subjects were again presented with safe and risky options (Figure 2.1B). In the non-social 
trials, subjects made choices as in the first task. In the social trials, subjects were shown two sets 
of identical safe and risky options and informed that one set was allocated to them, and the 
other set corresponded to a trial the partner had previously experienced in the non-social 
decision task. Subjects were informed that on these trials they could not make a decision for 
themselves, but observed, and were subject to, the outcomes of the choices that the partner 
had previously made. In reality, choices on social trials were generated using a standard decision 
model based on prospect theory, using parameters for a typical subject (see Methods). This 
procedure ensured that all participants had a similar experience in social trials. 
When the partner chose the safe option, both players received the same outcome; when the 
partner chose the risky option, both players received the gamble. The critical manipulation 
centered on the independence of the two gambles for the subject and the partner. This meant 
that for any single gamble chosen by the partner, the outcomes experienced by the subject and 
their partner could be identical or different (Figure 2.1B), providing the potential for inequality. 
In all trials, the outcomes for the subject counted toward overall earnings. To investigate the 
relationship between the outcomes of choices and subjective emotional state, including choices 
made by others, we used experience sampling15,27,28, repeatedly asking subjects, ‘How happy are 
you at this moment?’ after every 2-3 trials. Subjects were tested using two slightly different 
procedures (see Methods) with an identical trial structure, and were informed of total earnings 
only after completion of all tasks. Although happiness due to inequality could potentially be 
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measured without any choice on the subject’s part, not being able to make any choices would 
reduce engagement, and the results of our previous studies show that outcomes resulting from 
a subject’s choices substantially impact happiness. Thus, we interleaved social and non-social 
trials, and outcomes for the two types of trials were independent, allowing us to dissociate these 
influences. 
2.4.1 Reinforcement learning model predicts subjective well-being 
We first examined the determinants of subjective well-being, and found, consistent with our 
previous research15, that subjects reported greater average happiness at the subsequent rating 
after winning compared to losing gambles in both social and non-social trials (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, n=47, both Z>4, P<0.001). In social trials, we tested whether there was an impact of 
partner outcomes on well-being by z-scoring ratings for each subject and computing average 
happiness at the subsequent rating across the following four contexts: both participants win, 
both participants lose, subject wins and partner loses, and subject loses and partner wins. The 
last two conditions are associated with advantageous (subject has more) and disadvantageous 
(subject has less) inequality, respectively. These two contexts are ones that might engender the 
social emotions of guilt and envy, respectively, emotions that might relate to terms in models of 
altruistic behavior12.  
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Figure 2.2 | Descriptive analysis (A) Subjects (n=47) reported being happier at the subsequent 
rating after winning compared to losing gambles, and happiness ratings were lower on average 
when the partner received a different outcome, regardless of whether that outcome was better 
or worse. (B) The amount that happiness was affected by advantageous inequality (guilt is when 
subject wins and is equal to happiness for partner loses minus partner wins) and 
disadvantageous inequality (envy is when subject loses and is equal to happiness for partner win 
minus partner loses) was uncorrelated across subjects (Spearman’s ρ=-0.04, P=0.78). (C) Subjects 
completed a dictator game in which they could anonymously give a fraction of an endowment to 
their partner; 10 subjects gave half of the endowment and 16 subjects gave nothing. (D) Subjects 
were more generous in the dictator game if their happiness in the separate social decision task 
was higher when the partner won than lost gambles. The difference between guilt and envy 
measures was correlated with generosity in the dictator game (Spearman’s ρ=-0.48, P<0.001). 
Subjects who were happier after the partner lost than won gambles included only 2 of 10 
subjects who gave half but 12 of 16 subjects who gave nothing. Error bars, SEM. *P<0.05. 
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2.4.2 Inequality reduces subjective well-being  
We found that, regardless of whether subjects themselves won or lost, average subjective well-
being was attenuated by inequality in outcomes. Well-being was reduced both when subjects 
were better off (Z=-2.2, P=0.028) and when they were worse off (Z=-2.8, P=0.005) than the other 
person (Figure 2.2A). We tested whether the sensitivity of subjective well-being to advantageous 
and disadvantageous inequality (referred to here as guilt and envy) is equivalent, as might be 
expected if it reflected a unified concept of inequality aversion. However, we found no 
correlation between the change in well-being when subjects were better compared to worse off 
than their partner (Spearman’s ρ=-0.04, P=0.78; Figure 2.2B), suggesting independent variation in 
the degrees of guilt and envy, a result inconsistent with a unitary concept of inequality aversion. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 | Model-based analysis of happiness (A) Happiness ratings of an example subject 
over the course of the experiment plotted with the predictions of the guilt-envy model. (B) 
Happiness was affected by model parameters (n=47) related to the subject’s rewards. Two 
additional model parameters related to inequality aversion were both negative, indicating that 
 70 
both advantageous inequality (guilt parameter) and disadvantageous inequality (envy 
parameter) negatively impact happiness on average. (C) Subjects with stronger (more negative) 
guilt parameters were more generous in the separate dictator game than subjects with stronger 
(more negative) envy parameters. The difference between guilt and envy parameters was 
correlated with generosity in the dictator game (Spearman’s ρ=-0.48, P<0.001). (D) Guilt and envy 
parameters estimated by the model for subjects with different levels of generosity in the dictator 
game. Subjects who gave nothing had significant envy parameters. Subjects who gave 
something had significant guilt parameters. Error bars, SEM. *P<0.05. 
 
2.4.3 Emotional impacts of inequality relate to generosity 
We next determined whether a social influence on well-being was related to generosity in the 
separate dictator game. For each subject, we computed the difference in happiness between the 
two situations where the partner loses and the two situations where the partner wins, 
equivalent to taking the difference between guilt and envy measures. Against a backdrop of a 
20% average allocation in the dictator game (Figure 2.2C), consistent with previous studies26,29, 
subjects who were on average happier after partner wins than partner losses were also more 
generous in the dictator game, compared to subjects who were less happy after partner wins 
than partner losses (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Z=3.4, P<0.001; Figure 2.2D). Strikingly, the first 
group of subjects gave three times as much of an endowment on average than the second 
group (30% vs. 10%). Generosity in the dictator game was highly correlated with the difference 
between guilt and envy measures derived from happiness ratings (Spearman’s ρ=-0.48, P<0.001). 
Although generosity might be thought to depend on the guilt of receiving an unexpected 
endowment, we found that generosity was not significantly correlated with guilt measures alone 
(Spearman’s ρ=-0.18, P=0.22) but was correlated with envy measures (Spearman’s ρ=0.30, 
P=0.042) such that subjects exhibiting greater envy were less generous, a pattern of results 
inconsistent with any plausible demand characteristics of the experimental design. 
2.4.4 Modelling the impact of inequality aversion on well-being 
Our next goal was to apply our previously established methodology for measuring determinants 
of momentary subjective well-being to quantify individual dispositions in the social domain that 
impact emotional reactivity. Our starting point was our pre-existing non-social happiness 
model15, in which chosen certain rewards (CR), the expected value (EV) of chosen gambles, and 
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RPEs resulting from those expectations, all exert separate influences that decay exponentially 
with time:  
𝐇𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝑡 = 𝑤 + 𝑤J 𝛾HOHQJ 𝐂𝐑 + 𝑤^ 𝛾HO
H




where t is trial number, w0 is a constant term, other weights w capture the influence of different 
event types, 0≤γ≤1 is a discount factor that makes events in more recent trials more influential 
than those in earlier trials, CRj is the certain reward if chosen instead of a gamble on trial j, EVj is 
the average reward for the gamble if chosen on trial j, and RPEj is the RPE on trial j contingent on 
choice of the gamble. Terms for unchosen options were set to zero. We z-scored happiness 
ratings to prevent subjects with greater variability in their ratings from having a disproportionate 
effect on results. The constant term is omitted when ratings are z-scored. We fitted parameters 
to the happiness ratings of individual subjects in the social decision task and found, as expected, 
that CR, EV, and RPE weights were on average positive (all Z>4, P<0.001). The discount factor γ 
was 0.67±0.25 (mean±SD) indicating that ratings on average depended on the cumulative impact 
of 5-10 past events. Despite having no way to account for any social effect, this model explained 
momentary happiness well, with r2=0.39±0.19 (mean±SD), comparable to fits for a non-social 
task in a previous study15. 
We next expanded the model by including additional terms to account for influences related to 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality12. These influences might be considered as 
related to guilt and envy, respectively: 
 
𝐇𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝑡 = 𝑤 + 𝑤J 𝛾HOHQJ 𝐂𝐑 + 𝑤^ 𝛾HO
H
QJ 𝐄𝐕 + 𝑤~ 𝛾O
H
QJ 𝐑𝐏𝐄 
+𝑤 𝛾HOHQJ max 𝐑 − 𝐎, 0 + 𝑤 𝛾HO
H
QJ max 𝐎 − 𝐑, 0  
Equation 2.2 
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where w4 relates to advantageous inequality (guilt) when the reward received by the subject Rj 
exceeds the reward received by the other player Oj, and w5 relates to disadvantageous inequality 
(envy) when Oj exceeds Rj. This guilt-envy model explained momentary happiness better than its 
non-social variant with r2=0.44±0.18 (mean±SD; Figure 2.3A). This model was preferred to the 
simpler non-social model in a Bayesian model comparison30,31 (see Table 2.1), demonstrating 
that social comparison significantly impacts subjective well-being in our task. Model parameters 
for guilt and envy were negative on average (both Z<-2, P<0.05; Figure 2.3B), consistent with both 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality reducing momentary happiness. 
2.4.5 Envy and guilt parameters predict generosity 
When we tested how model parameters related to individual social preferences, we found 
subjects with stronger (more negative) guilt parameters were more generous in the dictator 
game than subjects with stronger (more negative) envy parameters (Z=2.8, P=0.006; Figure 2.3C). 
Consistent with the descriptive analysis, the difference between guilt and envy parameters 
estimated from happiness ratings was highly correlated with generosity in the dictator game 
(Spearman’s ρ=-0.48, P<0.001). Guilt but not envy parameters were significantly negative for 
subjects that altruistically gave either half or some of the endowment (guilt, both Z<-2.3, P<0.05; 
envy, both |Z|<0.5, P>0.5; Figure 2.3D) while the opposite was true for those subjects that gave 
nothing (guilt, Z=-0.2, P=0.88; envy, Z=-2.9, P=0.003). 
One concern is whether demand characteristics might contribute to any of our results. Some 
subjects might have noticed that inequality was one feature of the experiment and hypothesized 
that well-being should reflect a unitary concept of inequality (“inequality is bad”). To test whether 
this possibility could explain our results, we fitted an additional model with a term for the 
magnitude of the difference in rewards between players. The inequality parameter in this 
simple-inequality model was significantly negative on average (Z=-5.13, P<0.001), capturing lower 
well-being with greater inequality (see Methods). However, this inequality parameter was 
uncorrelated with generosity in the dictator game (Spearman’s ρ=-0.036, P=0.81), which might 
theoretically have responded to the same demand characteristic, and the guilt-envy model 





Mean r2 Median r2 Model BIC Relative BIC 
Non-social 4 0.39 0.37 -1723 +72 
Simple-inequality 5 0.41 0.40 -1704 +91 
Guilt-envy 6 0.44 0.47 -1795 0 
 
Table 2.1| Bayesian model comparison analysis 
BIC values are summed across the 47 subjects. Model fits were performed with z-scored 
happiness ratings. All three models contained separate terms for CRs, gamble EVs, and gamble 
RPEs, with influences that decay exponentially. The simple-inequality model included an 
additional parameter for the magnitude of the difference in outcomes between the two players. 
The guilt-envy model included additional parameters for advantageous and disadvantageous 




Our results provide striking quantitative confirmation that an individual’s subjective reports of 
momentary well-being reflect not just how well things are going relative to expectations, but also 
how things are going relative to other people, even when outcomes for others are both 
independent from, and irrelevant to, the subjects’ own earnings. By quantifying social 
preferences based on emotional reactivity to inequality separately from economic choice, we 
avoid strategic considerations, a potential confound in using economic games to understand the 
role of inequality aversion in behavior32. Furthermore, by using the continuously varying 
subjective state as an output measure, we avoid forcing subjects to explicitly admit to emotions 
that might be perceived to have negative social connotations, such as envy. 
Increasing wealth disparity in many countries33,34 lends urgency to the need to understand the 
impact of inequality, both at individual and societal levels35. Our demonstration that inequality 
aversion reduces momentary well-being aligns with wider observations of inequality’s negative 
impact on societal well-being36. Culturally entrained aversion to inequality such as ‘Janteloven’ 
observed in Scandinavia37 may therefore play an important role in shaping well-being in those 
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countries, which rank highly in international well-being surveys. The fact that individual 
differences in well-being measures were predictive of social preferences suggests these 
parameters reflect values that are at least part of a stable variation in generosity between 
individuals38, variation that has been difficult to explain using economic approaches alone14. Our 
findings also highlight an important issue for future research: our subjects experienced 
inequality in social trials where they were unable to influence their partner’s decision. 
Understanding how instrumental control impacts well-being could shed additional light on the 
mediation of societal inequality. 
We adopted a quantitative model that opens up new avenues to investigate the relationship 
between subjective well-being and behavior. Although numerous studies have linked 
experienced and anticipated emotions during choice to subsequent behavior (reviewed in ref. 
39), it has remained unclear whether choices accurately anticipate the emotional impact of 
outcomes on subjective well-being, with some arguing that these quantities are distinct40. 
However, recent economic research suggests quantitative links can be forged between 
hypothetical choices and hypothetical consequences for well-being41. Here, we demonstrate a 
precise link between subjective well-being following actual rewards and incentivized economic 
altruistic choice.  
There is considerable debate as to the underlying basis for altruistic behavior. Although Fehr 
and Schmidt posit that guilt and envy relate to altruistic behavior12, it has never been tested 
whether emotional responses to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality explain a 
heterogeneity in generosity14. We found that the relative emotional impact of guilt and envy is 
predictive of generosity, lending support to the Fehr-Schmidt model. However, our results are 
inconsistent with two assumptions of this model, specifically that weights for guilt and envy are 
correlated and that the weight for envy is greater than the weight for guilt. We found that the 
emotional impacts of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality are uncorrelated such that 
people who experience more guilt do not necessarily experience more envy. Furthermore, we 
found that guilt parameters were greater than envy parameters in the majority of our subjects, 
in sharp contrast to a stated assumption of the Fehr-Schmidt model. This result is relevant to 
altruistic behavior in that participants who had larger guilt than envy parameters were on 
average more generous that individuals for whom the converse was true (Figure 2.3C). Our 
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results therefore recommend alternate social-welfare preference models that relax the 
assumptions of the Fehr-Schmidt model42,43.  
Our emotional dissection of inequality aversion also addresses an important critique that 
emerges from the constraints of dictator games, namely that any action other than keeping all of 
the money looks like inequality aversion42. Inattentive subjects could inadvertently appear 
altruistic. Our results show that much of the variance in generosity cannot be explained by this 
concern, because noisy happiness ratings could not be misconstrued as evidence for inequality 
aversion. Our finding of a link between emotional measures and generosity provide a new 
perspective on the value of dictator games as assays of social preferences. 
Recent work on the ontogeny of fairness across cultures finds that an aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality arises early in development, but that an aversion to advantageous 
inequality arises later, and possibly for strategic reasons13. Similarly, dual-process models 
suggest that prosocial behavior might result from an interaction between intuitive/emotional 
and deliberative/non-emotional processes44,45. However, we find that emotional processes alone 
are sufficient to explain heterogeneity in generosity, without invoking strategic concerns or 
conflict between emotional and non-emotional processes. This result also argues against the 
need to appeal to any understanding of the emotional state of another person, as in popular 
empathy models46, at the time that altruistic decisions are made. 
Demand characteristics can be a concern in the study of both well-being and altruism. However, 
there are several reasons why a demand-driven explanation of our results is unlikely. First, the 
task was designed such that the rewards of others are irrelevant to earnings, reducing the 
chance that subjects will realize that their ratings reveal a socially undesirable emotion like envy. 
Evidence that this was successful is that most (~90%) of the variance in ratings accounted for by 
the model arose from non-social influences, influences known to be the same in paid lab 
subjects and unpaid anonymous subjects15, inconsistent with significant demand effects in the 
non-social influences on well-being. Second, the average forgetting factor is such that ratings 
reflected the cumulative influence of 5-10 past events. However, ratings were made too quickly 
(on average in 1.7 s in the social decision task) to allow the sort of deliberate calculation that 
demand effects over such a timescale might require. Third, we fitted a simple-inequality model 
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that captures the unitary concept of inequality (“inequality is bad”) that is most likely to be 
consistent with perceived experimenter demands. This model did not explain variation in 
generosity, and did not explain the data as well as the guilt-envy model. A final argument against 
any explanation in terms of demand characteristics is that we observe a strong effect of envy on 
well-being in subjects who also appear sufficiently immune to experimenter demands as to give 
nothing in the dictator game (Figure 2.3D).  
Our computational approach might be fruitfully employed to meet a variety of challenges. The 
most immediate application is in testing hypotheses regarding the role of emotions in prosocial 
behavior across economic games, including social and moral emotions that might relate to 
behaviors such as trust and punishment. Furthermore, computational models such as ours can 
provide precise subject-specific predictions for interrogating the neural circuits that support 
prosocial behavior while also generating predictors related to negative emotions such as guilt 
and envy that can be difficult to elicit explicitly in experimental settings. Understanding 
individual differences in the determinants of well-being may also yield insight into interactions 
between people of different socioeconomic status, which may have economic implications. 
Finally, individual phenotyping based on emotional dynamics could provide a powerful tool to 
dissect social pathologies, such as borderline personality disorder. 
 
2.6 References 
1. Oswald, A. J. & Wu, S. Objective confirmation of subjective measures of human well-being: 
evidence from the U.S.A. Science 327, 576-579 (2010). 
2. Krueger, A. B. & Stone, A. A. Progress in measuring subjective well-being. Science 346, 42-43 (2014). 
3. Stiglitz, J. E., Sen, A. & Fitoussi, J. P. Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress (2009). 
4. Blanchflower, D. G. & Oswald, A. J. Well-being over time in Britain and the USA. J. Pub. Econ. 88, 
1359-1386 (2004). 
5. Layard, R. Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (Allen Lane, 2005). 
6. Easterlin, R. A., McVey, L. A., Switek, M., Sawangfa, O. & Zweig, J. S. The happiness-income paradox 
revisited. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 22463-22468 (2010). 
7. Kahneman, D. & Deaton, A. High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 16489-16493 (2010). 
8. Stevenson, B. & Wolfers, J. Subjective well-being and income: is there any evidence of satiation? 
Am. Econ. Rev.: Papers Proc. 103, 598-604 (2013). 
9. Clark, A. E. & Oswald, A. J. Satisfaction and comparison income. J. Pub. Econ. 61, 359-381 (1996). 
10. Luttmer, E. F. P. Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being. Q. J. Econ. 120, 963-1002 
(2005). 
 77 
11. Boyce, C. J., Brown, G. D. A. & Moore, S. C. Money and happiness: rank of income, not income, 
affects life satisfaction. Psychol. Sci. 21, 471-475 (2010). 
12. Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Q. J. Econ. 114, 817-
868 (1999). 
13. Blake, P. R. et al. The ontogeny of fairness in seven societies. Nature 528, 258-261 (2015). 
14. Blanco, M., Engelmann, D. & Normann, H. T. A within-subject analysis of other-regarding 
preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 72, 321-338 (2011).  
15. Rutledge, R. B., Skandali, N., Dayan, P. & Dolan, R. J. A computational and neural model of 
momentary subjective well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, 12252-12257 
(2014).  
16. Schultz, W., Dayan, P. & Montague, P. R. A neural substrate of prediction and reward. Science 275, 
1593-1599 (1997). 
17. Caplin, A., Dean, M., Glimcher, P. W. & Rutledge, R. B. Measuring beliefs and rewards: a 
neuroeconomic approach. Q. J. Econ. 125, 923-960 (2010). 
18. Rutledge, R. B., Skandali, N., Dayan, P. & Dolan, R. J. Dopaminergic modulation of decision making 
and subjective well-being. J. Neurosci. 35, 9811-9822 (2015). 
19. Fliessbach, K. et al. Social comparison affects reward-related brain activity in the human ventral 
striatum. Science 318, 1305-1308 (2007). 
20. Tricomi, E., Rangel, A., Camerer, C. F. & O’Doherty, J. P. Neural evidence for inequality-averse social 
preferences. Nature 463, 1089-1091 (2010). 
21. Zaki, J. & Mitchell, J. P. Equitable decision making is associated with neural markers of intrinsic 
value. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, 19761-19766 (2011). 
22. Sokol-Hessner, P. et al. Thinking like a trader selectively reduces individuals’ loss aversion. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, 5035-5040 (2009). 
23. Brown, H. R. et al. Crowdsourcing for cognitive science - the utility of smartphones. PLoS ONE 9, 
e100662 (2014). 
24. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. & Thaler, R. H. Fairness and the assumptions of economics. J. Business 
59, S285-S300 (1986). 
25. Eckel, C. C. & Grossman, P. J. Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games Econ. Behav. 16, 181-
191 (1996). 
26. Camerer, C. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton University 
Press, 2003). 
27. Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Larsen, R. Validity and reliability of the experience sampling method. J. Nerv. 
Ment. Disease 175, 526-537 (1987). 
28. Killingsworth, M. A. & Gilbert, D. T. A wandering mind is an unhappy mind. Science 330, 932 (2010). 
29. Engel, E. Dictator games: a meta study. Exp. Econ. 14, 583-610 (2011). 
30. Schwarz, G. Estimating the dimension of a model. Ann. Stat. 6, 461-464 (1978). 
31. Burnham, K. P. & Anderson, D. R. Model Selection and Inference (Springer, 1998). 
32. Fehr, E. & Krajbich, I. Social preferences and the brain. Neuroeconomics: Decision-Making and the 
Brain, 2nd Ed. (eds Glimcher, P. W. & Fehr, E.) 193-218 (Academic Press, 2014). 
33. Piketty, T. Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Belknap Press, 2014). 
34. Piketty, T. & Saez, E. Inequality in the long run. Science 344, 838-843 (2014). 
35. Nishi, A., Shirado, H., Rand, D. G. & Christakis, N. A. Inequality and visibility of wealth in 
experimental social networks. Nature 526, 426-429 (2015). 
36. Wilkinson, R. G. & Pickett, K. E. Income inequality and social dysfunction. Ann. Rev. Sociol. 34, 493-
511 (2009). 
37. Nelson, M. R. & Shavitt, S. Horizontal and vertical individualism and achievement values: a 
multimethod examination of Denmark and the United States. J. Cross-Cultural Psychol. 33, 439-458 
(2002). 
38. Fisman, R., Kariv, S. & Markovits, D. Individual preferences for giving. Am. Econ. Rev. 97, 1858-1876 
(2007). 
 78 
39. DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Chester, D. S. & Bushman, B. J. How often does currently felt 
emotion predict social behavior and judgment? A meta-analytic test of two theories. Emotion Rev. 
1-8 (2015). 
40. Kahneman, D., Wakker, P. P. & Sarin, R. Back to Bentham? Explorations of experienced utility. Q. J. 
Econ. 112, 375-406 (1997). 
41. Benjamin, D. J., Heffetz, O., Kimball, M. S. & Szembrot, N. Beyond happiness and satisfaction: 
toward well-being indices based on a stated preference. Am. Econ. Rev. 104, 2698-2735 (2014). 
42. Charness, G. & Rabin, M. Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Q. J. Econ. 117, 817-
869 (2002). 
43. Engelmann, D. How not to extend models of inequality aversion. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 81, 599-605 
(2012). 
44. Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D. & Nowak, M. A. Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature 489, 
427-420 (2012). 
45. Rand, D. G. et al. Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation. Nat. Commun. 5, 3677 (2014). 
46. Batson, C. D. & Shaw, L. L. Evidence for altruism: toward a pluralism of prosocial motives. Psychol. 
Inquiry 2, 107-122 (1991). 
  
 79 
 Chapter 3: Acute stress selectively impairs 
learning to act 
Previously published as: 
de Berker A. O.*, Tirole M.*, Rutledge R. B., Cross G. F., Dolan R. J.  & Bestmann S. Acute 
stress selectively impairs learning to act. Scientific Reports 6, 29816 (2016).  
* Denotes shared first-authorship 
 
3.1 Abstract 
The experiments reported in Chapter 2 revealed that emotional dynamics can be predicted 
using models inspired by reinforcement learning. In this experiment we examine the 
complementary relationship; how does an intense emotional experience alter subsequent 
reward learning? Previous work has established that stress interferes with instrumental learning. 
However, choice is also influenced by non-instrumental factors, most strikingly by biases arising 
from Pavlovian associations that facilitate action in pursuit of rewards and inaction in the face of 
punishment. This suggests, contrary to classical models from reinforcement learning, that action 
and valence play interactive and partially separable roles in animal learning.  Whether stress 
impacts on instrumental learning via these Pavlovian associations is unknown. Here, in a task 
where valence (reward or punishment) and action (go or no-go) were orthogonalised, we asked 
whether the impact of stress on learning was action or valence specific.  We exposed 60 
participants either to stress (socially-evaluated cold pressor test) or a control condition (room 
temperature water). We found that stress specifically impaired learning to produce an action, 
irrespective of the valence of the outcome, an effect consistent with a Pavlovian linkage between 
punishment and inaction. This deficit in action-learning was also reflected in pupillary responses; 
stressed individuals showed attenuated pupillary responses to action, hinting at a noradrenergic 
contribution to impaired action-learning under stress.   
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3.2 Introduction  
Stress is linked to a cascade of changes in central and peripheral physiology, including a rapid 
rise in catecholamines and a sustained increase in glucocorticoids 1. Stress also induces a shift in 
instrumental learning from flexible (model-based) systems towards an inflexible, and 
experience-dependent (model-free), form of control 2-6. The degree of shift depends upon 
working memory capacity 5, consistent with the idea that an impaired allocation of cognitive 
resources is a key mediating mechanism  2-7.  
However, recent work has also highlighted the importance of non-instrumental influences upon 
choice, as reviewed in section 1.3.2.2. Pavlovian responses resulting from the prediction of 
reward and punishment interfere with the learning of instrumental contingencies 8-11. For 
example, this innate coupling between reward and approach is of such potency that chicks are 
unable to learn to walk away from a food source in order to harvest it 12. An opposite linkage, 
between punishment and inaction, is evident in the freezing behaviour (inaction) seen across a 
wide variety of species 13. 
Pavlovian approach behaviour is also thought to underlie aspects of cue-triggered relapse in 
addiction 14, an influence potentiated by stress 15 via putative corticosteroid-dopaminergic 
interactions  16. The observation that stress also engenders fast, context-inflexible, forms of 
control 2, raises the possibility that its impact on instrumental behaviour is mediated via 
Pavlovian biases. Limited evidence in rodents 17 suggests that stress transiently attenuates the 
impact of reward prediction upon vigour (Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, PIT), although other 
studies failed to observe an effect 18. However, stress itself constitutes a sustained aversive 
state. Given the linkage between negative valence and inaction 11, this suggests an alternative 
hypothesis, namely that stress impacts on instrumental learning via the Pavlovian coupling of 
punishment and inaction. Such a coupling would explain the augmented inhibition of pre-potent 
actions observed under threat of shock 19, and predicts that sustained activation of punishment-
related tendencies (such as active avoidance, or inaction11) might interfere with the learning of 
instrumental responses which required different behavioural outputs (such as approach).  
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Figure 3.1 | Experimental design (A) Timecourse of the experiment. After instruction and 
training, subjects were asked to immerse their arms for three minutes in 0-1 0C (Stressed group) 
or 24-27 0C (Control group) water. Blood Pressure (BP) and Heart Rate (HR) were assessed before 
and after immersion. After a waiting period of ten minutes, they then completed the Go/NoGo 
task followed by a separate gambling task. At the end of the experiment, subjects underwent an 
expected second immersion lasting 30 seconds. Subjective stress and salivary cortisol were 
assayed regularly throughout the task. (B) The Go/NoGo task. On each trial, one of four cues was 
presented. Each cue was associated with an initially unknown correct action (Go or NoGo) and 
an outcome (Win money or Avoid Losing money). Subjects learned to select actions based upon 
the outcomes. Following the cue, a target was presented on the left or right side of the screen 
and subjects chose whether to press a button corresponding to the side of target presentation. 
For the cues associated with winning money, the correct choice was rewarded with an increase 
in earnings on 80% of trials. For cues associated with losing money, the incorrect choice was 
punished with a decrease in earnings on 80% of trials.  
 
To distinguish between these two competing hypotheses we compared a Stressed group who 
underwent the socially-evaluated Cold Pressor Test (CPT), and a Control group who submerged 
their hands in room-temperature water 5-7 (Figure 3.1A). We measured subjective stress and 
salivary cortisol at multiple time-points, allowing us to track stress levels throughout the 
experiment. Additionally, we recorded pupil diameter throughout, as an indirect assay of 
noradrenergic activity 20,21, which has a central role both in action initiation 22 and the co-
ordination of stress responses 23. 
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On each trial, participants saw a cue, and had to produce or withhold an action (Go/NoGo) so as 
to gain a reward (Win) or avoid a punishment (Avoid Loss) (Figure 1B). The design was factorial, 
giving four conditions: Go to Win, Go to Avoid Losing, NoGo to Win, NoGo to Avoid Losing. The 
contingencies were probabilistic, such that the correct action led to the better outcome in 80% of 
cases. This task can be understood as comprising two Pavlovian-congruent conditions, in which 
the instrumental requirements match the valence-evoked Pavlovian resposnes (Go to Win and 
NoGo to Avoid Loss), and two Pavlovian-incongruent conditions, where the instrumental and 
Pavlovian responses are in conflict (NoGo to Win and Go to Avoid Losing). This task therefore 
provides a well-validated assay of Pavlovian biases, assessed by comparison of performance in 
the Pavlovian-congruent conditions, on which people perform well, and Pavlovian-incongruent 
conditions, on which they perform poorly 8,9. This enabled us to ask whether stress affected 
Pavlovian biases over learning, or whether its effects were better described by a specific bias 
towards inaction, as suggested by an inhibition account of stress effects upon behavior.  
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
We recruited 64 participants (32 males) through UCL's Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (ICN) 
database. Participants were screened for medical conditions, previous CPT exposure, and 
previous participation in any experiments involving the Go/NoGo task. 4 participants were 
excluded (distractibility during the experiment or misunderstanding of the task revealed upon 
debrief), leaving 60 participants (30 CPT, 30 Control, 15 males in each group). 
All participants signed an informed consent form. All collected data was treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Medical supervision was present throughout. The protocol was approved by the UCL Research 
Ethics Committee (Ethics 4377/001). All experiments were conducted in accordance with 
approved guidelines.  
3.3.2 Experimental Procedure 
The experimental procedure is summarised in Figure 3.1A. Participants read an instruction sheet 
describing the structure of the experiment, which specified whether they were in the CPT or 
Control group. They then gave their informed consent, and underwent basic computerized 
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training in the Go/NoGo task and a separate gambling task (results not discussed here). They 
then provided a saliva sample and had their blood pressure taken, before a measurement of 
baseline pupil diameter. Participants then submerged an arm in ice-cold (Stressed condition) or 
room-temperature water (Control condition) [details below]. Following withdrawal of the hand 
from water, participants completed a questionnaire (Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, 
Sensation seeking; UPPS 26), and then maintained fixation until 10 minutes had elapsed since the 
end of submersion. This period was chosen to accommodate the timecourse of glucocorticoid 
release, such that cortisol concentrations would be elevated when they began the Go/NoGo task 
56. Participants then performed the Go/NoGo task, with a self-paced break halfway through. They 
then performed a gambling task, the results of which will be presented elsewhere, before 
performing a final, brief submersion of 30 seconds. 
3.3.3 Stress manipulation & measures 
3.3.3.1 Cold Pressor Test 
We used the widely adopted Cold Pressor Test (CPT) to induce stress 5-7,57,58. Water temperature 
was 0-10C in the Stressed condition, and 24-270C in the Control condition. Participants were 
asked to keep their arm submerged for 3 minutes. Participants in the Stressed condition were 
monitored by an additional experimenter, who entered the room specifically to observe this 
phase of the experiment, adding a social-evaluation component to the stressor 7. All control 
subjects kept their arms submerged for the full 3 minutes, whilst several stressed participants 
were unable to remain submerged for the entire period (mean duration=144 seconds, range 39–
180 seconds). Subjects were informed at this point that they would be completing a second 
submersion at the end of the experiment, a manipulation designed to sustain negative affect 
throughout the task. 
3.3.3.2 Cortisol  
We measured stress responses in three ways, designed to capture the subjective response 
(assessed with visual analogue scale ratings) and physiological responses to stress. The latter 
can be fractionated into a rapid, catecholaminergic component (indexed by pupil diameter) and 
a slower, glucocorticoid release (indexed by salivary cortisol samples). We refer to the timings of 
cortisol and subjective stress assays with reference to the end of submersion and the 
approximate times for subsequent assays: T0, T10, T20, T30, T45. Cortisol was not measured at 
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T0, as the sluggish dynamics of the HPA axis preclude an immediate glucocorticoid response to 
stress 59. Pupil diameter was measured throughout, though measurements could not be 
obtained at hand immersion and withdrawal due to excessive movement.  
3.3.3.3 Subjective stress  
Subjective stress was assayed using experiential sampling 43,60, which involved each subject 
moving a cursor along a line to answer the  question ‘How stressed do you feel right now?’, 
anchored by ‘Not stressed’ and ‘Very stressed’ at each extreme. Ratings for subjective stress 
from three participants were lost due to technical error. 
Pupil diameter was measured using an EyeLink 1000 system, sampling at 250Hz. The experiment 
took place in a darkened room, with a computer screen shielded on each side to minimise 
reflections. Participants were asked to maintain fixation wherever possible. All stimuli in the 
experiment were luminance matched within stimulus-type, although it was not possible to 
match luminance between stimuli. Data was subsequently exported to ASCII and imported to 
Matlab for analysis, where automatically-identified blink events were removed and replaced via 
linear interpolation of samples 140ms either side of the blink. Data were then low-pass filtered 
(2nd order Butterworth Filter, 4Hz) and z-scored before analysis 31,32,61.  
3.3.3.4 Pupil diameter 
For analyses of stress effects upon pupil diameter (Figure 3.2C) we measured pupil diameter in a 
baseline period prior to T0, during immersion, and post immersion. A single subject was 
excluded from this analysis due to complete data loss during immersion. Having removed 
periods of signal dropout, we then subtracted the average pupil diameter for each subject 
during the baseline period to correct for inter-individual variance in pupil size.  
To examine the effect of task-events upon pupil diameter, we epoched the data in three ways: 
by Cue, by Target, and by Outcome. This was necessary as the timings of events within each trial 
varied according to imposed jitter and variable reaction time (Figure 3.1B). In all cases, we 
accounted for drift in baseline pupil diameter over time by subtracting a baseline measurement 
of the average diameter for the first 200ms following cue presentation, resulting in pupil 
diameter traces for all trials starting around zero. 
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We used multiple regression models to decompose the influence of different task events upon 
pupil diameter at multiple timepoints 30. We used separate models in order to describe pupil 
diameter locked to Target presentation, and at Outcome. In both, we assessed the influence of 
action (Go/NoGo), outcome valence (Gain, No Change, Loss) and surprise (absolute prediction 
error from reinforcement learning models, see below) upon pupil responses. In the Outcome 
analysis, we also included an interaction term (Action*Valence). All predictors were z-scored 
before analysis to produce regression coefficients of comparable magnitude. 
 We decomposed each epoch into 40 time points (one every 200ms), and performed a multiple 
regression analysis across trials at each time point using the robustfit function in Matlab. This 
allowed us to examine the influence of each of our predictors (action, valence, and surprise) 
upon pupil diameter at different times in the trial. Inference was based upon the distribution of 
regression coefficients (β) across subjects, where we test for differences from zero using single-
sample t-tests. When testing for differences from zero (i.e. whether a predictor consistently 
affects pupil diameter) we take the average β coefficients for a period 1-2s following outcome. 
For inference between individuals, we use the maximum absolute β across timepoints for each 
subject, allowing for interindividual variance in reaction time and pupillary dynamics. 
3.3.3.5 Cortisol analysis 
For salivary samples, participants salivated through straws into 2ml polypropylene tubes. 
Samples were frozen on the day of collection. Analysis was performed by Viapath at King’s 
College Hospital, using a competitive immunoassay. Briefly, cortisol in the sample competes with 
cortisol conjugated to horseradish peroxidase for binding sites on a microtitre plate. Unbound 
reagents are then washed away.  Bound cortisol enzyme conjugate is measured by the reaction 
of the horseradish peroxidase enzyme to the substrate tetramethylbenzidine, producing a blue 
colour. A yellow colour is formed after stopping the reaction with an acidic solution. The 
concentration of cortisol in the sample is calculated as a function of the optical absorption at 450 
nm; more absorption implies greater concentration of cortisol enzyme conjugate, and therefore 
lower concentration of cortisol in the sample (for further details see 62). We quantified the 
experimental manipulation-evoked change in cortisol by calculating the Area Under Curve (AUC) 
with respect to baseline cortisol concentrations 29. This standardised measure is a discrete 
equivalent of integrating the timecourse of cortisol concentrations.  
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3.3.4 Go/NoGo task 
The structure of the Go/NoGo task 9,25,33,37 is depicted in Figure 3.1B. Participants performed 240 
trials. On each trial, one of four stimuli was displayed. Each stimuli denoted a different 
action/outcome contingency: Go to Win, NoGo to Win, Go to Avoid Losing, and NoGo to Avoid 
Losing. Following a variable interval, a target was presented on the left or right hand side of the 
screen, to which participants decided to respond (pressing the arrow button corresponding to 
the side of target presentation) or not. Following a brief fixation, the outcome was then 
presented. In the Win conditions, the correct choice was associated with a monetary gain on 
80% of trials, and no change in earnings on 20%. In Avoid Losing trials, correct choice resulted in 
no change in earnings in 80% of trials, and a monetary loss in 20% of trials. Following incorrect 
choice, the outcomes were flipped, such that the worst outcome was received 80% of the time. 
Trials were separated with a variable fixation period of 1800-2500ms. 
We analysed data from the task in four ways. Firstly, we examined average learning curves for 
each condition and in each group, following previous analyses 9. In analyses where we present 
aggregates across conditions (e.g. Fig 3.3B and 3.3C), we averaged across conditions (within 
subject) before computing between-subject averages. Where relevant we performed two-sample 
t-tests between groups, correcting for comparisons at multiple time-points using the Benjamini-
Hochberg method 63 to control the False Discovery Rate (FDR).  
However, average learning curves can obscure more discrete differences between individuals 
who have learnt the task and those who have not 28. To accommodate this, we also performed 
group comparisons based upon the number of participants who responded correctly in >50% of 
trials for each condition, testing for significance using chi-squared tests.  
Thirdly, modified reinforcement learning models describe learning in the Go/NoGo task 11 as  a 
process of belief updating in each state on the basis of reward prediction errors, where the 
latter capture discrepancies between an action’s actual and expected consequences. To test for 
effects of stress upon the Pavlovian bias we fit a common variant of Q-learning 34 in which 
action-values are biased by an interaction between action and state-value, amplifying weights on 
Go responses in the reward domain and suppressing them in the punishment domain (see 11, 
Box 1 for a limpid description of this implementation, and below). We also use a representation 
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of reward prediction error in this model to quantify and control for effects of surprise upon pupil 
diameter 30,31. 
Finally, the Pavlovian performance bias was calculated as described previously 37  as the average 
of action invigoration in rewarded conditions ([Go in Go To Win + Go in NoGo to Win]/Total Go) 
and action suppression in punished conditions ([NoGo in Go to Avoid Losing + NoGo in NoGo to 
Avoid Losing]/Total NoGo). This provided a summary measure of how strongly action and 
valence interacted in choice.   
3.3.5 Structure of the Pavlovian bias model 
Our model is based upon learning in 4 states – Go to Win, NoGo to Win, Go to Avoid Losing, 
NoGo to Avoid Losing. These correspond to the 4 cues. For each state, there are two possible 
actions: Go and NoGo. We assume that on each trial the agent updates their beliefs about which 
action is betterbased upon Reward Prediction Errors (RPEs), which are calculated as the 
difference between outcomes and the agent’s expectation. Expectations are captured by Q-
values (hence Q-learning). See section 1.3.2.1 for a full description of Q-learning and its 
antecedents. Here, 𝑄H 𝑎, 𝑠 +	 describes the Q-value of state s and action a, at time t. Q-values are 
updated via RPE’s, so following an action a in state s: 
𝑄HIJ 𝑎, 𝑠 = 𝑄H 𝑎, 𝑠 + 	α ρ𝑟H 	− 	𝑄H 𝑎, 𝑠  
Equation 3.1 
Where 𝑄H is the state value on trial t, α is the learning rate, ρ is a weighting parameter which is 
multiplied by rt, the reward or punishment on that trial (taking a value of -1, 0 (no change) or 1).  
We allow ρ to vary, accommodating varying sensitivity to punishments and rewards (losing a 
given amount of money is typically more negative than acquiring the same amount of money). 
To reiterate, a and s denote the current action and the current state, respectively. 
Action selection is based upon 𝑄H 𝑎, 𝑠 ; however, the model is ‘indirect’ in the sense that action 
weight are allowed to diverge from 𝑄H 𝑎, 𝑠 ;  by the addition of two additional terms: an action 
bias, and a Pavlovian bias. This captures the intuition that action selection might be subject to a 
variety of biases that do not affect beliefs. Action weights are thus updated separately from 𝑄H, 
following Q-updates, and contingent upon which action was selected: 
 88 
If Go:  𝑊HIJ 𝑎, 𝑠 = 	𝑄HIJ 𝑎, 𝑠 + 	𝜀 + 	𝜋𝑉H 𝑠  
If NoGo: 	𝑊HIJ 𝑎, 𝑠 = 	𝑄HIJ	 𝑎, 𝑠  
Equation 3.2 
Where 𝜀 is the action bias, 𝜋 is the Pavlovian bias, and 𝑉H 𝑠  is the current state value. The effect 
of this uncoupling between Q and W is to accommodate an action bias (a general bias towards 
Go), and the Pavlovian interaction between action and valence, which emerges from the 
parameter 𝜋 as follows. Go weights in rewarded states are amplified by the addition of the 
product of the positive parameter 𝜋 and the positive state value 𝑉H 𝑠 . Conversely, negative state 
values decrease 𝑊HIJ for Go trials, through the addition of the product of the positive parameter 𝜋 and the negative state value 𝑉H 𝑠 . Note that unlike 𝑄H, 𝑉H is a function of the state alone, not 
contingent upon the currently selected action. 𝑉H  is updated through prediction errors in a 
manner analogous to 𝑄H but irrespective of action: 𝑉HIJ 𝑠 = 𝑉H 𝑠 + α ρ𝑟H 	− 	𝑉H 𝑠  
Equation 3.3 
Where 𝑉H 𝑠  is the state value of state s at time t, α is the learning rate, ρ is the 
reward/punishment sensitivity, and 𝑟H  is the outcome of that trial. 
Action selection on each trial is based upon a comparison of action-weights within a squished-
sigmoid, which allows the entry of irreducible noise (ξ) into action selection. This effectively 
prevents action selection becoming deterministic (all Go or all NoGo) even when the evidence in 
favour of one action over the other is comprehensively conclusive.  
 
p(𝑎H|sH) 	= 	 (1 − 	ξ) exp	(𝑤 𝑎H	, 𝑠H	 )exp	(𝑤 𝑎H	, 𝑠H	 )Y + ξ2 
Equation 3.4 
Where 𝑝(𝑎H|sH) is the probability of selection an action a in a state s at time t, ξ is irreducible 
noise, and 𝑤(𝑎H	, 𝑠H	) is the action weight for action a in state s at time t.  
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3.3.6 Model fitting 
The value of six parameters (	𝛼, the learning rate; ρreward, the reward weighting; ρpunishment, the 
punishment weighting; 𝜀, the action bias; 𝜋, the Pavlovian bias, and ξ, the irreducible noise in 
action selection) were fitted using Expectation Maximisation (EM) algorithms, as described in 64. 
The reader is referred there for full details, although we sketch out the intuition below. 
EM fitting occurs iteratively. The ultimate aim is to maximise the likelihood of all the data given a 
set of population parameters that are quantified by their mean (μ) and variance (σ). This 
approach differs markedly from a single-subject fitting algorithm, in which data from each 
subject would be described by a fitted parameter, resulting in a total of 360 free parameters. 
This renders the procedure highly vulnerable to overfitting. Conversely, we effectively fit a total 
of 12 parameters, a mean and a variance for each parameter. To achieve this, on each iteration 
of the model, the likelihood of a value for a given subject’s parameter estimate is penalised by its 
improbability given the current distribution of parameters in the population. This effectively 
‘pulls in’ extreme parameter values, which might fit a single subject’s data well, but are unlikely 
given the population distribution of parameter values. Note that we fit both groups as a single 
population, allowing us to compare parameters between groups using conventional statistics.  
Fitting each separately would be a mistake, breaking the independence of data-points in each 
population and precluding traditional comparisons. All parameters were fit in an unbounded 
space (-∞ à+∞), and then transformed to a space of either 0à+∞ (exponential transform, used 
for ρ, 𝜀, and 𝜋), or 0à1 (sigmoid transform, used for 𝛼 and ξ).  
3.3.7 Statistical analysis 
Statistical tests are described at the point of use. We used parametric tests throughout. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Stress induction 
Contrasting the stressful CPT condition with the Control condition revealed a profound effect of 
our manipulation upon subjective stress, autonomic, and glucocorticoid activity (Figure 3.2). 
Subjective stress ratings increased in the stressed group following immersion, and remained 
elevated above baseline throughout the task (Figure 3.2A).  The manipulation did not elicit a 
change in subjective stress in the Control group, yielding an interaction between Group and 
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Time (Repeated measures ANOVA, Effect of Time: F5,58=7.31, η2=0.037, p<0.001; Effect of Group: 
F1,58=2.01, η2=0.021, p=0.16; Interaction: F5.58=10.05, η2=0.051, p<0.001). In both groups, stress at 
the end of the experiment was greater than at baseline (paired t-test, Stressed T29=3.89, d’=0.71, 
p<0.001; Control T29=2.64, d’=0.48, p=0.013).  
Similarly, cortisol concentrations diverged between the two groups over time (Repeated 
measures ANOVA, Effect of Time: F4,58=4.97, η2=0.022, p<0.001; Effect of Group: F1,58=2.44, 
η2=0.028, p=0.12; Interaction F4.58=9.2, η2=0.040, p<0.001) in the manner predicted from previous 
work 5,7 (Figure 2B). Importantly, cortisol concentrations in the stressed group were still higher 
than those in the Control group at the end of the Go/NoGo task, consistent with a persistence of 
stress throughout the task (two-sample t-test at T30 following task completion, T58=2.76, d’=0.72, 
p=0.0067).  
Pupil diameter reflected stress induction (Figure 3.2C). Pupil diameter immediately preceding 
immersion was similar between groups with no difference at baseline (two-sample t-test, 
T57=0.87, p=0.38). In the Control group, pupil diameter rapidly fell over the duration of 
immersion. However, the Stressed group showed a sustained elevation of pupil diameter, an 
effect also present in the post immersion period, producing a significant interaction between 
group and time (Repeated measures ANOVA, Effect of Time: F2,57=55.61, η2=0.017, p<0.001; 
Effect of Group: F1,57=0.15, η2=0.0025, p=0.70; Interaction: F2,57=32.78, η2=0.10, p<0.001).  
Treatment-induced changes in autonomic nervous activity were also evident in our 
measurements of blood pressure before and after stress induction (Table 1). Systolic and 
diastolic blood pressure after treatment were both higher in the Stressed group relative to 
Control (Systolic: Repeated measures ANOVA, Effect of Time: F1,56=2.57, η2=0.005, p=0.11; Effect 
of Group: F1,56=1.30, η2=0.020, p=0.26; Interaction: F1,56=6.6, η2=0.013, p=0.013; Diastolic: 
Repeated measures ANOVA, Effect of Time: F1,56=0.13, η2=0.0004, p=0.72; Effect of Group: 
F1,56=0.08, η2=0.0011, p=0.78; Interaction F1,56=6.28, η2=0.022, p=0.015). Heart rate showed a 
trend towards a difference between groups and an interaction with time (Repeated measures 
ANOVA, Effect of Time: F1,56=9.46, η2=0.0082, p=0.0032; Effect of Group: F1,56=3.60, η2=0.57 




Figure 3.2 | Confirmation of stress induction (A) Subjective stress was assessed using a visual 
analogue scale. Immediately before timepoint T0, subjects immersed their hands in either very 
cold (0-10C, Stressed group) or room temperature water (25-28 0C, Control group). We observed 
an interaction between group and time, with an increase in subjective stress induced by the Cold 
Pressor Test relative to the control condition. (B) Salivary cortisol samples were taken at 10-15 
minute intervals following immersion. We observed a robust and sustained increase in baseline-
corrected salivary cortisol in the Stressed relative to the Control group, which persisted until the 
end of the experiment. Data baseline corrected for display. (C) We measured pupil diameter in a 
baseline period prior to T0, during immersion, and post immersion (see Figure 3.1A). Grey 
rectangles: signal loss during insertion and withdrawal of the hand from water. Data baseline 
corrected for display. (D) Increase in subjective stress during immersion correlated both with the 
increase in pupil diameter during immersion and with the Area Under Curve (AUC) of cortisol 
increase (see Methods). Filled circles: stressed subjects; Open circles: control subjects, with dark 
blue corresponding to pupil measurements and cyan to cortisol measurements. Each participant 
contributes two data points (one dark blue, one cyan). All error bars are SEM across participants. 
 
Finally, we examined the relationship between our three primary stress measures (Figure 3.2D). 
Partial correlations indicated that manipulation-elicited change subjective stress was related to 
both AUC cortisol (rSubjective-Cortisol=0.39, pSubjective-Cortisol=0.0030) and change in pupil diameter 
(rSubjective-Pupil=0.41, pSubjective-Pupil=0.0019). However, pupillary and cortisol responses were not 
themselves related (r=0.056, p=0.68). This suggests that the subjective response to stressors 
may capture elements of the immediate catecholaminergic response reflected in pupil diameter, 
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whilst also predicting the extent of delayed glucocorticoid release. We note that this is a 
relatively rare example of concordance between multiple stress measures 24. 
 
 
Table 3.1 | Cardiovascular stress measures 
 
3.4.2 Stress selectively impairs performance in learning to Go 
Across all subjects, task performance was comparable to that in previous experiments 9,25. 
Subjects performed best in the Go to Win condition (average correct=87.6%), with poorer 
performance on Go to Avoid Losing (77.0%) and NoGo to Avoid Losing (77.83%), with the worst 
performance observed in the NoGo to Win condition (58.3%), replicating previous studies 11. An 
ANOVA confirmed the action by valence interaction predicted from extant work, along with main 
effects of action (participants found it easier to learn to Go than NoGo) and valence 
(performance was better in the Avoid Losing conditions) (Repeated Measures ANOVA, Effect of 
Action: F1,59=238.27, η2=0.32, p<0.001; Effect of Valence: F1,59=83.82, η2=0.028, p<0.001; 
Interaction F1,59=35.62, η2=0.28, p<0.001). We gathered a questionnaire measure of impulsivity 
(Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, Sensation seeking; UPPS 26), which we hypothesized 
might relate to behavior in the task due to its association with dopaminergic tone 27. This was 
not the case; impulsivity was not related to the number of Go responses emitted during the 
 





















































Figure 3.3 | Stress impairs learning to act (A) Percentage Go responses for each condition, for 
stressed subjects (dashed line) and controls (solid lines). (B) Grouping by Go and NoGo 
conditions (taking the mean across valences) reveals a deficit in Go learning in stressed subjects. 
(C) The difference in performance in Go conditions (averaged across valences) between groups, 
corrected for baseline differences in Go responding, grew throughout the experiment. All error 
bars are SEM across participants. 
 
To visualize differences between groups and conditions, we plotted the average choices across 
subjects, smoothed with a 5 trial window (Figure 3.3A). Our results demonstrate a selective 
impairment in Go learning in the stressed group (Figure 3.3B), the magnitude of which grew over 
time (Figure 3.3C). Baseline-correcting for differences in Go responding at the start of the 
experiment in order to isolate changes in responding with learning, we tested for group 
differences over 10 time bins of 6 trials each. Stress decreased performance in the Go conditions 
at every time point (p between 0.0216 and 0.038, FDR correction for multiple comparisons 
applied). In order to confirm that this effect was not due to performance differences at baseline, 
we examined the number of correct responses made during the second-half of the experiment. 
The stressed group again showed reduced performance in the Go conditions (two-sample T-test, 
T58=2.17, p=0.034). Mindful of artefacts in group-averaging 1,28, which can produce aggregate 
 94 
curves suggesting incremental learning despite discrete jumps in performance at the individual 
level, we also performed non-continuous classification of subjects as learners and non-learners 
(see Methods). This allowed us to ask whether the percentage of participants that successfully 
learned the contingencies in each condition differed by group. This analysis also showed that 
stress impaired learning in Go to Win (Learners in stress group: 26, Learners in control group: 
30, X2=4.2, p=0.038) and Go to Avoid Losing (Learners in stress group: 25, Learners in control 
group: 30, X2=5.45, p=0.020) but not in either of the NoGo conditions (NoGo to Win Learners in 
stress group: 19, Learners in control group: 18, p=0.79; NoGo to Avoid losing Learners in stress 
group: 26, Learners in control group: 26, p=1). 
Our results suggest a specific deficit in Go-learning following stress, in accordance with the 
hypothesis that the aversive nature of stress leads to a bias towards inaction. Our results do not 
support the alternative hypothesis of a general increase in Pavlovian biases in the Go/NoGo task. 
Performance on the NoGo to Win condition did not differ between groups, and the decrement in 
the Go to Win condition is incompatible with an increase in bias, which should lead to 
improvement on the Pavlovian congruent conditions (Go to Win and NoGo to Avoid Losing). We 
further confirmed that the Pavlovian performance bias, which quantifies the difference between 
responding on congruent and incongruent trials (see Methods) did not differ between the two 
groups (, T58=0.02, p=0.98, d’=0.0063).  
To bolster this conclusion, we fit a reinforcement learning model that allowed us to isolate the 
Pavlovian interaction between action and outcome valences in trial-by-trial learning (see 
Methods and 2-6,25 for a description of the model). No parameters differed between groups 
(Learning rate T58=1.54, p=0.13; Reward Sensitivity T58=0.38, p=0.71; Punishment Sensitivity T58=-
0.99, p=0.33; Action Bias T58=-.078, p=0.93; Pavlovian Bias T58=1.55, p=0.12; Noise T58=1.80, 
p=0.078) (Figure 3.4A & B). Following a recent study which found no effect of stress upon model-
based learning but did observe a relationship with cortisol concentration changes 5 we looked 
for a correlation between model parameters and cortisol change (quantified by Area Under 
Curve, AUC, equivalent to the integral of cortisol changes over time) 2-7,29. No correlations 
between cortisol change and model parameters were evident (Figure 3.4C) (Learning rate r=0.20, 
p=0.12; Reward Sensitivity r=0.097, p=0.46; Punishment Sensitivity r=-0.12, p=0.37; Action Bias 
r=-0.18, p=0.18; Pavlovian Bias r=0.17, p=0.20; Noise r=0.18, p=0.16). Our reinforcement learning 
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model did, however, provide us with trial-by-trial estimates of surprise for each subject, which 
we used to examine the relationship between stress and pupil responses during the task.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 | Stress does not affect the parameters of a Pavlovian learning model (A) 
Distribution of parameters fit to responses from Stressed participants. (B) Distribution of 
parameters fit to responses from Control participants. (C) Relationship between AUC cortisol 
(see Methods) and model parameters. No correlations were significant. Each data point is a 
participant. 
 
3.4.3 Stress alters the effect of action upon arousal 
Evidence suggests that pupillary responses relate to both action and outcome processing 8-11,30-
32, echoing noradrenergic responses 12,22. Since noradrenergic dynamics are profoundly altered 
by stress 13,23, we asked whether stress might influence the impact of action or outcome on 
pupillary responses, paralleling deficits in Go learning in the stressed group.  
Our task elicited reliable fluctuations in pupil diameter, which depended both upon action and 
valence (Figure 3.5A). Action produced a robust increase in pupil diameter, and this was further 
enhanced by an anticipation of loss. In light of our finding that Go learning is specifically 
 96 
impaired in stress subjects, we isolated an effect of action using multiple regression models 
aligned to target presentation (see Methods). Since stressed subjects performed worse in the 
two Go conditions relative to controls, they experienced a greater number of suboptimal 
outcomes and, on average, larger prediction errors (due to surprising outcomes). To account for 
this we included outcome valence and surprise (absolute prediction error as provided by our 
reinforcement learning model) on each trial in the regression, along with the action taken (Go or 
NoGo).  
Action exerted a large effect upon pupil diameter both preceding and following target 
presentation in both groups, as captured by large positive regression coefficients (β) (average β 
1-2s following target, T59=8.58, p<0.001)  (Figure 5B). This captures the difference between Go 
and NoGo conditions depicted in Figure 3.4A. However, the magnitude of this action-induced 
dilatation differed between groups (Figure 3.5F). Taking the maximum β for each subject, 
Stressed subjects displayed a smaller increase in pupil diameter in Go vs. NoGo conditions, as 
captured by a smaller β relative to Control subjects (T58=-2.32, p=0.024). This aligns with our 
behavioural observation that stress induces an action-dependent deficit in learning. 
Our behavioural data suggests that stress-induced impairments are valence independent, and 
that Pavlovian biases within the task are unaffected by stress. To specifically examine valence 
and Pavlovian effects, we used an outcome-aligned regression model (see Methods), including 
terms for action, valence, their interaction (capturing Pavlovian biases), as well as the surprise 
induced by an outcome (extracted from reinforcement learning models for each participant). All 
three exerted systematic influences upon pupil diameter (Figure 3.5C-E). Valence (whether an 
outcome was positive or negative) induced both anticipatory (average β 0-1s preceding 
outcome, T59=-3.48, p<0.001) and post-outcome (average β 1-2s after outcome, T59=-7.09, 
p<0.001) effects (Figure 3.5C). Since valence was coded as 1, 0, or -1, corresponding to Win, No 
Change, or Loss respectively, the negative value of coefficients implies a larger pupil in 
anticipation of, and following, monetary losses compared to gains of equivalent magnitude. The 
size of this effect did not differ between groups (T58=-0.83, p=0.41), as predicted from our 
behavioural finding of an action-specific, valence-independent effect of stress. The interaction of 
action and valence was significant post-outcome (average β 1-2s after outcome, T59=-2.62, 
p=0.011) echoing a well-established interaction between action and valence in behaviour 9,11,14,33. 
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This also  validates  reinforcement  learning models which localise this interaction to a post-
outcome updating step (see Methods and 11,15) (Figure 3.5D). In line with our behavioural and 
modelling results, which implied that stress did not affect the expression of Pavlovian biases 
within the task, there was no difference in the magnitude of this interaction between groups 
(T58=0.25, p=0.81) (Figure 3.5F). 
 
Figure 3.5 | Stress alters pupillary responses to action (A) Pupil diameter for Go and NoGo 
responses, separated by whether cue indicated the possibility for winning or losing money, and 
whether an action was produced. Action induces a robust increase in pupil diameter, amplified 
in trials involving the potential for monetary loss. (B) To isolate an effect of action upon pupil 
diameter, we constructed multiple regression models allowing us to account for between-group 
differences in outcome and surprise (see Methods). Aligned to target presentation, action exerts 
a large positive impact upon pupil diameter. On average, this effect was larger in the Control 
group (Figure 3.5F). (C) We used an outcome-aligned regression model (see Methods) to 
examine the effect of outcome valence upon pupil diameter. Valence affected pupil diameter 
both in anticipation of and following outcome, with negative valence increasing pupil diameter. 
(D) The same outcome-aligned regression model as in C demonstrated a significant interaction 
of action and valence following outcome presentation. This effect was driven by a stronger 
differentiation of gain and loss following Go. (E) Surprise increases pupil diameter. Using the 
same outcome-aligned regression model as in C and D, surprise (absolute prediction error) 
induced an increase in pupil diameter. (F) Action-induced pupil dilatation is reduced by stress. 
To avoid multiple comparisons over time, we selected the maximum absolute β for each subject 
for each of our 4 regressors. We then asked whether any of the effects we observed differed by 
group. Only the β for action was affected by stress. Coefficients for valence, action-valence 
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interaction and surprise did not differ between groups. All error bars are SEM across 
participants. 
Several reports 16,30-32 have highlighted a correlation between pupil diameter and trial-by-trial 
estimates of surprise inferred from computational models. We quantified surprise as the 
absolute magnitude of the prediction errors 2,30 used to update beliefs in Q-learning models, as 
employed here 11,34. We replicated previous findings that surprise exerts a positive influence 
upon pupil diameter post-outcome (average β 1-2s after outcome, T59=2.72, p=0.0086) 19,30-
32(Figure 3.5E). This effect did not differ between groups (T58=-1.08, p=0.29) suggesting that the 
feedback signals used in error-driven learning were not altered by stress (Figure 3.5F).  
3.5 Discussion 
We tested two hypotheses regarding the impact of stress on learning. First, stress might induce 
a greater dependence upon Pavlovian biases, in line with the idea of a stress-induced general 
shift from computationally demanding flexible systems towards more automatic forms of 
control 2,5-7. Second, an alternative account suggests that stress facilitates punishment-related 
behaviours, as indexed by a shift towards inaction 19-21. We found evidence supporting this 
second hypothesis; stressed participants were impaired in responding to both Go cues, and 
showing no deficit for both NoGo cues (Figure 3.3), a conclusion supported by reinforcement 
learning models (Figure 3.4). This impairment in learning to act is reflected by pupillary 
responses in stressed subjects, who showed attenuated pupillary responses to action whilst 
displaying no differences in the response to outcome valence or surprise (Figure 3.5).  
We note, however, that we do not observe an improvement in NoGo learning in the Stressed 
group, arguing against a global shift towards inaction. Stress thus appears to induce a specific 
deficit in action learning, whilst leaving intact the ability to learn to withhold an action. The 
specificity of our findings enables us to rule out several alternative explanations. Firstly, average 
performance on the NoGo conditions (67.6%) was lower than in the Go conditions (82.7%). 
Stressed subjects were therefore impaired on the easier of the two actions, ruling out the 
possibility that stressed subjects exhibit a difficulty-dependent deficit. Secondly, performance 
under stress in NoGo conditions was indistinguishable from the control condition, precluding a 
general performance deficit and underlining that stressed subjects were no more likely to 
correctly withhold a Go response in NoGo conditions. Stressed subjects were therefore not 
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merely more likely to withhold actions; they were equally likely to produce them (incorrectly) in 
the NoGo conditions. Thus, the deficit we describe is learning-specific and unlikely to reflect an 
impaired production of action by stress, but instead reflects an impairment in action learning 
from reinforcement. We speculatively note here that motor excitability is enhanced by cortisol 
administration 22,35, but motor plasticity is inhibited 23,36. These observations underline a 
potentially pertinent difference between simple action production and action learning under 
stress.  
This distinction is also important for interpreting the results of the reinforcement learning model 
(Figure 3.4). This model quantifies the Pavlovian bias in learning, crystallized in a parameter 
estimate for each participant. This parameter is affected by dopaminergic manipulations 8,9,25 
and related to midline-theta activity in EEG experiments 5,7,37. We found that this parameter was 
unaffected by stress, bolstering our rejection of the hypothesis that stress amplifies within-task 
Pavlovian biases. The model failed to capture the effect we observed, namely a selective deficit 
in action-learning. This is unsurprising; the model explains interindividual differences in the 
production of action in terms of an action bias parameter, but it cannot capture specific deficits 
in action learning. Our results suggest that expansion of the model to capture action-specific 
learning deficits would be fruitful.  
The influence of action upon pupil diameter was attenuated in stressed subjects (Figures 3.5B & 
F). Pupil diameter is frequently described as an index of noradrenergic activity 20,24,30. This link is 
reinforced by observations in a non-human primate study in which specific correlations were 
observed between pupil diameter and activity of single neurons in the noradrenergic locus 
coeruleus, but not the dopaminergic substantia nigra pars compacta 9,21,22,25. Numerous reports 
of interactions between glucocorticoid and noradrenergic systems 11,38-41 suggest plausible 
substrates for altered pupillary responses under stress. Another possibility is that altered 
pupillary responses in the Go conditions is a consequence of the inability to learn.  However, by 
including surprise as a regressor in our model of pupil diameter we show this did not account 
for group differences, despite an overall positive effect of surprise upon pupil diameter post-
outcome (Figure 3.5E), in line with previous reports 26,30-32. 
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 We observed an interaction between action and valence in pupillary responses (Figure 3.5D). 
Although fMRI studies have highlighted an interaction between action and valence in responses 
in the basal ganglia9,27, we believe ours is the first physiological data with the necessary temporal 
precision to offer insight into the belief-updating process hypothesized to underlie this task. 
Computational models of learning in the Go/NoGo task place this interaction at the point at 
which action-weights are updated, precisely in the time window in which we observe such an 
interaction. Our physiological evidence for action-valence interactions following outcome 
thereby validates modified reinforcement learning models which incorporate Pavlovian 
influences in a post-outcome updating term. 
We used a common laboratory stressor, the CPT, to manipulate stress levels 5-7. This produced 
both an immediate increase in subjective stress and physiological arousal (Figures 3.2A & 3.2C), 
and a delayed, sustained increase in glucocorticoid concentrations (Figure 3.2B). Subjective 
stress returned swiftly to baseline following the manipulation, mirroring recent findings that 
subjective states such as stress reflect recent events with a relatively fast decay constant 42,43. We 
do find, however, that subjective stress response to the manipulation predicts the magnitude of 
the sustained glucocorticoid increase that follows it (Figure 3.2D), suggesting a degree of 
concordance between the severity of the subjective experience of stress and its physiological 
sequelae, which are presumably responsible for the protracted behavioural effects we observe 
here.   
A recent study used a reward-based paradigm in which participants performed certain actions to 
obtain stimulus-paired confectionary rewards from a ‘vending machine’ 44.  This allowed them to 
assess both the enhancement of a certain action given the presence of the reward-cue 
associated with that action (specific Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer, PIT), and the general 
increase in responding accompanying the presence of a reward-associated cue (general PIT). 
They observed effects of chronic stress (assessed with a questionnaire measure) upon general 
transfer. Highly stressed participants did not respond more in the presence of a reward-related 
cue. Although the similarities between that study and this one should not be overstated – there 
are considerable differences between the acute stress manipulation employed here and the and 
assessment of chronic stress levels used there- this blunting of reward-related action production 
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may relate to the deficit in action-learning we observe. In both cases, stress is associated with a 
reduced tendency to produce actions associated with positive reinforcement.  
The reported effects of stress upon learning are famously variable 45. One potential explanation 
for this heterogeneity is that superficially similar behaviours are supported by distinct neural 
computations, which exhibit contrasting responses to stress. Recent work using choice between 
pairs of stimuli has suggested a shift towards the use of rewarding vs. punishing feedback 
during learning 46,47. By contrast, we observe a valence-independent deficit in a task where  
participants choose to produce or withhold a response to a single stimulus. Such subtle 
differences in choice reference frame can have dramatic impact upon the neural circuits 
recruited during choice 48. Specific stressors may also differ in the effects that they produce. For 
example, the CPT requires participants to suppress an action (the withdrawal of the hand from 
the ice bucket), which could conceivably prime the suppression of action-learning we observe. 
Exposure to chronic uncontrollable stress induces an inability to learn to avoid future 
punishment, an effect described as ‘learned helplessness’ 49. However, this effect also holds 
when the agent is required to learn NoGo responses to avoid punishment, suggesting that it is 
distinct from the deficit we observe here 50.  Learned helplessness is perhaps best described as a 
consequence of generalisation from one episode to another 51. It is not clear how generalisation 
from events in the Cold Pressor Test to learning in our Go/NoGo learning task might underpin 
the effect we describe here, though we consider it a possibility. 
What might be the functional impact of stress inhibiting learning to act? One possible 
explanation is that stress is typically associated with periods of high metabolic demand and 
uncertainty 52. In situations where you are unsure what to do, doing nothing has the immediate 
advantage of being metabolically inexpensive. In the aftermath of an acute stressor such as the 
one we deploy here, biasing learning away from energetically costly activity may be a useful 
strategy for conserving resources.  
In many professions, such as military, financial, or emergency medical services, sporadic surges 
in cortisol levels are the norm 53-55. Our data suggest that whether an option is selected by action 
or inaction might have an important role in learning from decisions made under stress. One 
prediction is that stressed people should manifest a greater reliance upon default options, a 
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consequence of an impaired ability to learn from action relative to inaction. Such biases could 
theoretically be prevented by randomising action-outcome associations. For example, the 
performance of a stressed stock-trader might benefit from sometimes having selling a stock as 
the default option and keeping the stock requiring action. 
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 Chapter 4: Linking computations of uncertainty 
to acute stress responses in humans 
Previously published as: 
de Berker A. O.,	Rutledge R. B., Mathys C., Marshall L., Cross G. F., Dolan R. J. & Bestmann 
S.  Computations of uncertainty mediate acute stress responses in humans. Nature 
Communications 7, 10996 (2016). 
 
4.1 Abstract 
In the Chapter 2 we saw that fluctuations in happiness are captured by a model inspired by 
reinforcement learning, quantifying the expectations and rewards experienced by participants 
and their co-players. In this chapter we go on to capture emotional state in a dynamic 
environment in which participants’ are continually learning about the probability of receiving a 
painful electric shock. Subjects learned a probabilistic mapping between visual stimuli and 
electric shocks. We found that Bayesian models provide a superior characterisation of learning 
relative to reinforcement learning models. Using the model introduced in section 1.4.5, the 
Hierachical Gaussian Filter, we quantified the relationship between different forms of subjective 
task uncertainty and acute stress responses. Subjective stress, pupil diameter, and skin 
conductance all tracked irreducible uncertainty. We observed a coupling between emotional and 
somatic state, with subjective and physiological tuning to uncertainty tightly correlated. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty-tuning of subjective and physiological stress predicted individual 
task performance, consistent with an adaptive role for stress in learning under uncertain threat.  
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4.2 Introduction 
Stress has broad ranging physiological consequences 1. Although acute stress is often 
characterized as a challenge to homeostasis, the precise features of the environment that 
contribute to the generation of stress responses are largely unknown. Understanding the 
computations that underlie acute stress responses is important for insight into how stress 
relates to adaptive behavior, potentially illuminating links between stress and disease and 
facilitating treatment of stress-related disorders 2. In Chapter 2 we used reinforcement learning 
models to capture fluctuations in happiness. Here we extend this work into the aversive domain, 
and show how Bayesian uncertainty estimates can be used to predict stress responses.  
Extant work suggests that unpredictability and uncontrollability are central features of stressful 
experiences 3-7. Classic experiments in rodents demonstrate that rats exposed to a series of 
electric shocks show attenuated stress responses if they are able to predict or control the timing 
of a stressor 8, with subsequent work in humans documenting increased pain and stress in 
response to unpredictable stimuli 9-11. However, such experiments typically contrast conditions 
of complete unpredictability to those of complete predictability 4. Such binary comparisons do 
not capture the dynamic nature of uncertainty, which varies as an organism learns about and 
interacts with its environment 12. Furthermore, stress affects learning 13 suggesting that 
reduction of uncertainty may be a function of stress responses. Previous approaches have thus 
left several key questions unanswered.  
Firstly, it remains to be demonstrated whether the subjective and autonomic responses to acute 
stressors track fluctuations in uncertainty over time, which would imply a link between the 
processes underpinning learning and those of stress control. Secondly, it is unclear whether 
such responses relate to objective unpredictability, or whether they are entrained to subjective 
estimates of uncertainty. If so, inter-individual variation in assessment of uncertainty might 
provide insight into the considerable variation in acute stress responses across individuals 14. 
Finally, recent work has demonstrated that individuals track separable forms of uncertainty 
during learning 15, and it is unclear which form of uncertainty is important for driving subjective 
and autonomic responses to acute stressors 16.  
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To address these questions, we here adopt a subject-specific Bayesian model of decision making 
to track distinct forms of uncertainty and examine their relationship to acute stress responses 
during an aversive learning paradigm (Figure 4.1). As discussed in section 1.4.4, uncertainty can 
be parsed into several distinct forms 17,18, for which there exists a variety of theoretical and 
neurobiological evidence 12,15,19,20. For example, forecasters predicting the performance of a 
football team over the coming season face several distinct sources of uncertainty when 
formulating their predictions. Firstly, there is ‘irreducible uncertainty’, which captures a chance 
slip by a goalkeeper or a fortuitously mis-struck shot. Irreducible uncertainty reflects the 
randomness inherent to any complex environment. Irreducible uncertainty might increase if it 
begins to rain, decreasing the accuracy with which players move. Secondly, after a series of 
summer signings, it may be unclear how good a team is, producing uncertainty about the 
probability of a team winning each match. As the season progresses, this ‘estimation uncertainty’ 
falls as the strengths and weaknesses of the team become evident. A third source of 
unpredictability in this context is managerial instability. Assuming the manager influences 
performance, uncertainty about how long the current manager will remain in charge makes it 
harder to predict performance. This ‘volatility uncertainty’ is about the stability of the context. To 
appreciate this, compare the stability in English football of Arsenal Football Club (1 manager for 
the last 18 years) to the famous volatility of Newcastle United (19 managers over the same 
period).  
To dissect the role of these three forms of uncertainty in acute stress we utilised an hierarchical 
Bayesian perspective 21 (Figure 4.2A). Importantly, the model is fit individually to each subject, 
with two free parameters (ϑ and ω) capturing variation between individuals and allowing for 
divergence between subjective and objective uncertainty. In this framework, beliefs at several 
levels of a probabilistic hierarchy are represented as Gaussian distributions characterised by 
means and variances, the latter quantities corresponding to uncertainty. This naturally captures 
the sources of uncertainty described above: irreducible uncertainty resulting from probabilistic 
relationships between predictors and outcomes, estimation uncertainty resulting from imperfect 
knowledge of those probabilistic relationships, and volatility uncertainty reflecting potential 
environmental instability 17. How these different forms of uncertainty contribute to subjective 




Figure 4.1 | Task structure and stress measures (A) Learning task. Visual stimuli (rocks) were 
probabilistically associated with outcomes (Snake or No Snake). Subjects made a prediction of 
the outcome on each trial. The appearance of a snake was accompanied by the delivery of a 
painful electric shock. (B) Example trial. Here the participant incorrectly predicts No Snake. 
Timing was jittered; see Methods. (C) The probabilities governing stimulus-outcome 
relationships shifted unpredictably over time, producing fluctuations in uncertainty. (D) 
Subjective stress ratings were collected every 4-6 trials. Measures of skin conductance (n=45) 
and pupil dilatation (n=22) were collected in some subjects. 
 
We evaluated the contribution of different forms of uncertainty to subjective and physiological 
stress responses, using a commonly employed acute stressor over which we had precise control, 
electric shock 22-25. Participants completed a probabilistic learning task (Figure 4.1) in which 
electric shocks were delivered with varying predictability. On each trial, a stimulus (Rock A or 
Rock B) was presented and participants were asked to predict whether or not there was a snake 
underneath (Snake or No Snake). Each time a snake was presented, participants received a 
painful electric shock to the hand. We used a computational model of learning 21 (Figure 4.2A) to 
estimate the fluctuations in uncertainty experienced by each individual, based on the predictions 
they made. Although the sluggish dynamics of endocrine responses preclude a detailed analysis 
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of the relationship between cortisol release and uncertainty 26, we measured salivary cortisol 
levels by way of confirmation of our stress induction. We complemented this slow measure with 
high-frequency assessments of subjective stress and sympathetic arousal, which vary on a time 
scale equivalent to the forms of uncertainty in which we are interested. This allowed us to 
examine the online evolution of stress responses rather than merely their delayed endocrine 
consequences, which may have distinct determinants and function 27,28. As acute stress involves 
the coordinated action of emotional, physiological, and motivational systems 29, we measured 
subjective stress ratings, pupil diameter, and skin conductance (Figure 4.1D) throughout the 
task. Pupil diameter and skin conductance provided established measures of activity in the 
autonomic nervous system, a key effector of acute stress responses 30-32. We found that all three 
were predicted by subjective irreducible uncertainty. We further examined inter-individual 
variance in the degree of coupling between uncertainty and stress responses, which we related 
to the ability of participants to learn in an uncertain dynamic environment.  
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Participants 
All experiments were approved by the University College London Ethics Review Board. 
Participants (n=45, 25 females, aged 19-35) were recruited via the UCL Institute of Cognitive 
Neuroscience recruitment mailing list, and gave their written informed consent before beginning 
any experiments. All participants were healthy, with no history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders, and no family history of epilepsy. Sample size was based on recent experiments 
involving stress33. 
4.3.2 Task  
Participants initially underwent a shock thresholding procedure (see below). Participants then 
received thorough written instruction (see below) that made explicit the structure of the task, 
and completed a practice session of 30 trials of the probabilistic learning task used in the main 
experiment. They were also familiarised with the use of the subjective stress rating scale. 
Our learning task was closely modelled on that used in a recent study leveraging the same 
computational framework in a non-stressful context 15. Timings on each trial were jittered using 
 110 
a uniform distribution to allow us to maximally divorce physiological responses to different 
events.  
Each participant completed a set of 320 trials. On each trial, participants were presented with 
one of two stimuli (in our case, rocks). These stimuli remained on screen for 300ms (+/-50ms) 
before participants were asked to make a prediction, signalled with a button press, as to which 
outcome (Snake or No Snake) was likely to follow (Figure 4.1A & B). This decision was made 
under time pressure, with a timeout period averaging 1000ms (+/- 200ms).  
Once the decision had been made, the prediction was displayed for an average of 1200ms (+/- 
200ms), before the outcome was revealed. Outcomes remained on screen for 1000ms (+/- 
200ms). In the case of the Snake stimulus, outcome presentation was conincident with the 
delivery of a shock. This was followed by an inter-trial interval of 2000ms (+/- 500ms), during 
which a fixation cross was displayed. 
 The probabilistic mapping from stimulus to outcome shifted over the course of the experiment 
(Figure 4.1C), requiring participants to constantly track the relationship over time. This resulted 
in fluctuations in the level of uncertainty. Each session of 320 trials was divided into 10 blocks of 
different stimulus-outcome probabilities, of lengths that varied between 26 and 38 trials. The 
transitions between these blocks were not made explicit to the subject. The probabilities 
governing each block varied from heavily biased (90/10), through moderately biased (70/30) to 
unbiased (50/50), allowing us to examine the effect of predictability upon stress responses. We 
used 4 repeats each of the biased probability blocks (2 for each bias direction i.e. 70/30 and 
30/70) and 2 repeats of the 50/50 to generate 10 blocks in total.   
Participants were paid a base rate of £10 and informed that they would receive an extra £0.05 
for each correct prediction they made. Outcomes (correct/incorrect) were not explicitly signalled. 
Participants were allowed to take a self-timed break every 10 minutes.  
For 41 of the 45 subjects, we report questionnaire measures of life stress (Perceived Stress 
Scale, PSS). Data from the remaining participants was lost due to a technical error. Some 
subjects (n=23) completed questionnaires on a separate day, whilst the remainder (n=22) did so 
after the main task. We also collected a questionnaire measure of Intolerance of Uncertainty 
(IUS, n=43) (see Supplementary Fig 4.6), depression (Beck Depression Index [BDI]), and a 
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questionnaire related to anxiety (Mood & Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire [MASQ])). We do not 
report data from the latter two questionnaires here.  
4.3.3 Participant instruction 
Participants were given detailed computerised instruction on the structure of the task. This 
emphasised that the accuracy of their predictions did not affect the number of shocks they 
received but did influence their earnings on the task. Understanding was confirmed with the 
question: “How much do you earn per correct prediction?”. 
We also attempted to ensure good understanding of the probabilistic relationships governing 
stimulus:outcome relationships. We emphasized that the probabilities were reciprocal 
(p(Snake|Rock A) = 1-p(Snake|Rock B)), and checked for comprehension with the question: “If 
the probability of a snake being under Rock A is 40%, what is the probability of it being under 
Rock B?” 
Participants were further informed that the probabilities changed throughout the task, and that 
at times might appear to be random i.e. the probability of an outcome following each stimulus 
might be equal (50/50). 
4.3.4 Shock thresholding procedure 
Electric shocks were controlled using a Digitimer DS5 system in conjunction with a National 
Instruments Data Acquisition Board, which allowed control of shock amplitude via Matlab 
(Mathworks). Electrodes were placed 0.5cm apart on the first dorsal interosseous of the left 
hand. Electrode sites were cleaned with alcohol and a mild abrasive (NuPrep Skin Prep Gel). 
Shocks were delivered using BioPac Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with Sigma Spectra 360 Electrode 
Gel, attached using double-sided adhesive pads.  
Participants first underwent a thresholding procedure which allowed us to map their subjective 
sensitivity to shock. Thresholding consisted of a sequence of 80 shocks, with currents of 
magnitudes between 0.1 and 10 mA chosen according to a staircasing procedure. After each 
shock, participants were asked to report how painful it was, from a rating of 1 (not painful) to 5 
(very painful). We used an automated thresholding procedure inspired by Gracely et al. 62, in 
which separate staircases are used to estimate the transition points between each rating 
(1/2,2/3,3/4,4/5). For robustness, we used two independent staircases, running the QUEST 
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thresholding algorithm 63 for each transition. This gave a total of 8 independent staircases, with 
trials from each staircase randomly interleaved. At the end of thresholding, we averaged the two 
estimates for the 4/5 boundary to set the shock intensity for the rest of the experiment. 
Participants were given a sample shock at this intensity and in 3 cases we reduced the amplitude 
of the experimental shock by 20% at the participant’s request. Shock sensitivity was also 
measured at the end of the task, and on average showed a slight decrease (single-sample t-test, 
t44=2.70, p=0.097, d=0.403), equivalent to an 11% reduction in subjective pain. 
4.3.5 Stress Measures.  
Each participant was asked to make 65 subjective stress ratings at semiregular points 
throughout the probabilistic learning task (every 4-6 trials). These required participants to move 
a marker along a line to answer the question ‘How stressed do you feel at this moment?’ (Figure 
1D). All analyses were conducted upon z-scored ratings to obviate between-subject differences 
in use of the scale. 
Pupil diameter was recorded in a subset of participants (n=22) using an EyeLink 1000 System (SR 
Research), sampled at 100 Hz. Participants were seated in a darkened room, and asked to 
maintain fixation wherever possible. Stimuli were luminance matched, with the No Snake 
outcome signalled by a scrambled version of the Snake picture.  
Skin conductance was recorded from the index and middle fingertips of the left hand using 8mm 
BioPac AgCl electrodes. Electrodes were filled with a 0.5%-NaCl paste (BioPac Gel 101) and 
attached using double-sided adhesive pads supplemented by tape. We utilised a custom 
recording system based upon the provision of a constant current between the two electrodes 
and the measurement of the resultant voltage, allowing calculation of the conductance of the 
skin (AT64, Autogenic Systems). This signal was converted to an optical pulse and then digitally 
recorded at 100Hz in Spike2 (v6.17). 
In a subset of subjects (20) we collected saliva samples at 8 time points, from which we 
measured cortisol concentrations. In order to avoid baseline-elevation due to anticipatory stress 
we collected 2 baseline readings (Samples 1 & 2) on a separate day, on which participants were 
aware that no shocks would be received. On the day of the experiment, we collected the 
following samples: (3) Upon arrival (4) Immediately before task (~15 minutes after shock 
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thresholding) (5) 10 minutes into task (6) 20 minutes into task (7) 30 minutes into task (8) Post 
task. Participants salivated through straws into 2ml polypropylene tubes. Samples were frozen 
on the day of collection. Analysis was performed by Viapath at King’s College Hospital, using a 
competitive immunoassay. See section 3.3.3.5 for details of assay. Some samples were not 
suitable for analysis due to damage in storage (28/160). To accommodate for these missing 
values we used a Skilling-Mack test to assess changes in cortisol over time. One subject was 
excluded due to baseline concentrations > 3 standard deviations away from the mean (60.59 
nmolL-1; Population Mean = 6.92 nmolL-1; Population Standard Deviation = 13.57 nmolL-1). To 
verify that this did not affect our conclusions, we repeated our analyses without excluding this 
subject, and found comparable results.  All data was log transformed prior to analysis to render 
data close to normal33. 
4.3.6 Analysis of pupil diameter 
Data were exported using the EDF2ASC plugin, and imported as ASCII files into Matlab. Pupil 
diameter measurements were down-sampled to 100Hz, and low pass filtered (4Hz, 3rd order 
Butterworth) 41. Blinks were automatically detected by the EyeLink software, and removed by 
linear interpolation of samples 140ms either side of the blink. Data were then z-scored and 
detrended. No further artefact removal was necessary. 
Linear modelling involved a mixture of delta and boxcar regressors convolved with a canonical 
pupillary response function (see below for details of response functions) 41. For phasic 
responses, we also convolved regressors with the first and second derivatives of the canonical 
response function, a standard method in magnetic resonance imaging 65 designed to 
accommodate inaccuracies in the modelling of the amplitude and timing of induced responses. 
These were subsequently orthogonalised to their respective regressors, to apportion shared 
variance to the primary regressor. We took an additional step to remove signal due to changes 
in luminance, which produces pupil constrictions discernible from emotional/cognitive pupillary 
changes by their short latency 31. We estimated a luminance-response function for each subject 
on the basis of passive viewing of the images in our task (each image presented 50 times, 
displayed for 1000ms, with a jittered inter-trial interval of between 9000 and 1100ms). This 
provided a response function which could then be convolved with each presentation of an 
image, allowing us to discriminate fast, luminance-dependent constrictions from slower 
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dilatations relating to cognitive variables (Supplementary Figure 4.3). Following convolution of 
predictors with their response functions, predictors were z-scored. Details of the full linear 
model can be found in Supplementary Table 4.1. 
4.3.7 Analysis of skin conductance 
Data were first visually inspected and 8 participants were rejected due to low recording quality.  
Data from the remaining 37 participants were imported and preprocessed using tools from the 
SCRalyze suite 42. Data were downsampled to 10Hz and low pass filtered (5Hz, 1st order 
Butterworth). We used a custom artefact rejection regime based upon the second differential of 
the signal; non-physiological signals were identified by their very rapid rate of change. Subjects 
took self-paced breaks every 10 minutes, which caused substantial changes in skin conductance 
amplitude due to movement of the arm, and so we discarded the first 5 trials following a break. 
The timeseries was then concatenated, detrended, and z-scored. 
For linear models, we used a mixture of delta and boxcar regressors to represent phasic and 
sustained influences upon skin conductance. These regressors were then convolved with the 
canonical skin conductance response function outlined in ref. 35 and provided in SCRalyze 
(http://scralyze.sourceforge.net/) (see below for details of response functions). We utilised a 
variety of nuisance regressors to isolate changes in skin conductance relating to our cognitive 
variables of interest. All predictors were z-scored prior to modelling. Details of the full linear 
model can be found in Supplementary Table 4.2.  
4.3.8 Modelling of learning 
We modelled learning in our task using several models. Three of these (Rescorla-Wagner, Sutton 
K1, Hierarchical Gaussian Filter) were implemented using the HGF toolbox 
(http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/hgf-toolbox-v3-0/). For a full list of priors, see 
Supplementary Table 4.3. For details of each model, see Supplementary Table 4.4.  
The model that best explained our data was the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) (Figure 4.2A). 
Introduced by Mathys et al. 21, the HGF is a Bayesian learning model not constrained by the 
optimality typically assumed by such models; instead, subject-specific fitting allows for inter-
individual variability in learning. A recent fMRI study using the HGF highlighted its utility in 
assessing learning under uncertainty and its neural correlates 15; our task and analysis was 
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inspired by the ones used there. For a full description of the structure of the HGF, the reader is 
referred to the start of the Results section and to the introduction (section 1.4.5). 
The HGF was fit to each individuals’ choices using Variational Bayes, with two free parameters: ϑ, 
a metavolatility parameter which determines step size at the third level of the HGF, and ω, which 
is a constant component of the learning rate at the second level.  
The four quantities utilised in our analyses of stress measures are all trajectories over time, with 
a value that evolves according to the predictions made and outcomes experienced by that 
subject.  
The first of these is surprise (|δ1| in the HGF). This is the difference between the observed 
outcome (1 = Snake /0 = No Snake) on trial k and the subject’s belief about the probability of that 
outcome: 
 
|δ(k )1| =|μ (k )1 – s(µ (k )2) | 
Equation 4.1 
 
Where μ (k)1  is the actual outcome (1 or 0) and s(µ (k)2) is the sigmoid transformation of belief 
about probabilities before seeing the outcome i.e. the subject’s expectations. By taking the 
absolute value of δ(k)1  we therefore obtain a quantity which represents surprise about 
outcomes. 
The three forms of uncertainty we consider are: 
𝜎(k)1  : Uncertainty of predictions at the first level on trial k. Because beliefs at the first level take 
the form of a Bernoulli distribution, the variance is a function of the mean µ1, namely 	µ (k)1 * (1- µ 
(k)
1). This means that uncertainty has an inverted-U relationship with belief, as depicted in Figures 
3C and 4B. Intuitively, this form of uncertainty represents an individual’s estimate of the entropy 
of the environment at that moment in time; i.e. how surprising they expect things to be. We 
refer to it as irreducible uncertainty. 
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𝜎(k)2  : This is a form of informational uncertainty on trial k, representing lack of knowledge about 
the current stimulus:outcome relationship. Over time and in a stable environment, this 
uncertainty would fall to zero as the probabilities underlying the task are learned. In volatile 
environments, however, this is not the case. In the HGF, this form of uncertainty is 
approximately equivalent to a time-varying learning rate, used to update beliefs quickly when 
they are uncertain and slowly when they are supported by plentiful evidence. We refer to it as 
estimation uncertainty. 
 𝜎(k)3  : This can also be considered a form of estimation uncertainty, this time over the volatility 
of the environment at trial k. Again, it controls the speed of learning about volatility, weighting 
prediction errors from the probability space at the second level. We refer to it as volatility 
uncertainty. 
We ran an additional pair of Rescorla-Wagner (RW) learning models to test the validity of two 
assumptions made by the models in the original comparison. The first is that we assume 
participants update probabilities symmetrically on each trial: if p(outcome|stimulus1) increases 
then p(outcome|stimulus2) decreases by the same amount, as constrained by our task and 
explained to participants. To accommodate for departures from this scheme, we tested a RW 
model in which the probabilities for each stimulus were updated independently. Secondly, we 
examined the possibility that beliefs were updated differently following trials on which shocks 
were delivered by fitting two learning rates (αshock and αnoshock) for each subject. We then 
compared these two models to the original RW model (in which probabilities were updated 
symmetrically with a single learning rate). Bayesian Model Comparison showed that the simple 
model comprehensively outperformed the two variants (Exceedance Probability=1). We 
concluded, therefore, that the assumptions of symmetric probability updating and balanced 
learning across Shock/NoShock trials were justified. 
4.3.9 Modelling of stress 
We used multiple regression models to examine the relationship between task variables, 
including the trajectories from the HGF outlined above, and stress responses. We used least-
squared error to fit data from subjective ratings, using Matlab function glmfit. For physiological 
data we used robust fitting to avoid spurious fits due to unidentified artefacts. These were 
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implemented in Matlab with the function robustfit. In both cases we used two-tailed t-tests to 
assess whether parameters were different from zero i.e. whether, at the population level, a 
given parameter meaningfully and consistently predicted the dependent variable in question.   
We compared several multiple regression models to examine the effect of uncertainty upon 
subjective stress. All models included parameters for the previous rating and the number of 
shocks received since the last rating. The third term varied between models, and captured the 
effects of absolute prediction error (Model 1), and uncertainty at each level (Models 2-4).   
Model 1: Surprise 
Model 1 omitted an explicit representation of uncertainty, but summed the absolute prediction 
errors (|δ1|, bounded 0-1 on each trial) since the last rating, reflecting surprise in response to 
outcomes given an individual’s beliefs.  
Model 2: Irreducible Uncertainty 
Irreducible uncertainty is the variance of the Bernoulli distribution representing subject’s beliefs, 
captured by the HGF parameter 𝜎1. It is highest when p(outcome|stim1) and p(outcome|stim2) 
are both equal to 0.5, i.e. the sequence of outcomes is totally unpredictable. Irreducible 
uncertainty is also correlated with the magnitude of surprise (surprise is on average higher in 
uncertain situations). 
Model 3: Estimation uncertainty 
Uncertainty about the probabilities currently governing the observed outcomes is known as 
estimation uncertainty. This is represented in the HGF by the variance of the Gaussian 
distribution representing beliefs at the second level, 𝜎2.  
Model 4:  Volatility uncertainty 
Finally, we tested the hypothesis that subjective stress related to uncertainty at the third level, 
corresponding to uncertainty about the volatility of the generative process. Again, this is 
explicitly represented in the HGF as the variance of the Gaussian representing beliefs at the third 
level, σ3. 
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For physiological stress measures, we convolved predictors with canonical response functions 
(see below) to account for the timecourse of physiological responses 41,42.. 
4.3.10 Model comparisons 
We performed two sets of model comparisons. In the first we determined the best learning 
model to explain predictions made by the subjects, and in the second the best model for 
subjective stress responses. In each case, for each model and each subject, we took the model 
evidence (F-values for learning models or Bayesian Information Criterion 66 for multiple 
regression models), and used these to assess model fit by Random-Effects Bayesian Model 
Selection (RE-BMC) 36, as implemented in the VBA toolbox 37. RE-BMC allows for heterogeneity in 
the population; the best model for each individual is allowed to vary, producing an estimate of 
model frequency in the population (i.e. for how many participants that model is the best model) 
and an exceedance probability (the probability that the model in question is the most frequently 
utilised in the population).  
4.3.11 Response functions used in pupillary and skin conductance measures 
We used linear modelling to elucidate the impact of different events upon pupil diameter and 
skin conductance. This approach is well-established in the fMRI literature, where the use of 
General Linear Model to interpret haemodynamic responses is common. 
In this approach, a response function is used to describe how the output of a system (the 
measured variable) relates to its inputs. This response function is then convolved with a 
representation of the putative inputs to the system, and the resultant time course is used as a 
predictor in the General Linear Model. A common further step is to create secondary and 
tertiary regressors which are convolved with the first and second derivative of the response 
function 65. These ‘dispersion regressors’ allow for inaccuracy in the timing or form of modelled 
responses; we utilize this approach in our modelling of events (this is unnecessary when the 
modelled process is extended over time, and represented by a boxcar). 
Our response functions were drawn directly from previous studies. For skin conductance, we 
used the skin conductance response functions provided in SCRalyze 
(http://scralyze.sourceforge.net/), which are based on a gamma function convolved with a 
Gaussian kernel 67. 
 119 
Response functions for pupillary dilatation were first discussed by Hoeks et al. 68 and we use the 
response function described there, which takes the form of a gamma function: 
Diameter 𝑡 = t©	𝑒O©/Hª«¬ 
Equation 4.2 
The constants n and tmax dictate the shape of the response function. As advocated in the original 
paper, we use values of n=10.1 and tmax=930ms; we note that a recent study using this response 
function 41 demonstrated that this algorithm is robust to changes in the values of the constants 
used (see the Supplementary Information for ref. 3).   
We took an additional step in our modelling of pupillary responses. As the appearance of stimuli 
and outcomes involved increases in luminance, they evoked light-related pupil constrictions. 
Importantly, such luminance responses are faster than the dilatations evoked by cognitive or 
emotional factors 31. We accounted for light-related constrictions by convolving stimulus and 
outcome onsets with a luminance response function, which was fitted to each subject on the 
basis of a separate data set in which subjects were passively exposed to each of the image used 
in our experiment (see above and Supplementary Figure 4.3). The best fitting parameters were 
found using least-squared fitting implemented by the Matlab function fmincon. Calculated in this 
way, average n=3.6 and tmax=839ms. 
4.3.12 Statistical analysis 
All data analysis was completed in Matlab (Mathworks). All statistical tests were two-sided. We 
used one-sample t-tests to test for the significance of parameters in multiple regression models, 
and 2-way repeated-measures ANOVAs to analyse the time course data for skin conductance 
and pupil diameter. We used Pearson correlation coefficients except in the one case in which the 
data were a priori not normal, having been fit in a logit space (ϑ, Figure 2c). In this instance we 
confirmed non-normality using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and used Spearman’s Rank to assess 
the correlation non-parametrically. We used a Skillings-Mack test to analyse cortisol data 
(accounting for non-normality and missing data). 
4.3.13 Code availability 
Custom Matlab code for analysis of skin conductance and pupil diameter is available on request 
to the corresponding author. We used the HGF toolbox 
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(http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/hgf-toolbox-v3-0/) for modelling of learning, the 
VBA toolbox for model comparison (mbb-team.github.io/VBA-toolbox/), and the SCRalyze suite 
for preprocessing of skin conductance data (http://scralyze.sourceforge.net/).  
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Unpredictable aversive threat induces stress 
On each trial, participants (n=45) were shown one of two rocks and asked to predict whether or 
not there was a snake underneath (Figure 4.1 A&B). Participants were explicitly informed of the 
reciprocal probabilities linking the two stimuli: p(outcome	1|stimulus	1) = 1 − 	p(outcome	1|stimulus	2)		  
Equation 4.3 
The probabilistic mapping from stimulus (Rock) to outcome (Snake) shifted over the course of 
the experiment (Figure 4.1C), requiring participants to track this relationship over time. When an 
outcome was revealed, the presence of a snake was deterministically associated with an electric 
shock delivered to the back of the left hand. Over the course of 320 trials, the probabilistic 
mapping between stimuli and outcomes changed every 26-38 trials, requiring participants to 
maintain and update their beliefs about the probability of a snake being under either rock. 
Participants chose correctly on 68% of trials on average. Our use of electric shock proved an 
effective elicitor of cortisol release. A Skillings-Mack test (used to account for non-normality and 
missing data, see Methods) confirmed that cortisol concentrations changed over the course of 
the experiment (Skilling’s Mack T7=18.48, p=0.010). Paired tests indicated that this was due to an 
elevation of cortisol above baseline 20 minutes after the first shocks were received (Wilcoxon 
rank sum, Z=2.20, p=0.028), in line with the typical timecourse of endocrine responses 26 28,33. 
4.4.2 Hierarchical Bayesian learning explains predictions of shock 
We compared the performance of three learning models in explaining the predictions that 
participants made on each trial, defining our model space by reference to a recent study using a 
similar prediction paradigm 15. The simplest was a Rescorla-Wagner model 34, in which beliefs 
are updated by prediction errors with a fixed learning rate. Our second model, the Sutton-K1 35, 
allows the learning rate to vary as a function of recent prediction errors. The third model was a 
3-level Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) 21 in which beliefs are updated via prediction errors, 
with learning rates influenced by uncertainty about the veracity of current beliefs and 
environmental stability (Figure 4.2A). The HGF is hierarchical in the sense that learning occurs 
simultaneously on multiple levels. We consider a three level model, as this has been shown to 
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describe learning in a similar task where tone-picture associations were learned in a non-
stressful context 15 (see introduction section 1.4.5).  
The first level of the HGF constitutes participants’ predictions for each trial, the second level 
represents beliefs about probabilities that give rise to those predictions, and the third level 
quantifies the estimated volatility of the probabilities. On each trial, the model provides an 
estimate for each level, before the outcome is revealed and the estimate updated accordingly. 
Circumflexes (^) are used to distinguish the pre-update estimates from the updated version. The 
model is Gaussian in that predictions at each level are represented by a Gaussian distribution, 
described by its mean, 𝜇i, and variance 𝜎i, with i denoting the level in question (1, 2, or 3 in our 
model). The variance 𝜎i represents the uncertainty of the estimate at each level.  As previously 
alluded to, the first, second, and third level variance (𝜎1,	𝜎2,	𝜎3) correspond to irreducible, 
estimation, and volatility uncertainty respectively. Updates of beliefs at each level occur via 
prediction errors that propagate upwards and are weighted by the relative uncertainty of the 
level that generated them to the uncertainty of the level being updated, a form of precision-
weighting 15.  
We compared these three models (Rescorla-Wagner; Sutton K1; HGF) in a Random-Effects Model 
Comparison 36, using tools available online 37 (Figure 4.3A). We found that the HGF was the best 
model by a considerable margin (Model Frequency=82%, Exceedance Probability~1). This is a 
close replication of the aforementioned study in which tone-picture associations were learned in 
a non-stressful context 15. Having ascertained that the HGF was the model that best explained 
the predictions made by our participants, we proceeded to examine the distribution of fitted 
model parameters across the population. Fitting of the HGF allows for variance between 
individuals 15,21, which in this instantiation is expressed by two parameters: ω and ϑ. ω is a 
constant component of the learning rate at the second level, capturing interindividual variability 
in how rapidly people update their beliefs. ϑ determines the rate of update of the third level; this 
parameter can be understood as capturing ‘metavolatility’, with higher values implying a belief in 




Figure 4.2 | Modelling of learning and stress (A) Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) model 21. 
Beliefs are represented in probability distributions organized in a hierarchy, with the speed of 
updating at each level influenced by the estimate at the level above. This allows learning to occur 
more quickly in volatile environments. Each level is Gaussian, characterised by a mean (μ) and a 
variance (σ), which corresponds to uncertainty. These representations unfold over time, with the 
model furnishing an estimate at each level, for each trial. We take these dynamic 
representations of uncertainty from this model (B) and use them to predict stress responses (C) 
using linear modelling (D). The resultant regression coefficients (β1-n) quantify the influence of 
each form of uncertainty upon that stress measure. Note that X1-n are the regressors in the 
linear model, which include but are not limited to uncertainty trajectories; we also include terms 
such as number of shocks, and nuisance variables such as gaze co-ordinates. 
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We found that individuals’ metavolatility parameter correlated with levels of chronic stress, as 
assessed by a questionnaire measure of life stress, the Perceived Stress Scale 38 (Figure 4.3B) 
(Spearman ρ=0.39, p=0.014; non-parametric statistics used due to non-normality of ϑ 
[Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p<0.001]) ). This suggests that people who report higher levels of life 
stress behave as if they believe the environment is more uncertain, indicating that chronic stress 
levels may be affected by prior exposure to environments of high uncertainty. This confirms that 
interindividual variability in stress relates to variability in the beliefs about uncertainty, as 
expected if stress responses are tuned by exposure to uncertainty in the real world.  Having 
established a relationship between beliefs about uncertainty and a static subjective measure of 
chronic stress, we next addressed the coupling between dynamic stress measures and the 
trajectory of uncertainty within the task. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 | Assessing models of learning (A) Random-effects Bayesian Model Comparison 
confirmed that the HGF outperformed fixed-learning-rate models (Rescorla-Wagner) and 
variable-learning-rate non-Bayesian models (Sutton K1). (B) Life stress was assessed with a 
Perceived Stress Scale 38. Life stress scores were correlated with the metavolatility parameter (ϑ) 
in the HGF, suggesting that more stressed individuals believe the world to be less stable (n=41; 
Spearman ρ=0.38, p=0.014). 
 
4.4.3 Current irreducible uncertainty predicts subjective stress  
Having found that the HGF was the appropriate model of learning in our task, we asked how the 
dynamic quantities represented in this model related to acute stress responses. In fitting the 
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HGF to each participant, we obtained estimated trajectories of surprise (absolute prediction 
errors) and uncertainty over time (Figure 4.2B). To assess the influence of surprise and 
uncertainty upon subjective stress, we fit multiple regression models (Figure 4.2D) to subjective 
stress ratings for each participant (example trajectory shown in Figure 4.4A).  We compared the 
ability of four different models to predict stress ratings. All four models incorporated the 
previous stress rating and the number of shocks received since the last rating. Our predictions 
therefore took the following form: 
Rating 𝑘 = 					𝛽J ⋅ 	Rating(uOJ) + 	 𝛽^ ⋅ Shocks(u)´(u)´(uOJ) + 			𝛽~ ⋅ Variable	Term(u) 
Equation 4.4 
 
Here k represents the rating number [1-65], and i(k) is the trial number [1-320] associated with 
rating k (ratings occurred on average every 4-6 trials). Hence the shock term is the number of 
shocks received since the last subjective stress rating.  
Our first model summed the surprise experienced by a participant since the last rating, as 
captured by the variable δ1 in the HGF. The other three regression models quantified the 
uncertainty represented at each level of the HGF: irreducible uncertainty (𝜎1), estimation 
uncertainty (𝜎2), and volatility uncertainty (𝜎3).  
Subjective stress responses were best predicted by a model incorporating solely the current 
level of irreducible uncertainty (𝜎1) (Model Frequency=41%, Exceedance Probability=0.849, Figure 
4B). The resultant model is depicted in Figure 4.4D. As predicted, participants reported being 
most stressed when they believed the current state was high in irreducible uncertainty. All 
parameters were significantly greater than zero (Single-sample t-tests on parameters from 
multiple regression: Previous Rating β=0.25, t44=7.60, p<0.001; Shocks β=0.074, t44=3.58, p<0.001; 
Irreducible Uncertainty β=0.099, t44=3.22, p=0.0024). We found no evidence for a model of 
subjective stress featuring multiple forms of uncertainty (Supplementary Figure 4.1A). 
Additionally, we found that the estimates of subjective irreducible uncertainty furnished by the 
HGF provided better predictions of subjective stress than the objective irreducible uncertainty 




Figure 4.4 | Irreducible uncertainty predicts subjective stress (A) Example subjective stress 
trajectory for one participant (blue) and irreducible uncertainty estimates for that individual 
(red). (B) Regression models of subjective stress. All models shared two components: the value 
of the previous rating, and the number of shocks delivered since the last rating. The surprise 
model summed the surprise (|δ1|) for each outcome since the previous rating, whilst models σ1-
3 included the estimated uncertainty at each level of the HGF at the time of rating. Irreducible 
uncertainty (σ1) provided the best fit to our participants (n=45). (C) Irreducible uncertainty 
predicts prediction response times. A curve describing the variance of a Bernoulli distribution 
representing beliefs about probabilities, corresponding to irreducible uncertainty, predicts 
average response times (Pearson r=0.99, p<0.001). (D) The winning regression model predicting 
subjective stress responses (mean r2=0.25). Shocks and irreducible uncertainty both predicted 
subjective stress ratings (single-sample t-tests, p<0.001; p=0.0024). Error bars are SEM. 
 
 127 
Subjective irreducible uncertainty is highest in our task when the subject’s estimated probability 
of a shock is 50%, corresponding to a situation where the environment is utterly unpredictable, 
and maximal in entropy 17,18. There is an inverted-U relationship between irreducible uncertainty 
and probability, according to the variance of a Bernoulli distribution (Uncertainty = Probability x 
(1-Probability)). This relationship was also reflected in participants’ behavior, in that they were 
slowest making decisions under conditions of maximal uncertainty (Figure 4.4C) (Pearson 
correlation, r=0.99, p<0.001).  
We found that subjective stress responses are predicted by the trajectory of irreducible 
uncertainty experienced by each individual. The link between subjective and physiological 
indices of stress is problematic, with proposals that stress responses should exhibit coherence 29 
not well supported by extant data 39. Consequently, we next asked whether irreducible 
uncertainty also predicts physiological arousal, examining its relationship with two standard 
physiological stress measures, pupil diameter and skin conductance (Figure 4.2C).   
4.4.4 Physiological stress reflects uncertainty and surprise 
As a first step in gaining insight into the role played by uncertainty, we epoched physiological 
responses (pupil diameter, n=22; skin conductance, n=37) by trial, starting 2 seconds before an 
outcome was revealed. Based on evidence that pupil diameter and skin conductance reflect 
surprise 40, and building upon our finding that subjective stress responses are predicted by 
irreducible uncertainty, we implemented  median splits, separating trials according to whether 
they were high or low in irreducible uncertainty and high or low in surprise. This resulted in four 
groupings (high/high, high/low, low/high, low/low). Taking the average across participants, we 
observed that uncertainty increased pupil diameter throughout the trial (Figure 4.5A), with an 
additional, positive effect of surprise approximately 2 seconds after outcome presentation. The 
time-course of skin conductance responses was similar, albeit slower (Supplementary Figure 
4.2A). Two-Way ANOVAs demonstrated that both pupil diameter and skin conductance were 
increased by irreducible uncertainty (Pupil: F1,21=22.56, p<0.001, η2=0.051; Skin Conductance 
F1,36=9.36, p=0.004, η2=0.104) and surprise (Pupil: F1,21=20.71, p<0.001, η2=0.045; Skin 
Conductance: F1,36=12.40, p=0.001, η2=0.070), with no interaction (Pupil: F1,21=0.51, p=0.48; Skin 
Conductance: F1,36=0.14, p=0.71).  
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Within the framework of our model, information about uncertainty on the current trial is 
available to the subject before the trial begins, as it is computed on the basis of trial history 21. 
Consequently, we asked whether baseline pupil diameter and skin conductance, as assessed at 
the start of each trial, reflected the subjective belief of probabilities on that trial, as represented 
in our learning model. We found that baseline arousal displayed an inverted-U relationship with 
belief, strikingly reminiscent of the relationship between reaction time and belief (compare 
Figure 4.4C and 4.5B). To confirm this relationship, we show that a curve fit to the variance of a 
Bernoulli distribution, describing the relationship between irreducible uncertainty and belief, 
captured this relationship well (Pearson correlations, Pupil: r=0.96, p<0.001; Skin Conductance: 
r=0.84, p=0.002).  
To examine more precisely this relationship between uncertainty, surprise, and skin 
conductance, we employed a model-based approach (Figure 4.2D), convolving response 
functions for pupillary 41 and skin conductance 42 responses with our predictors (see Methods 
for full details of model and Supplementary Figure 4.3 for details of pupillary response function). 
We included surprise as a regressor in our models to ensure that responses to uncertainty were 
independent of the surprise at outcome (Supplementary Figure 4). We found that the level of 
irreducible uncertainty on each trial was a significant predictor of both pupil diameter (robust 
regression β=0.11, single-sample t-test t21=4.72, p<0.001) and skin conductance (β=0.044, 
t36=2.25, p=0.031) (Figure 4.5C).  
Finally, we asked whether the sensitivity of physiological stress to uncertainty related to that 
inferred from reported subjective stress responses. We took the magnitude of the regression 
coefficients (β) for irreducible uncertainty from our models of pupil diameter and skin 
conductance and compared them to the equivalent terms from our subjective stress model. In 
both cases, the two were positively correlated (Pearson correlation, Pupil: r=0.52, p=0.013; Skin 
Conductance: r=0.38, p=0.021) (Figure 4.5D) such that individuals whose subjective reports were 
more sensitive to uncertainty also showed a greater impact of uncertainty upon their 
physiological stress responses. This concordance between emotional and physiological state is 
predicted by theories of emotion 43, although direct evidence for this relationship is rare 44. Our 
computational perspective on the cognitive dynamics of stress responses reveal a strong 
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coherence between emotional and physiological systems, though we note that the sensitivity of 
the two physiological measures were not themselves correlated (Supplementary Figure 4.4). 
  
Figure 4.5 | Physiological responses reflect uncertainty and surprise (A) Median splits 
indicate that both irreducible uncertainty and surprise increase pupil diameter (both p<0.001). 
Shading is SEM across participants. (B) Baseline pupil diameter and skin conductance on each 
trial displayed a clear inverted-U relationship with belief, as seen for subjective stress. A curve 
describing the variance of a Bernoulli distribution fit well (Pearson correlations: Pupil diameter: 
r=0.96, p<0.001; Skin conductance: r=0.84, p=0.02). Error bars represent SEM. (C) A multiple 
regression model demonstrated a role for uncertainty throughout the trial for both pupil 
diameter (robust regression β=0.11, single-sample t-test, t21=4.72, p<0.001) and skin 
conductance (robust regression β=0.044, single-sample t-test, t41=2.25, p=0.031). Error bars 
represent SEM. (D) Across subjects, the sensitivity of subjective stress to irreducible uncertainty 
correlated with the sensitivity observed in pupil diameter (Pearson correlation, n=22, r=0.53, 
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p=0.014) and skin conductance (Pearson correlation, n=37, r=0.38, p=0.021) models. Each data 
point is one participant.  
4.4.5 Uncertainty-tuning of stress predicts performance  
We hypothesised that if the tuning of stress responses to uncertainty is adaptive, the degree of 
coupling between uncertainty and stress responses would predict how well participants 
performed in our task. We found this was indeed the case, as both subjective (Pearson 
correlation, r=0.37, p=0.012) and pupillary (Pearson correlation, r=0.62, p=0.0023) sensitivity to 
uncertainty predicted task performance (Figure 4.6A and B). Thus, the degree to which stress 
responses track irreducible uncertainty in the environment predicts learning under uncertain 
threat, in accordance with an adaptive account of stress responses under uncertainty. No such 
relationship was evident between gross measures of stress such as the mean or standard 
deviation of stress ratings, highlighting the utility of our model-based approach (Supplementary 
Figure 4.5). We also observed a negative relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and 
pupil diameter (Supplementary Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6 | Relationship between uncertainty sensitivity and task performance (A) 
Subjective stress sensitivity (the regression coefficient for uncertainty in the subjective stress 
model) correlated with how frequently participants predicted the correct outcome (Pearson 
correlation, n=45, r=0.37, p=0.012). (B) Pupillary sensitivity to uncertainty also predicted 




Stress responses are co-ordinated physiological and behavioral responses to environmental 
challenges 1. The precise features of the environment that generate stress have proved hard to 
pin down, particularly within a quantitative framework. Here we reveal a strong relationship 
between stress and subjective estimates of a quantifiable property of the environment, namely 
irreducible uncertainty. This demonstrates that computational models of learning can provide 
quantitative metrics of environmental and psychological variables that drive emotional and 
physiological stress responses. In the present case this highlights a striking relationship between 
a specific form of uncertainty and stress responses. 
4.5.1 Understanding emotion using learning models 
We built upon recent progress in computational modelling of subjective well-being 45, to inform 
a dissection of subjective stress responses. This was made possible by a hierarchical Bayesian 
model which allowed us to infer the trajectory of uncertainty experienced by each individual in 
our experiment. The use of computational models has proved indispensable in exploring the 
relationship between stress, genotype, and behaviour 46, but has not to our knowledge 
previously been applied to understand the genesis of stress responses. Our finding that such 
models can be used to link subjective uncertainty and stress responses adds to a growing 
consensus that detailed quantitative models are indispensable for the understanding of 
complex biological and mental phenomena 47-50.  
4.5.2 Linking subjective and physiological stress responses 
Having identified that irreducible uncertainty best predicted subjective stress responses, we next 
asked whether physiological responses were similarly predicted by uncertainty. Pupil diameter is 
a readout of central arousal thought to relate to noradrenergic activity in the locus coeruleus 51. 
Recent evidence suggests that locus coeruleus firing correlates with pupil diameter in the 
macaque monkey, and that stimulation of the locus coeruleus is sufficient to induce changes in 
pupil diameter 52. Although noradrenergic dynamics are crucial in orchestrating acute stress 
responses 53 as well as their behavioral 54 and mnemonic 55 impact, pupillometry is not typically 
employed in studies of stress (though see Henckens et al. (2012) for a notable exception). This is 
a potentially rich avenue of exploration, given that pupillary response metrics provide insight 
into emotional 31  and cognitive dynamics 41,56,57. Our finding that pupil diameter reflects the 
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surprise associated with an outcome, regardless of valence, replicates previous results 56-58. 
Furthermore, we also find a correlation between pupil diameter and the current level of 
irreducible uncertainty, with greater pupil diameter associated with higher levels of uncertainty.  
In rewarding environments, pupil diameter has been shown to reflect estimation uncertainty 
and, as we find here, irreducible uncertainty, often referred to as risk 56,57.  
A recent study examining individual differences in aversive learning found a post-outcome 
pupillary sensitivity to volatility 58. The authors found that learning-rate malleability in the face of 
changing volatility was related to trait anxiety.  We additionally establish a link between chronic 
stress states and beliefs of environmental volatility (Figure 4.2C). However, the stimulus-
outcome contingencies used in the previous study kept irreducible uncertainty roughly constant, 
precluding the comprehensive characterisation of multiple forms of uncertainty and the relation 
to the dynamics of emotional and physiological stress responses that we perform here. Our 
finding that pre-outcome pupil diameter correlates with irreducible uncertainty, and that this 
modulation is proportional to the effect of uncertainty upon subjective stress, is uniquely 
enabled by our design, and not inconsistent with the volatility-sensitivity observed previously. 
Fluctuations in skin conductance depend upon activity in the sympathetic nervous system 42, a 
key component of physiological stress responses 53. Our finding that skin conductance tracks 
uncertainty chimes with findings using the Iowa Gambling Task, in which participants make 
choices between decks of cards that produce rewards and punishments of varying magnitudes. 
Greater skin conductance responses are elicited whenever participants choose a card from the 
pack with higher risk, as defined by the variance of the outcome distribution 59. However, binary 
choices in static environments do not reveal whether skin conductance truly reflects uncertainty, 
or instead some aspect of the decision process. Our results suggest that even in non-
instrumental settings, somatic state relates closely to uncertainty in the environment. 
Furthermore, we show that these responses are dynamically driven by evolving internal 
estimates of irreducible uncertainty.  
Our multiple stress measures reflect the view that stress is a multidimensional construct, 
expressed through subjective and physiological channels 43. Some theoretical accounts highlight 
the importance of ‘coherence’ between stress systems in response to a challenge 29, though 
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discordance between the amplitude of physiological and subjective stress responses is rife 
(reviewed by Campbell & Ehlert 39). This is in part because the stressors typically used in 
laboratory experiments with humans, such as social stress, are difficult to parameterise, 
precluding a detailed quantitative analysis. Conversely, using a quantitative computational 
approach, we show that emotional and physiological stress responses track uncertainty and are 
correlated within individuals. We do not claim that ours are exhaustive metrics of stress, nor that 
chronic stress necessarily behaves similarly to the acute stress examined here. Establishing how 
acute stress accumulates to produce allostasis 60, and what effects such allostasis exerts upon 
subsequent acute stress responses, is a major challenge for the field.  
4.5.3 Conclusion 
An integrated understanding of normal brain function and its perturbation in disease will 
require detailed analysis at multiple levels of description, from behavioural to cellular. Here we 
provide a computational account of acute stress responses in humans. Our results emphasise 
the utility of formal models of learning, particularly those in a Bayesian tradition, to 
understanding emotional dynamics. Dysfunction of stress response systems is common to many 
psychiatric disorders 2 suggesting that a computational decomposition of stress responses of 
the kind provide here may prove a fruitful addition to the nascent field of computational 
psychiatry 61.   
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4.6 Supplementary figures  
 
Supplementary Figure 4.1 | Assessing alternative models of subjective stress (A) Model 
comparison demonstrated that adding additional estimation or volatility uncertainty did not 
improve the performance of the irreducible uncertainty model used to explain subjective stress 
responses (Model Frequency=70.5%, Exceedance Probability~1). (B) Model comparison 
confirmed that subjective uncertainty as furnished by the HGF model provided a better predictor 
of subjective stress (Model Frequency=70.5%, Exceedance Probability=0.993) than objective 
uncertainty. (C) As expected, objective and subjective uncertainty are correlated (Pearson 
correlation, mean r=0.452); if both are placed in the model, only subjective uncertainty provides 
a significant predictor of subjective stress. Error bars are SEM across participants.  
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Supplementary Figure 4.2 | Additional physiological stress data (A) We split trials by 
uncertainty and surprise (see main results and Figure 4.4A). Average skin conductance was 
higher for trials with higher uncertainty and surprise (Repeated Measures ANOVA, Uncertainty: 
F1,36=9.36, p=0.004, η2=0.104, Surprise: F1,36=12.40, p=0.001, η2=0.070), with no evidence of an 
interaction (F1,36=0.14, p=0.71). (B) Our regression models of pupil diameter and skin 
conductance included regressors for surprise at outcome,to ensure that correlations with 
surprise were not attributed to uncertainty. Uncertainty was a significant predictor of both pupil 
diameter (robust regression, β=0.11, single-sample t-test t21=4.72, p<0.001) and skin 
conductance (robust regression, β=0.044, single-sample t-test t36=2.25, p=0.031), with surprise 
predicting pupil diameter equally on shock and no shock trials (robust regression, SurpriseShock: 
β=0.018, single-sample t-test t21=4.11, p<0.001; SurpriseNoShock: β=0.017, t21=3.05, p=0.0060; 
Difference, paired t-test t21=0.209, p=0.84). However, skin conductance reflected surprise 
asymmetrically, with the parameter for surprise on shock trials greater than that for no-shock 
trials (robust regression, SurpriseShock: β=0.035, single-sample t-test t36=2.58, p=0.014; 
SurpriseNoShock: β=0.0019, single-sample t-test t36=0.167, p=0.87; Difference, paired t-test 
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t36=1.84, p=0.07). This replicates previous observations of asymmetric prediction error 
representations in skin conductance measurements69. However, a direct comparison of 
parameters from participants for whom we recorded both pupil diameter and skin conductance 
suggested that the two were not significantly different, with neither a main effect (Repeated 
Measures ANOVA, Effect of recording modality, F1,35=2.82,  p=0.11, η2=0.025) nor an interaction 
between modality and regressor (Repeated Measures ANOVA, Modality x Regressor interaction, 
F1,35=0.96,  p=0.39, η2=0.012). We are therefore unable to reject the null hypothesis that pupil 
diameter and skin conductance track aversive learning in comparable manners; disparities 
between the two may therefore be a result of low signal-to-noise in skin conductance 




Supplementary Figure 4.3 | Luminance fitting procedure used for model of pupil 
diameter. In order to accommodate fluctuations in pupil diameter induced by luminance 
changes, we fit a luminance response function for each subject. This was conducted using a 
reference data set acquired after the experiment, in which each of the images used in the 
experiment was shown 50 times. We then fit a single luminance response function using data 
from all image presentations (red trace above, shading is SEM). We used the gamma response 
function defined in41 which has two free parameters: time to peak (Tmax) and number of cascade 
components (n). We found the best fitting pair of parameters for our luminance response 
function using gradient descent methods implemented by the MatLab function fmincon (blue 
trace above, shading is SEM). As expected from the fast constriction typically associated with the 
light reflex, the average Tmax in our luminance response function was smaller than that used in 
the conventional response function (839ms vs 930ms). We were thus able to include luminance 




Supplementary Figure 4.4 | Pupillary and skin conductance sensitivity to uncertainty are 
uncorrelated. We found no evidence of correlation between pupillary and skin conductance 
sensitivity to uncertainty (Pearson correlation, n=19, r=0, p=0.97). This is in contrast to the 
positive correlation observed between each of these parameters and subjective stress 




Supplementary Figure 4.5 | Mean and variance of subjective stress ratings are unrelated 
to performance. Neither mean (A) (Pearson correlation, n=45, r=-0.18, p=0.23) nor standard 
deviation (B) (Pearson correlation n=45, r=0.014, p=0.93) of subjective stress ratings relate to 
performance on our task. Conversely, computational modelling reveals that the ‘uncertainty-
tuning’ of stress responses based on dynamic uncertainty estimates is correlated with task 






Supplementary Figure 4.6 | Uncertainty-tuning in the pupil is inversely correlated with 
Intolerance of Uncertainty. Pupillary sensitivity to uncertainty was inversely related to a 
questionnaire measure of uncertainty aversion (Intolerance of Uncertainty70). Subjects with 
greater pupil sensitivity to uncertainty were less averse to uncertainty (Pearson correlation, 
n=22, r=-0.51, p=0.015). This may be related to the other effect we observed, that performance 
under uncertainty is predicted by the sensitivity of the pupil to uncertainty (Figure 4.6B); 
aversion to uncertainty may be a preference rooted in the fact that individuals whose pupils do 
not track uncertainty perform poorly when in uncertain situations.  
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Supplementary Table 4.1: Parameters used in pupil model 
Parameter Mean SEM Tt21 p Form 
Constant 0.0614 0.0229 2.68 0.0140  
Stimuli* -0.0704 0.0165 -4.27 <0.001 
Delta function, 
aligned to stimuli 
presentations, 
luminance convolved 
Outcome -0.6922 0.1774 -3.90 <0.001 
Delta function, 
aligned to all 
outcomes, luminance 
convolved 
Shocks 0.4930 0.1042 4.73 <0.001 
Delta function 
aligned to shock 
outcomes 
No Shocks 0.2561 0.1106 2.32 0.0308 
Delta function 
aligned to no shock 
outcomes 
Surprise Shock 0.0183 0.0045 4.11 <0.001 
Delta function 
aligned to shocks and 
scaled by trial 
surprise (|δ1|) 
Surprise No Shock 0.0167 0.0055 3.05 0.0060 
Delta function 
aligned to no shocks 




0.1069 0.0227 4.72 <0.001 
Boxcar from stimulus 
onset, scaled by trial 
irreducible 
uncertainty (σ1) 
Gaze X coordinate -0.0501 0.0102 -4.90 <0.001 Unconvolved 
Gaze Y coordinate 0.0051 0.0218 0.23 0.818 Unconvolved 
Predictors were convolved with a standard pupillary response function (see SI Methods).The 
exceptions were the gaze X and Y coordinates, which were unconvolved, and the Stimuli 
regressor. For all phasic responses (Stimuli, Outcome, Shock, No Shock, Surprise Shock, 
Surprise No Shock), we also convolved predictors with first and second derivatives of the 
response function to allow for variance in the shape and timing of the response (data not 
shown).  
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* The Stimuli regressor was not convolved with the canonical pupillary response function, 
but with the luminance response function estimated for each subject. See Supplementary 
Figure 3 for details.  
Supplementary Table 4.2: Parameters used in skin conductance models 
Parameter Mean SEM Tt21 p Form 
Constant -0.1054 0.0111 -9.47 <0.001  
Stimuli -0.0093 0.0087 -1.07 0.2905 




Outcome 0.1177 0.0260 4.53 <0.001 
Delta function, aligned 
to all outcomes, 
luminance convolved 
Shocks 0.0698 0.0242 2.89 0.0066 
Delta function aligned 
to shock outcomes 
No Shocks -0.1890 0.0347 -5.45 <0.001 
Delta function aligned 
to no shock outcomes 
Surprise Shock 0.0347 0.0134 2.59 0.0139 
Delta function aligned 
to shocks and scaled by 
trial surprise (|δ1|) 
Surprise No Shock 0.0019 0.0113 0.17 0.8686 
Delta function aligned 
to no shocks and 




0.0442 0.0196 2.25 0.0305 
Boxcar from stimulus 
onset, scaled by trial 
irreducible uncertainty 
(σ1) 
Predictors were convolved with a standard skin conductance response function (see SI 
Methods). 
We also included regressors for each block (i.e. each stretch of 10 minutes between breaks) 
to account for changes in baseline between blocks. 
As with the pupil model, for all phasic responses (Stimuli, Outcome, Shock, No Shock, 
Surprise Shock, Surprise No Shock), we also convolved predictors with first and second 




Supplementary Table 4.3: Hierarchical Gaussian Filter details 
Parameter Notes Value 
Model constants 
ϑ Metavolatility parameter, controlling step size 
at the third level. Estimated in logit space. 
Mean              = 0 
Variance         = 16 
ω  Constant component of the learning rate at 
the second level. Estimated in native space. 
Mean               = -2 
Variance         = 16 
κ Modulates coupling between 3rd and 2nd levels. Held constant. 
Trajectories 
Note that since uncertainty (σ) has a natural lower bound at zero – one cannot have 
negative uncertainty – it is estimated in log space. The numbers given here refer to values in 
that space. 
Predictions (X1) The predictions are a sigmoid transformation 
of the probabilities represented in X2, and so 
do not have a starting value. 
𝜇1: Mean      = none 
     Variance = none 𝜎1: Mean      = none 
     Variance = none 
Probabilities (X2) A starting value of 0 implies neutrality between 
outcomes. Starting variance was chosen to be 
Bayes optimal using the tools provided in the 
TAPAS toolbox 
(‘tapas_bayes_optimal_binary_config’). 
𝜇2: Mean       = 0 
     Variance = 0 𝜎2: Mean       = 0.06 
     Variance = 0 
Volatility (X3) The absolute starting value of X3 is arbitrary, as 
changes in fitted parameters will affect scaling.  
𝜇3: Mean       = 1 
     Variance = 0 𝜎3: Mean       = 4 
     Variance = 0 
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Beliefs are symmetrically updated, 




Beliefs are asymmetrically updated, 
with beliefs about the two stimuli 
updated individually. 
α=0.47 (0.25) 
Dual Learning Rate Rescorla-
Wagner 
Beliefs are updated with different 
learning rates on shock and no shock 






Beliefs updated with a variable 
learning rate that depends upon the 
amplitude of recent prediction errors. 




Three layer model with two fitted 
parameters governing connections 
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 Chapter 5: Formation of value from quality and 
quantity in human decision making 
5.1 Abstract 
In the previous chapters we have seen how learning models can be applied to understand the 
generation and impact of emotion. In Chapters 2 and 3, we used reinforcement learning models 
to represent how organisms learn about the value of stimuli through repeated experience. In 
many cases, however, value estimates are computed ‘on the fly’, on the basis of multiple pieces 
of data. In this chapter we explore the neural process underlying a common case of this process, 
in which information about quality and quantity must be combined to assess the value of an 
option. We used giftcards, allowing us to vary the quality (by switching between stores, which 
have distinct values to our participants) and the quantity (by changing the amount of money on 
each card).  Using fMRI, we examined correlates of quality, quantity, and their integration into 
value signals. We found that the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) correlated with the giftcard quality, 
whilst the Intra Parietal Sulcus (IPS) specifically reflected quantity. Several brain regions, 
including the cingulate cortex, were sensitive to the interaction of quality and quantity, implying 
a role in the computation of value. We found that the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) was 
uniquely activated by quality, quantity, and their interaction, suggesting a hub for the flexible 
calculation of value from quality and quantity. Additional Repetition Suppression (RS) analyses 
identified a region immediately posterior to the value-integrating portion of the ACC which 





As reviewed in section 1.2, several decades of work on value-based decision-making have 
identified numerous correlates of value in the brain 1. Convergent evidence from human fMRI 2-8 
and non-human primate recordings 9-14 suggest that animals form neural representations of the 
subjective value of stimuli in a wide variety of brain areas, potentially in an automatic fashion 
invariant to the task at hand 15-16.  
Value representations might be useful for a wide variety of computations regularly performed by 
the brain, such as the allocation of attention 17, energy 18, and mnemonic resources 19. Most 
prominently, these value estimates are thought to form the input to value-comparison 
mechanisms whereby decision are made between options 21, by a process variously 
characterized as evidence accumulation 21,22 or mutually inhibitory competition 23-26. 
Representations of stimulus value also play a crucial role in the models of reinforcement 
learning discussed earlier in this thesis, in which discrepancies between experienced and 
expected values result in prediction errors that drive learning 30. 
5.2.1 How are value estimates constructed? 
Despite abundant evidence that value representations exist, we know little about how they 
come about. Efforts to isolate value signals in a neuroeconomic framework have involved 
carefully controlling stimulus characteristics and action requirements to distill value from its 
component parts31,32.  However, recent studies have emphasized that biological and 
evolutionary contextualization of decision-making provides a richer account of the 
representations and computations which underlie choice 33-35. An appreciation of the 
evolutionary pressures faced by an agent allows us to ask how the brain represents variables 
relevant to survival, rather than those considered important by economic theory.   
 One fruitful avenue of exploration has been the use of foraging tasks 36-38, in which animals 
make a series of decisions about whether to sample a currently presented option, or move on in 
the hope of obtaining something better.  Such tasks provide insight into the encoding of 
ethologically relevant variables, like the value of searching the environment for alternative 
options, in addition to more traditional analyses of option value 9,39,40.  In this experiment we 
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drew inspiration from foraging tasks to ask how current option value is constructed from its two 
component parts: quality and quantity. 
Quality (how good a specific reward is) and quantity (how much of it there is) arguably represent 
the cardinal dimensions from which the value of rewarding stimuli is calculated. Previous studies 
typically vary one or both to manipulate value, but to date a characterization of their 
independent representation and combination is lacking. The calculation of value from quality 
and quantity is a basic model-based computation (see section 1.3.2.4), requiring animals to 
combine estimates of quality with information about quantity*. Many primate studies vary both 
the number of drops and the subjective quality of different juices, but focus on the resultant 
menu-independent and persistent value representation 9,39,40. Conversely, human neuroimaging 
studies often involve choices between goods that are matched in quantity, but vary in quality 
(i.e. packet of crisps vs. chocolate bar) 2,41-44, or rely upon financial rewards that vary only in 
quantity 45-47. In both cases, how quality and quantity are processed in parallel before being 
combined to calculate an option value remains unclear.  
We designed an experiment in which participants integrated information about the quality of a 
giftcard (how subjectively valuable it was for them to be able to spend money at a particular 
store) and quantity (how many £ were on the giftcard). In a behavioural session we characterized 
the combination of quality and quantity into integrated value using an auction procedure 
(Becker-DeGroot-Marschak, BDM) 48, which allowed us to select giftcards with distinct qualities 
for use in an fMRI experiment. In the MRI scanner, participants evaluated a series of giftcards 
without choice, allowing us to examine the representation of quality, quantity, and value, free 
from decision-related signals 49. Interspersed choices ensured engagement and encouraged 
participants to evaluate displayed options.  
We asked two questions about value representations: which brain regions participate in the 
computation of value from its component parts, and what is the form of the resultant 
representation? To address the first question, we characterized the relationship between quality, 
                                                        
* Quality estimates might be obtained either in a model-based fashion or a model-free fashion. However, 
the combination of quality and quantity information requires a basic model of the world, in the form of 
knowledge about how the value of an offer scales with quantity.  
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quantity, and value, and looked for correlates of each in the brain: areas in which activity was 
higher when the variable of interest was greater. However, such analyses make an assumption 
about the underlying neural processes, namely that neurons fire more (or less) in order to 
encode the value of a single variable. This assumption dominates both fMRI and single-cell 
analyses of value. Bar a few recent studies using classification analyses 42-44, analysis of value 
representation is overwhelmingly conducted using General Linear Models (GLMs), sensitive to 
linear relationships between the dependent variable (BOLD activity in a voxel or firing rate in a 
neuron) and the independent variable (value).  
5.2.2 How are value estimates represented? 
There are (at least) three reasons to question the assumption that value is coded linearly. Firstly, 
recent analyses of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity have uncovered rich, flexible, and temporally 
diverse codes which suggest that simple monotonic coding is a poor model of tuning curves in 
the PFC 50-52. Given that the prefrontal and cingulate cortices are a hub for value-guided decision-
making 53, these studies suggest that representations of value might be more sophisticated than 
previously appreciated.  Secondly, value estimates must be highly malleable, preferably 
incorporating some measure of uncertainty in order to allow appropriate updating 54,55, as 
reviewed in the introduction section 1.4.3. Extant work has focused upon the segregated 
encoding of value-uncertainty by neurons distinct from the ones carrying value-magnitude 
information, thus assuming a ‘summary-statistics’ representation 56-63. Conversely, theoretical 
treatments of sensory coding suggest that uncertainty could be folded into the representation 
itself, elegantly conferring the ability to perform Bayesian integration via summation 64,65. As 
described in section 1.4.6, a prerequisite for such coding is that the variable in question is coded 
by a population of non-linearly tuned neurons. The fact that just such a non-linear encoding 
scheme is found in the representation of number in parietal and frontal cortices 66-68 provides a 
third reason to think that value coding might be non-linear, or even Gaussian-tuned, in some 
parts of the brain.  
We therefore constructed our experiment to make use of Repetition Suppression (RS). RS 
describes the phenomenon whereby repeated presentation of the same or similar stimuli elicits 
a reduction in evoked responses. By examining the influence of the previous trial upon activity in 
the current trial, RS can reveal structure to neural representations that is invisible to traditional, 
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parametric approaches 69. Although the cellular mechanisms of RS are unclear and probably 
diverse 70,71, numerous studies confirm that the amount of repetition suppression exerts by one 
stimulus upon another is modulated by the overlap in their neural representation, with maximal 
suppression elicited by repetition of the same stimulus 72-77. RS has recently been used to 
elucidate representations of outcomes and agents in value-based decision-making 78-80, the 
neural representation of space 81, and the organization of internal models of stimuli and their 
associations 82,83. Particularly salient to the current experiment, RS has provided evidence for 
Gaussian tuning for numerosity in humans 84-86, replicating recordings in non-human primates 
67.  
We therefore sought to use RS as an assay for non-linear tuning for value, as predicted by the 
considerations in the previous section. Concretely, we hypothesized that value might be 
represented by populations of tuned neurons with overlapping, non-linear tuning for value, as 
previously documented for number 67. Following the logic of previous repetition studies, 
presentation of a stimulus of a given value elicits repetition suppression in those neurons 
sensitive to the presented value. This means that subsequent stimuli which activate the same, or 
an overlapping, population of neurons, elicit less activity than stimuli activating un-suppressed 
populations of neurons. The aggregate effect, visible at the voxel-level, is that activity evoked on 
a trial is a function of how dissimilar the current stimulus is to the previous one 84,85. This idea is 
explored more in due course – see Figure 5.8 for a graphical description. 
To preview our results, we found that quality was represented in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), 
extending into the lateral PFC. Conversely, quantity was associated with increasing activity in the 
bilateral Intraparietal Sulcus (IPS). The interaction between the two (higher slope of quantity 
coding with higher quality) correlated with activity in the posterior cingulate cortex and 
bilaterally in the superior temporal lobe. We found that an Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) 
displayed a conjunction of all three effects, suggesting that it provides a focal point for the 
calculation of integrated value from its component parts. Consistent with this, we observed 
repetition suppression for integrated value in the cingulate; activity covaried with the absolute 
difference in value between consecutive trials. However, further analysis of a neural firing-rate 
model suggests that such signals might arise from mixed linear codes, and not Gaussian-tuning 




47 participants participated in the behavioural study, with 26 returning for the fMRI session. Of 
these, one participant failed to complete the experiment due to ill-health, leaving 25 participants 
in the imaging study. Both studies were approved by a local ethics committee (Research Ethics 
Committee UCL, ref. 3450/002). 
5.3.2 Stimuli & payment 
Based on pilot experiments, we selected 13 giftcards according to several criteria. We chose 
cards that were well known to the participant population, maximised between-subject variability, 
and displayed minimal correlations between cards (i.e. preferences for a given card were hard to 
predict from preferences for other cards).  
During the behavioural session, participants completed two tasks: an auction procedure, from 
which they could obtain a mixture of up to £20 cash and a £20 giftcard, and a session of paired 
choices between cards worth £20 (Figure 5.1). One trial was randomly selected across both 
sessions and reimbursed appropriately.  
For the fMRI experiment, participants first completed paired choices between cards worth £20 
outside of the scanner, and subsequently chose between cards worth £1-20 within the scanner. 
One trial from each task was reimbursed, in addition to a £20 flat rate for experiment 
completion. 
5.3.3 Behavioural session 
Participants first performed an auction task (Becker-DeGroot-Marshak, BDM) designed to elicit 
their subjective valuation of different giftcards holding varying amounts of money 48. Briefly, the 
BDM involves players placing a minimum bid for an item on each trial. After the experiment, a 
single trial is randomly selected for reimbursement. For that trial, a randomly drawn number – 
the ‘cost’- is compared to the bid. If the cost is higher than the bid, the player retains their 
endowment and does not receive the item. If the bid is higher than the cost, then the player 
receives the item, but, crucially, pays the cost rather than their bid. This removes the incentive to 
place low bids, resulting in an optimal strategy in which players report their true values.  
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Prior to the task, participants were led through an example trial and answered questions 
confirming understanding. Each of 13 giftcards was presented in association with 12 different 
quantities, giving a total of 156 trials. 
Following the auction task, participants chose between pairs of giftcards of matched quantity 
(£20). Each combination of cards was presented twice, yielding 325 trials.  
5.3.4 Participant and card selection for scanning study 
We selected a subset of participants to complete the scanning part of the study (Figure 5.2). 
Selection was based upon reliability, stability, and diversity of preferences over giftcards.  We fit 
linear regressions to values reported during the auction procedure, yielding the following 
equation for each giftcard: 
Integrated Value = b*Quantity + C 
Equation 5.1 
Where b and C (an intercept term) were fit using robust regression (Figure 5.2A). The b’s thus 
obtained are a measure of a giftcard’s quality; the value of a single unit of currency on that 
giftcard. We next assessed how well these b’s predicted paired choice (Figure 5.2B), selecting 
subjects for whom there was a close relationship (e.g. 5.2B iii).  
For the scanning session, we selected three giftcards, chosen to maximise variance in quality 
(Figure 5.2C). We thus selected the lowest and highest quality card (max b and min b) and one 
closest to the mean of the two. Having performed this selection procedure, we verified that 
choices of these cards in the paired-choice session reflected the rankings calculated from the 
BDM (Figure 5.2D). These bs were used as indicators of quality for the fMRI analyses in which 
parametric modulators were used (GLM2 & GLM3, see below). 
5.3.5 fMRI task 
The task was designed to allow us to examine representations of quality, quantity, and their 
integration, using both linear analyses and measures of repetition suppression. To avoid 
measurements being confounded by variables related to the dynamics of stimulus comparison 
49, on the majority of trials we presented a single stimulus (Figure 5.1D), and asked participants 
to evaluate its desirability. 
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Presentation side was flipped every 10 trials. Stimuli remained onscreen for 4000ms, before 
being followed by an ITI (normally distributed around 1500ms) or, in 1/7 trials, the appearance of 
a second giftcard. Participants were asked to make a choice between the two within 4000ms, 
using a button box. Failure to register a choice within this time period resulted in a ‘TIME OUT’ 
message, and participants were informed prior to scanning that if a timed-out trial was selected 
for reimbursement, they would receive no payment for that part of the experiment. Each 
giftcard displayed in the scanner was pseudo-coloured red or blue to reduce gross visual 
differences between cards. 
Repetition suppression in fMRI effects can be sensitive to expectation 87, necessitating 
counterbalancing of stimulus order. We defined 7 trial types (red and blue versions of each three 
giftcards, + decision trials), and used a genetic algorithm to find a stimulus order in which 
p(stimi2|stimj1) was matched for all stimuli i and j. We manually removed trials on which 
decisions were repeated, leaving a sequence of 97 stimuli.  The quantity (1-20) on the giftcards 
were randomised, effectively orthogonalising quality and quantity (mean correlation coefficient 
across participants = 0.0074, p= 0.40). Participants completed 4 runs of the task, yielding a total 
of 340 stimulus evaluation trials and 48 decision trials. 
5.3.6 Logistic regression modelling of choices during fMRI task 
We used logistic regression to quantify the factors modulating choices in the scanner. For each 
participant, we fit a model to predict whether they chose the new card (presented during the 
decision trial), or the old card (on-screen from the valuation trial): 
Choice(t) = s(b0 + b1QualityNew-Old + b2Quantity New-Old + b3Interaction New-Old ) 
Equation 5.2  
Where b0 is a constant term accounting for option-independent biases in choice, b1-3 are 
regression coefficients describing the effect of each term on choice, and s is the sigmoid 
function: 
𝑠 𝑥 = 	 11 + 𝑒O· 
Equation 5.3 
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Quality was defined using the betas from the BDM auction (see above and Figure 5.4A), whilst 
quantity merely reflected the number of £ on each giftcard. The interaction term was calculated 
as the mean-centred product of quality and quantity. 
To assess choice predictability, we took the output of the model  (valued between 0 and 1), 
rounded it (such that choices were either a 0 or a 1), and compared it to the vector of actual 
choices made by the participant. Predictability was then defined simply as the % of choices 
correctly predicted by the model. 
5.3.7 fMRI data acquisition 
Data were acquired using a Siemens 3T Trio scanner with a 32-channel head coil at the 
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging.  
We used a 2D Echo Planar Image (EPI) sequence optimised to minimise dropout in the OFC 88, 
with voxels 3mm isotropic (TR=3.36s,TE=30ms), with 48 slices giving whole brain coverage. Slices 
were tilted at -300. Scans were preceded by a field map (TE1=10ms, TE2= 12.46ms). The first 5 
volumes of each run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration.  
We also acquired a T1-weighted structural scan for each subject, comprising 176 slices over a 
field of view of 256mm with a 1mm isotropic resolution (TR=7.92ms, TE=2.48ms) 89.  
Throughout scanning, we monitored breathing rate using a pneumatic belt and pulse & blood 
oxygenation using an infrared pulse oximeter (Nonin systems, Model 8600 F0). Both were 
digitized and recorded via Spike2 (v6.17), and subsequently included in GLM analyses of brain 
activity along with regressors derived from motion correction 90. 
5.3.8 Pre-processing 
All pre-processing and data analysis took place in SPM 12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). 
Subsequent data visualization took place in MRICron 
(http://people.cas.sc.edu/rorden/mricron/index.html) and MRIcroGL 
(http://www.cabiatl.com/mricrogl/).  
Having discarding the first 5 volumes, we corrected EPIs for field inhomogeneities using acquired 
field maps, bias corrected, slice-time corrected (to the middle slice), and realigned and unwarped 
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to the first EPI for each participant. EPIs were then co-registered to each participant’s structural 
scan.  
We used the DARTEL toolbox for between-subject registration and normalization 91. Structural 
images were first segmented into white matter, grey matter, and CSF components. Segmented 
images were then iteratively warped into normalized MNI space, providing a template which was 
then used to normalize EPIs, a step which included Gaussian smoothing at 8mm FWHM.  
5.3.9 fMRI data analysis 
Data were analysed using a series of General Linear Models (GLMs). These were estimated for 
each participant, including the calculation of contrasts between different regressors (first-level 
analysis). This provided summary-statistics (bs) which could be tested at a population level 
versus a null hypothesis that they were on average equal to zero (second-level analysis) 92.  
In order to obviate multiple comparisons when performing whole brain analyses, we used 
cluster-based correction using a cluster-defining threshold of p<0.005, and a cluster-corrected 
FWE threshold of p<0.05, except for in analysis of repetition suppression (GLM2, below), where a 
more lenient cluster-forming threshold of p<0.01 was used, in line with recent repetition 
suppression studies 78,80,82.    
To extract the parameter estimates displayed in Figure 5.6, we used group-functional ROIs 
thresholded at p<0.005. For the conjunction analysis described in Figure 5.7 we took the product 
of 3 binary masks (quality, quantity, interaction), each thresholded at puncorrected<0.05, resulting in 
a family-wise error rate of puncorrected=0.000125.  
5.3.9.1 GLM1: quality and quantity 
Our first GLM incorporated separate onset regressors for cards of different qualities (low, 
medium, high). Each of these was modelled as a 4s long boxcar, and associated with a 
parametric modulator corresponding to the quantity on the card at each presentation. We used 
a fourth onset regressor corresponding to decision-trials, which were modelled as delta 
functions. This GLM was used to perform a whole-brain analysis of value computations during 
evaluation trials. 
We performed three key contrasts:  
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 Quality:  [QualityHigh – QualityLow] 
 Quantity:  [QuantityHighQuality + QuantityMediumQuality + QuantityLowQuality] 
 Interaction:  [QuantityHighQuality - QuantityLowQuality] 
 
The interaction analysis was constructed to test for regions displaying steeper coding of quantity 
for high quality cards than low quality cards, consistent with value integration (Fig 5.2C) and 
corresponding to the intuition that an extra unit of a more desirable good (e.g. a Ferrari) is worth 
more than an extra unit of a less desirable good (e.g. an apple). 
We excluded trials preceding decisions from the evaluation regressors in order to guard against 
contamination of the evaluation regressors by decision-related activity, a possibility due to the 
lack of ITI between evaluation and decision trials.   
5.3.9.2 GLM2: Repetition Suppression 
Following examples from the numerosity-coding literature 84-86, we designed a repetition-
suppression analysis based upon the absolute change in value between trials (see Figure 8A). We 
used this analysis to interrogate repetition suppression effects within ROIs identified by the 
whole-brain analysis using GLM1. 
ΔIntegratedValue(t) = |IntegratedValue(t) – IntegratedValue(t-1)| 
Equation 5.4 
Where IntegratedValue(t) is simply the product of quality and quantity on trial t (as in Equation 
5.1). We used a single onset regressor to represent all giftcard presentations, again using a 4s 
boxcar, with parametric modulators for ∆Integrated Value, and, as a precaution, Integrated 
Value. The inclusion of Integrated Value in the model allowed us to confirm that any effects of 
∆Integrated Value were not the result of spurious correlation with Integated Value itself. Trials 
following decisions were excluded as they were preceded by a pair of stimuli, obfuscating 
calculation of stimulus similarity. As before, we used a second onset regressor for decision trials. 
Contrasts were calculated merely as the value of the relevant parametric modulators.  
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5.3.9.3 GLM3: Integrated Value 
In order to obtain a measure of integrated value coding, we used a single 4s boxcar for all 
evaluation trials, associated with a parametric modulator for integrated value (Quality x 
Quantity), excluding pre-decision trials as in GLM1. As in GLM1 & 2, decision trials were modelled 
in a separate regressor with delta onsets. We used this analysis within ROIs identified by the 
whole-brain analysis in GLM1, to confirm that the ACC region showing a conjunction of quality, 
quantity, and interaction effects could also be described as coding integrated value (Figure 5.7A). 
5.3.9.4 Statistical tests 
Parameter estimates from fMRI are normally distributed, permitting the use of parametric 
statistics (t-tests and Pearson correlations). When analysing distributions we knew a priori to be 
non-normal (e.g. predictability, which is bounded at 0 and 100), we used non-parametric 
equivalents (sign-tests and Spearman rank coefficients).  
All statistical testing was carried out in Matlab. 
5.3.10 Neural modelling  
In order to better understand our fMRI data, we constructed a simple firing rate model in which 
1000 neurons were parameterised either as Gaussian or linear coders, and their response to a 
series of cues simulated under subtractive and divisive adaptation. We initialized each 
parameterisation 100 times and measured the model’s response to the same 500 cues, which 
were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of 1-30. 
5.3.10.1 Gaussian tuning curves 
For each neuron we defined a tuning curve, which was formulated as a Gaussian: 
 
𝐹𝑅 𝑥 = 	 𝛾𝑒O(·Ox)»^¼»  
Equation 5.5 
Where	𝛾	is a scaling parameter, 𝜇 is the stimulus evoking the highest firing rate, randomly 
selected from the interval -15:45, and 𝜎 is the variance, fixed at 5. The range of 𝜇 was set so that, 
on average, all stimuli in the range 1:30 evoked the same amount of activity; expanding the 
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range of 𝜇 used thus avoided end effects. 𝛾 was set to 300, to bring the evoked firing rates into 
the range produced by the linear model (see below). 
5.3.10.2 Linear tuning curves 
Linear tuning curves were defined as: 𝐹𝑅 𝑥 = 	𝛼𝑥 + 	𝛽 
Equation 5.6 
Where 𝛼 is the slope and	𝛽 the intercept (equivalent to the minimum firing rate). Both slopes 
and intercepts were constrained to be positive, set by taking the absolute value of draws from a 
normal distribution centred on 0. We then ‘flipped’ exactly half of the neurons, to produce a 
mixed population of positive and negative coders, consistent with single-cell recordings in ACC 
19,23,67,93.  
Firing rates were then normalized such that the maximum firing rate was 30Hz.  
5.3.10.3 Calculating population responses 
To calculate population response to a series of cues, we calculated the activity of each neuron in 
the population by indexing its tuning function with the value of the current cue. We then 
attenuated this activation by a fraction of the activity in that neuron on the previous trial, 
consistent with a fatigue model of repetition suppression 70, and adding a small amount of log-
normally distributed noise (mean=.05, variance=.5). 
In the subtractive regime, we subtracted the adaptation term: 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑥, 𝑡 = 	𝐹𝑅 𝑥 − 𝜆 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑡 − 1) + 	𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 
Equation 5.7 
Where 𝜆 is an adaptation coefficient set to 0.1. 
In the divisive regime, we divided by the adaptation term: 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑥, 𝑡 = 	𝐹𝑅 𝑥 ∗ (1 − 𝜆 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡 − 1 ) + 	𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 
Equation 5.8 
With 𝜆 again set to 0.1. 
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In both cases, negative firing rates were equated to zero. We then took the mean across neurons 
to estimate the population response to a given cue. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Behavioural session establishes stable quality estimates 
We used a behavioural session to identify participants for whom we could find giftcards which 
had consistently different subjective qualities (Figure 5.1B). The behavioural session consisted of 
two tasks. Participants (n=45) performed a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction 48 and a 
series of paired choices, each involving a selection of 13 giftcards (Figure 5.1C). In the BDM, 
players reported how much they’d be willing to pay for a giftcard loaded with a certain amount 
of money, from £1-20.  Subsequently, participants made paired choices between different 
giftcards containing matched sums (£20). 
We used a linear fit to the relationship between amount of money on the giftcard and amount 
bid for each giftcard during the BDM to provide a measure of the quality of each giftcard for 
each participant (Fig 5.2A). To maximize power in the fMRI study, we selected subjects whose 
bids were predictable (Fig 5.2A) and for whom we could select 3 giftcards with distinct qualities 
(Fig 5.2C, circled points in Fig 5.2B).  
By way of confirmation that BDM-estimated values predicted choice, we next compared quality 
estimates from the BDM with the number of choices of each giftcard in the paired choice 
session, preferring subjects for whom there was a high correlation (Fig 5.2B).  
Selected subjects thus displayed consistent BDM bids, a high correlation between preferences 
elicited in the BDM and paired choice sessions, and a low maximum correlation between quality, 
quantity, and integrated value (Figure 5.3). Integrated value was calculated as the product of 
quality ad quantity, effectively providing a prediction of the bid a participant would place for a 
given giftcard. The correlation between quality, quantity, and integrated value reflects the 
diversity of giftcard qualities. Giftcards with disparate qualities limit the correlation between 
quantity and integrated value (e.g. Fig 5.2C, row i and iii), whilst if all giftcards have similar 
qualities, the quantity/integrated value correlation will be high (Fig 5.2C, ii).   
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Figure 5.1 | Experimental procedure (A) We used giftcards to manipulate quality and quantity.  
Cards from different shops had different qualities, depending upon the subjective value of 
money that can be spent only at that shop. Quantity was varied with the amount of money 
(number of £) on the card. (B) Following an initial behavioural session in which we mapped value 
functions for different giftcards, a subset of participants were invited to return for an fMRI 
session. (C) Behavioural experiment. The behavioural session comprised two tasks. The first 
involved an auction procedure (Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure, BDM). Participants were 
offered different cards with varying amounts of money on them, and asked the maximum 
amount that they would be willing to pay for that card. In the second (paired choice) subjects 
made choices between pairs of giftcards with equal quantities (£20). (D) fMRI experiment. On 
most trials (6 of 7) participants saw only a single giftcard from one of three different shops, with 
a randomly varying quantity (amount of money). On decision trials (1 of 7), a second giftcard was 
displayed 2s after the first, and participants had 4s to make a choice between the two giftcards. 




Figure 5.2 | Example participants from behavioural experiment We used data from the 
behavioural session to determine inclusion in the fMRI study. Our criteria were the consistency 
and diversity of preferences for different giftcards (assessed using the predictability of BDM 
ratings), relationships between BDM and paired choice tasks, and correlations between quantity 
and subjective value in the BDM. (A) Firstly, we examined quantity-bid relationships for the 13 
different giftcards. The slope of the quantity-bid relationship for each giftcard is a measure of 
that giftcard’s quality, with higher slopes corresponding to more valuable brands. Here, 
participant i has diverse but noisy preferences, ii is consistent but has similar preferences across 
giftcards, whilst iii display an acceptable level of consistency whilst maintaining diverse 
preferences. (B) To assess preference stability, we compared the slope of lines estimated from 
the BDM task with the number of times each giftcard was chosen in the paired-choice task. 
Participant i shows a weak relationship between choices in each session; ii is consistent but 
shows little variability; and iii is both consistent and displays diverse preferences. (C) For the 
fMRI experiment, we selected three giftcards for each participant that differed maximally in 
quality. Here we show BDM plots for selected cards. As before, i is noisy but shows diverse 
quality preferences, ii has similar preferences over giftcards, and iii has consistent and diverse 
preferences over giftcards.  
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5.4.2 fMRI experiment: subjects integrate quality and quantity in choice 
For each participant in the fMRI experiment (n=25), we used data from the behavioural session 
to select 3 giftcards: the giftcard that displayed the steepest relationship between BDM bid and 
quantity (high quality), the one that displayed the lowest (low quality), and one of intermediate 
slope (medium quality) (Fig 5.4A). In a pre-scanning paired choice session, we confirmed that 
preference estimates from the preceding behavioural session were stable, with subjects making 
choices between the three selected giftcards in a highly predictable manner (Fig 5.4B).  
 
Figure 5.3 | Selected subjects for scanning experiment We selected participants who had 
high consistency between BDM and paired choice (high BDM/Choice correlation), well-fitting 
linear models of their BDM ratings (low RMSE of BDM fits), and low correlations between quality, 
quantity, and integrated value (low component correlations). Overlap between distributions of 
selected and non-selected subjects reflects the constraints of time and the scanning schedule. 
Good subjects who were in the same behavioural session as excellent subjects may not have 
been selected, and mediocre subjects who were in sessions with bad subjects were sometimes 
selected. 
 
Within the scanner, participants made choices between giftcards of varying quality and quantity 
on 1/7 of trials (Figure 5.1D), resulting in a total of 48 decisions. We used a logistic regression 
analysis to quantify the impact of differences between the two options upon choice. We 
calculated an interaction term as the mean-centred product of quality and quantity. Intuitively, 
the interaction term captures the fact that an extra £ on the highest quality giftcard is more 
valuable to the subject than an extra £ on the low quality giftcard. Differences between options 
in quality, quantity, and the interaction all influenced participants’ choices (Quality T24=8.6, 
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p<0.001; Quantity T24=13.7, p<0.001; Interaction T24=3.8, p<0.001) (Figure 5.4C). Importantly, this 
implies that participants were performing a multiplication of quality and quantity to estimate 
integrated value, rather than merely combining them additively.  
  
Figure 5.4 | Behavioural results for subjects in scanning experiment (A) Average quantity-
bid functions show the difference in quality for three selected giftcards for subjects who 
completed both the behavioural and fMRI sessions (n=25). (B) In a pre-scanning paired-choice 
session, we confirmed that the ordering of cards by quality was highly consistent between 
sessions. (C) Analysis of choices made in the MRI scanner. During the fMRI experiment, 
participants made 48 choices between cards of varying quality and quantity (see Fig 5.1D). We 
used the differences between options to predict choices using logistic regression. The 
differences between options in quality (T24=8.6, p<0.001) and quantity (T24=13.7,p<0.001) were 
predictive of choice. Importantly, the interaction between quality and quantity also predicted 
choice (T24=3.8,p<0.001), consistent with the multiplicative relationship expected from the 
observed quantity-utility functions (Figure 5.4A). This positive interaction term is consistent with 
subjects combining quantity and quality into an integrated value. 
 
5.4.3 Brain activity associated with quality, quantity, and their interaction 
In the scanner, participants were shown a single giftcard and asked to internally evaluate it 
(evaluation trials), in the knowledge that they might have to make a fast decision between that 
option and another (decision trials) (Fig 5.1D). The preponderance of valuation trials (340/388) 
provided us with an opportunity to examine value computation in isolation, without potentially 
confounding effects of decision dynamics 49. 
In order to isolate the elements of value representation, we used General Linear Models (GLMs) 
of voxel-wise brain activity to examine the representation of quality, quantity, and their 
interaction in valuation trials. We split our card presentations by quality (low, medium, high), and 
associated each onset with a parametric modulator corresponding to the quantity presented on 
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that trial.  This allowed us to look for main effects of card quality, [QualityHigh - QualityLow], card 
quantity [QuantityLowQuality+ QuantityMediumQuality+ QuantityHighQuality], and the interaction between 
the two [QuantityHighQuality - QuantityLowQuality]. 
We found three largely non-overlapping networks corresponding to the representation of offer 
quality, quantity, and their interaction. Higher card quality was associated with activity in the 
bilateral Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), centred on the pars opecularis (Left: Peak MNI= -54, 12, 30; 
T24=4.79, pFWE-corrected=0.023; Right: Peak MNI= 51, 9, 27; T24=4.37, pFWE-corrected=0.032) (Fig 5.5A). On 
the left hand side, this extended into the dorsolateral PFC (Peak MNI= -36, 48, 24; T24=3.16, pFWE-
corrected=0.044). Notably, this activation included Broca’s area, which is associated with semantic 
comprehension 94, a critical step in evaluating stimuli such as giftcards. Parameter estimates 
extracted from group-level functional ROIs (defined at p<0.005) revealed that neither quantity 
(T24=1.18,p=0.24), nor the interaction (T24=1.53,p=0.14) were associated with increased IFG 
activity, although direct comparisons did not distinguish quality coding from that of quantity or 




Figure 5.5 | Representation of quality, quantity, and their interaction (A) We observed 
bilateral coding of offer quality [QualityHigh – QualityLow] bilaterally in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
(IFG). (B) Increasing quantity, as tested by [QuantityHighQuality + 
QuantityMediumQuality+QuantityLowQuality], was associated with increasing activity bilaterally in the 
Intra Parietal Sulcus (IPS). (C) Activations in the posterior cingulate cortex were consistent with 
representing the interaction of quality and quantity [QuantityHighQuality – QuantityLowQuality]. Errors 
bars are SEM across subjects, SPMs thresholded at p<0.01 for visualization. 
 
Offer quantity was correlated with activity in bilateral Intraparietal Sulcus (IPS) (Left: Peak MNI: -
27,-66,51; T24=4.77, p FWE-corrected<0.001; Right: Peak MNI: 33,-66,51; T24=4.68, pFWE-corrected<0.001) 
resonating with the well-characterized role of this region in numerical reasoning in humans and 
non-human primates 67,84,85,95,96. As with the IFG, activity in the IPS was selective for number, with 
no obvious coding of quality (T24=0.19,p=0.85) or the interaction (T24=0.84, p=0.41), suggesting 
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that the IPS is not performing value coding per se, but specifically representing the quantity of 
available options. Direct comparisons confirmed that quantity correlations were greater than 
those for quality (T24=3.52, p=0.0017) and for the interaction (T24=3.36,p=0.0025).  We also 
observed quantity-related activity in bilateral visual cortex (Left: Peak MNI: -33,-87,-12; T24=5.54, 
p FWE-corrected<0.001; Right: Peak MNI: 27,-87,-12; T24=5.49, p FWE-corrected<0.001). 
Finally, we asked whether activity in any region of the brain was associated with the interaction 
between quality and quantity, correlating more steeply with quantity for high than low quality 
giftcards. This might be considered a signature of value computation, suggesting additional 
processing above and beyond a simple reflection of option quality and quantity. The most 
prominent activity associated with this contrast extended along the posterior cingulate (Peak 
MNI: -12,-15,54; T24=3.57, p FWE-corrected<0.001). As above, activity in this functional ROI was specific 
for the interaction term, with no evidence of quality (T24=-0.14,p=0.89), or quantity (T24=0.77, 
p=0.45) correlatinos, implying that despite this region’s involvement in value computation, it 
does not represent an integrated value signal per se. Direct comparisons confirmed that 
interaction exceeded both quality (T24=2.93,p=0.0072) and quantity (T24=2.53,p=0.018) contrasts. 
Effects of the interaction contrast were also present in bilateral superior temporal lobes (Left: 
Peak MNI=-63,-45,0; T24=5.55, p FWE-corrected<0.001; Right: Peak MNI=48,-33,3; T24=4.85, p FWE-
corrected<0.001). 
5.4.4 Computation of integrated value from component parts in the cingulate 
Having characterized the neural responses to the individual components of option value (quality, 
quantity, and their interaction), we next asked whether any regions represented integrated 
value. Since integrated value is somewhat correlated with quality and quantity (though this 
correlation is limited by design, see Figure 5.3), merely testing for effects of integrated value 
presents a problem; regions sensitive to quality or quantity alone might appear to reflect 
integrated value. To overcome this, we paired a traditional parametric modulation approach 
(testing for effects of integrated value, quality x quantity), with a conjunction analysis, reasoning 
that a region truly representing integrated value ought to display sensitivity to all of the 
component parts: quality, quantity, and their interaction.  
 167 
Both analyses revealed a striking convergence on the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Figure 6A). 
Activity in this region covaried with quality, quantity, and their interaction (all p<0.05uncorrected), 
and with a parametric modulator for integrated value (Peak MNI: -12,21,39; T24=6.04, pFWE-
Corrected<0.001).  This region is known to contain neurons that multiplex attributes in value-based 
decision-making 19, and is thought to be crucial to value-learning 53,97.  
We further reasoned that if the ACC’s value estimates were being used to guide choice, we might 
see greater activity in decision trials compared to mere valuation trials. This was indeed the case; 
decision trials were associated with an increase in activity in the same region (Peak MNI=9,15,45; 
T24=17.03, pFWE-Corrected<0.001) (Figure 5.6B). Dorsally, this region partially overlaps with activity in 
dmPFC previously characterized as the final value-comparison step before motor output 98. 
Our analyses revealed dissociable representations of quality, in the IFG, and quantity, in the IPS. 
Although we lack the temporal precision to test whether these segregated representations 
precede the emergence of integrated value signals in ACC, we can ask whether between-subject 
variability in component coding is related to between-subject variability in ACC representations. 
We found that this was indeed the case. As predicted, stronger IFG encoding of quality was 
associated with stronger coding of quality in the ACC (r=0.63, p<0.001) (Figure 5.6C), whilst 
stronger IPS encoding of quantity was associated with stronger quantity coding in the ACC 
(r=0.68, p<0.001) (Figure 5.6F). Importantly, the converse correlations did not hold, with 
parameter estimates for IGF quality unrelated to ACC quantity (r=0.04, p=0.83) and IPS quantity 
unrelated to ACC quality (r=0.14, p=0.50) coding (Figure 5.6D, 5.6E). This specificity suggests that 
observed correlations reflect meaningful inter-regional relationships rather than correlated 
variance in signal-to-noise between participants. 
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Figure 5.6 | Computation of utility from component parts in the anterior cingulate cortex 
(A) Overlapping effects of quality, quantity, and their interaction in the ACC. A conjunction 
analysis revealed overlapping representations of each component (p<0.05uncorrected) [green] in the 
ACC, suggesting a nexus for the computation of value.  A complementary analysis using an 
explicit representation of integrated value as a parametric modulator implied the same (p<0.05-
FWE-corrected) [red]. Timecourse displayed for illustration purposes. (B) Decision > Non-Decision 
trials. The ACC also showed higher activity in trials upon which a decision was made compared 
to valuation trials [red], overlapping with the conjunction analysis identified in panel a [green]. 
(C) Participants with stronger representations of quality in the IFG showed stronger 
representations of quality in the ACC (r=0.63, p<0.001). (D) Quality sensitivity in IFG was 
unrelated to quantity coding in ACC (r=0.04, p=0.83). (E) Quality sensitivity in IPS was unrelated 
to quality coding in IPS (r=-0.14, p=0.50). (F) Participants with stronger representations of 
quantity in the IPS showed stronger representations of quantity in the ACC (r=0.68, p<0.001). 
Each point is one participant. 
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5.4.5 Strength of neural quantity coding reflects choice predictability  
The degree to which subjects’ choices were correctly predicted by our logistic regression varied, 
from 69% to 92%. We reasoned that stronger neural representations of value components might 
lead to more predictable choices. 
Using parameter estimates (b’s) extracted from our GLM analyses, we asked whether between-
subject variability in b’s related to between-subject choice predictability. We found that the 
strength of neural correlations with quantity, but not quality, were associated with predictability 
of choice. Mean b’s in both the IPS (ρ=0.60, p=0.002) and ACC (ρ=0.42, p=0.039) were positively 
correlated with choice predictability, suggesting that stronger neural representations of quantity 
are associated with more reliable choices. Correlations between predictability and quality coding 
in the IFG (ρ=0.41, p=0.104) and ACC (ρ=0.30, p=0.142) were also positive but did not reach 
significance, perhaps reflecting the greater range of values in the quantity than the quality 




Figure 5.7 | Neural quantity sensitivity relate to choice predictability We found that 
coefficients for quantity in (A) IPS (ρ=0.60, p=0.002) and (B) the ACC (ρ=0.42, p=0.039) correlated 
with the predictability of participants’ choices, as assessed by the ability of our logistic regression 
model to predict choice. Correlations with quality coding in the IFG (ρ=0.41, p=0.104) and ACC 
(ρ=0.30, p=0.142) were positive but not significant. 
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5.4.6 Repetition suppression for integrated value in the ACC 
The analyses presented thus far provide an insight into the monotonic encoding of value 
components in the brain; they are sensitive to fluctuations in the BOLD signal which rise and fall 
in concert with the variables in which we are interested. This approach is common to all but a 
few recent studies, which have asked how patterns of brain activity might encode value in a 
more distributed fashion using multi-voxel decoding analyses 17,42,44,99. A complementary 
approach, offering insight into neural populations at a sub-voxel resolution 70,71, is to use 
repetition suppression. Repetition Suppression (RS) describes the phenomenon whereby 
repeated presentation of stimuli that are similar along some dimension evokes a reduction in 
activity in brain regions sensitive to that attribute, putatively due to a reduction in activity in 
neurons that are activated in both trials (Figure 5.8A). This provides a means to assay the neural 
overlap in the representation of two stimuli, from foods 78, to faces 69, to agents 80. An influential 
application of this technique has been to examine numerosity representations in the parietal 
cortex 84-86. Using RS designs, activity in the IPS has been found to scale with the absolute 
difference in number between sequentially presented options, a finding interpreted in the light 
of Gaussian-tuned number representations in IPS. 
 Adopting a similar approach, based upon putative populations of tuned neurons spanning the 
range of integrated values presented in the experiment (Figure 5.8A), we asked whether RS 
provided additional evidence of non-monotonic value encoding in the ACC. We constructed a 
GLM in which we modelled the absolute difference in integrated value (DIntegratedValue) 
between subsequent trials, as well as the Integrated Value on each trial. We found evidence for 
repetition suppression to value in dorsal ACC (Peak MNI: -3,3,51; T24=3.86, pFWE-Corrected=0.003), 
just posterior to the activity related to monotonic encoding of integrated value (Figure 5.8B). 
These activations were partially overlapping, such that the integrated-value coding conjunction 
identified in Figure 5.6 showed effects of both DIntegratedValue and Integrated Value (Figure 
5.8C) (DIntegratedValue: T24=2.48, p=0.020; Integrated Value: T=3.26, p=0.0034). Repetition 
suppression for integrated value was surprisingly widespread. We also observed repetition 
suppression for value bilaterally in the lingual gyrus (Left: Peak MNI: -15,-45,-9; T24=6.18, pFWE-
Corrected<0.001; Right: Peak MNI: 15,-48,3; T24=4.56, pFWE-Corrected<0.001), the right superior temporal 
sulcus (Peak MNI: 63,-30,3; T24=5.80, pFWE-Corrected<0.001), and bilaterally in the posterior insula 
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(Left: Peak MNI: -30,0,-3; T24=5.00, pFWE-Corrected<0.001; Right: Peak MNI: 33,-6,-12; T24=3.60, pFWE-
Corrected<0.001) 
 
Figure 5.8 | Repetition suppression for value in the anterior cingulate cortex (A) Repetition 
suppression analysis logic. We hypothesize a population of neurons tuned for value where the 
different neurons have overlapping tuning curves spanning the range of values presented. Black 
arrows denote stimulus value for that trial. If consecutive trials activate non-overlapping 
populations of neurons, evoked responses for each stimulus are similarly high on each trial (top 
panel in orange). However, repeated presentation of the same stimulus produces repeated 
activation of the same neurons on consecutive trials, leading to a reduction in the neural 
response (bottom panel in blue). Summation over all neurons in the population (as in the BOLD 
signal measured in fMRI), leads to higher activity when consecutive stimuli activate unique 
subsets of neurons (top panel) than when consecutively activated populations overlap (bottom 
panel). Predicted BOLD activity is thus proportional to the absolute difference in value between 
consecutive trials. (B) Evidence for multiple forms of value coding in the cingulate. We examined 
cingulate representations of repetition suppression to integrated value (change in value from 
trial n-1 to trial n, DIntegratedValue) [green], and monotonic encoding of integrated value (a 
standard parametric modulator approach) [red]. Voxels sensitive to repetition suppression were 
more posterior, with monotonic encoding stronger in anterior voxels. (C) The ACC region 
identified in the conjunction analysis (Fig 5.6A) also shows repetition suppression to integrated 
value. We extracted mean parameter estimates for DIntegratedValue and for integrated value 
from the voxels identified in the conjunction analysis. Both were positive on average 
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(DIntegratedValue: T24=2.48,p=0.020; Integrated Value: T=3.26, p=0.0034). Error bars are SEM 
across participants. 
5.4.7 Neural interpretation of repetition suppression effects 
Our experiment was designed with reference to numerosity studies, in which, following Piazza et 
al., 84 repetition suppression effects of the type observed here are interpreted as reflecting the 
Gaussian tuning curves of the underlying population 100. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude 
that our data provide evidence of Gaussian tuning for value in the cingulate, a finding of great 
interest given theoretical accounts of how tuned populations can multiplex magnitude and 
uncertainty signals 64,65. In order to explore the degree to which RS can be used to gain insight 
into population codes, we constructed a simple firing rate model and asked how aggregate 
activity in response to a series of 500 cues depended on two factors:  tuning curves and 
adaptation regime.  
Our starting point was the model of Piazza et al 84, in which Gaussian neurons undergo divisive 
adaptation. We modelled a population of 1000 Gaussian neurons of fixed tuning curve width 
(Figure 9A). In order to avoid end effects, preferred values (i.e. the peak of the Gaussians) were 
distributed from -15:+45, such that each value in the range 1-30 evoked a similar amount of total 
activity. On each trial the activity for each neuron was calculated by indexing the tuning curve 
with the cue value on that trial and adjusting by an adaptation term.  
We implemented two forms of adaptation: subtractive, and divisive. Under the subtractive 
regime, we subtracted a fixed fraction of activity on the previous trial. In the divisive regime, we 
divided the evoked firing rate by a fixed fraction of activity on the previous trial. In the 
subtractive regime, therefore, the reduction of activity was independent of the amount of 
evoked activity on the current trial. Conversely, in the divisive regime, larger firing rates suffered 
relatively greater adaptation. In order to relate our simulations to BOLD measurements, which 
sum across many thousands of neurons, we calculated the aggregate activity of the population 
by taking the mean across all neurons on each trial. 
We ran each simulation 100 times, randomizing the tuning curves each time, in order to obtain a 
distribution of correlation coefficients between aggregate activity and DIntegratedValue.  Under 
both adaptation regimes, we confirmed that the aggregate activity in the Gaussian-tuned 
population grew with the difference in value between consecutive trials (Figure 5.9B & D). 
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Plotting activity from the run with the median correlation coefficient (Figure 5.9C and 5.9E) 
demonstrated a clear, albeit non-linear, relationship between DIntegratedValue and aggregate 
activity on each trial. We thus confirmed that our repetition suppression effects were consistent 
with a Gaussian tuned population irrespective of adaptation regime, confirming and extending 
previous modelling efforts 84.  
We next adapted our model to ask whether we could obtain similar results using a population of 
cells coding value linearly. We used linear tuning functions of varying slope and intercept, with a 
mixture of positive and negative slopes for value (Figure 5.9F), consistent with single-neuron 
recording studies in the ACC 19,23,93,101. As before, we simulated the response of 100 different 
populations of cells to the same 500 cues, implemented subtractive or divisive adaptation, and 
examined the distribution of correlation coefficients between DIntegratedValue and aggregate 
activity. 
 
Figure 5.9 | Modelling of repetition suppression: dependence on tuning and adaptation 
type (A) Tuning curves for value in the ‘tuning’ model. Tuning curves are Gaussian, with a 
random mean and fixed width.  (B) Tuned model with subtractive adaptation: positive 
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relationship between change in value and activity. (C) Example run (median correlation 
coefficient), showing positive relationship between change in value and activity in tuned 
subtractive model. Each point is a trial. (D) Tuned model with divisive adaptation: positive 
relationship between ∆IntegratedValue and activity. (E) Example run showing positive 
relationship between change in value and activity in tuned divisive model. Each point is a trial. 
(F) Tuning curve for value in the ‘linear’ model. Tuning curves are linear, with variable slope and 
positive intercept. Half the neurons have positive slopes, half negative. (G) Linear model with 
subtractive adaptation: no relationship between ∆IntegratedValue and activity. (H) Example run 
showing no relationship between change in value and activity in linear subtractive model. Each 
point is a trial. (I) Linear model with divisive adaptation:  positive relationship between 
∆IntegratedValue and activity. (J) Example run showing weak positive relationship between 
∆IntegratedValue and activity in linear divisive model. Each point is a trial. 
 
We found that our results were strongly influenced by the adaptation regime we employed. 
Under the subtractive regime, the population displayed no relationship between 
DIntegratedValue and aggregate activity (Figure 5.9G, H). Conversely, if we implemented divisive 
adaptation, we observed a reliable relationship: trials on which DIntegratedValue was higher 
were associated with higher activity on average (Figure 5.9I, 5.9J). We therefore conclude that 
repetition suppression effects of the type we observe are not necessarily an unambiguous 
signature of non-monontonic tuning at the single-neuron level.  
In order to understand why the choice of adaptation scheme affected our models’ predictions so 
profoundly, we turned to an explicative toy model consisting of two neurons, one positively 
tuned (neuron 1), one negatively tuned (neuron 2) (Figure 5.10A). We then contrasted the 
response to two scenarios: repetition of the same value in two consecutive trials, and a large 
change in value between trials. 
In the subtractive case, the two were equivalent (Figure 5.10B, C). Due to the subtractive nature 
of the adaptation, it doesn’t matter whether the more adapted neuron 1 (which previously 
experienced a high firing rate) is exposed to a high or low value cue: its firing rate is a fixed 
quantity lower than the previous trial. Similarly, the minimally adapted neuron 2 fires almost as 
vigorously as it did in the first trial, regardless of where in its tuning function the stimulus lies. 





Figure 5.10 | Dissecting divisive vs. subtractive repetition suppression effects For both 
adaptation schemes we model two neurons with opposite linear tuning to value. In parts A, B,C,E 
& F, we plot the activation function for each neuron. (A) Trial 1. The first cue (value=30) is 
presented, eliciting high activity in neuron 1 (solid) and low activity in neuron 2 (dashed). (B) Trial 
2, similar cue (value=30), subtractive adaptation. Evoked activity in neuron 1 is much reduced, 
whereas neuron 2 is weakly adapted, giving a similar response to trial 1. Aggregate activity is 
moderate. Tuning curves on previous trial shown in blue for comparison. (C) Trial 2, disparate 
cue (value=1), subtractive adaptation. High activity in the lowly adapted neuron 2 and low in the 
highly adapted neuron 1. However, since adaptation is subtractive i.e. does not interact with 
evoked firing rate, aggregate activity matches that in panel b. Tuning curves on previous trial 
shown in blue for comparison. (D) Subtractive adaptation: over 500 trials, aggregate activity is 
unrelated to the change in value between cues. (E) Trial 2, similar cue (value=30), divisive 
adaptation. Evoked activity in the highly responsive neuron 1 is much reduced, whereas neuron 
2 is weakly adapted, giving a similar response to trial 1. Aggregate activity is low. Tuning curves 
on previous trial shown in blue for comparison. (F) Trial 2, disparate cue (value=1), divisive 
adaptation. High activity in the lowly adapted neuron 2 and low in the highly adapted neuron 1. 
However, since adaptation is divisive, the impact of the high adaptation of neuron 1 upon the 
aggregate activity is reduced, leading to higher activity on average. Tuning curves on previous 
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trial shown in blue for comparison. (G) Over 500 trials, aggregate activity scales with change in 
value between trials. 
 
Conversely, the divisive case produces an interaction between current firing rate and previous 
firing rate. In Figure 5.10E, the cue is repeated, and the heavily adapted neuron 1 produces a 
response which is substantially attenuated. Neuron 2, which is weakly responsive to the cue, 
produces a minimally adapted response. Conversely, in 5.10F, when we shift the cue, we 
increase the firing rate of neuron 2, which displays a much smaller effective adaptation than 
neuron 1 in 5.10E. This is not outweighed by the adaptation experienced by neuron 1, because 
the firing rate of neuron 1 is low to that cue. Hence, maximal aggregate activity is seen when 
consecutive cues occupy opposite ends of the value spectrum, producing a dependence of 
activity upon DIntegratedValue (Figure 5.10G).  
Our modelling therefore suggests that our repetition suppression effects are consistent with a 
Gaussian code, as previously suggested 84. However, this pattern of activity is not exclusively 
associated with such a code. A mixed linear code operating with divisive adaptation could also 
produce the dependence on DIntegratedValue that we observe in the ACC (Figure 5.8A).  
5.5 Discussion 
Value representations are typically studied as monolithic entities. Indeed, considerable effort 
has been expended in identifying abstract behavioural and neural signatures of scalar value 
estimates (see sections 1.2 & 1.3). However, recent work suggests that during choice, 
components of value compete at an attribute-level to guide decisions 102,103, emphasising the 
importance of decomposing value into its constituent parts. Here we show that in the absence of 
choice, integrated value correlates appear in the ACC, with component representations in the 
IFG (quality), and IPS (quantity) (Figures 5.5 & 5.6). A distinct network appears to contribute to 
the integration of the two, with posterior cingulate and superior temporal lobe activations 
corresponding to the interaction between quality and quantity (Figure 5.5). We further find that a 
more posterior region of the ACC displays repetition suppression to integrated value, consistent 
with (but not conclusive evidence for) multiple forms of value coding in the cingulate (Figure 5.8).  
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5.5.1 Correlates of quality in the brain 
We found that bilateral IFG activity was modulated by the quality of the giftcard presented on 
each trial (Figure 5.5A). This was unexpected, given the scarcity of reports of IFG involvement in 
value-based decision making (though see104-105). A priori, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) might 
represent a more promising candidate for the representation of stimulus quality. However, 
representations in the OFC appear to be particularly entangled with stimulus identity 38,42,43,78,79, 
potentially reflecting the central role of the OFC in providing an internal model of the world 106. 
This view suggests that the OFC is particularly interested in tracking relationships between 
rewards and their predictors 82,107-111, rather than estimating stimulus quality per se. 
Furthermore, a recent study found that OFC exclusively represented hidden variables related to 
the current state 112. The lack of OFC involvement in our task may therefore reflect the static and 
transparent relationship between stimuli and outcomes in our experiment. 
 The involvement of the IFG in the representation of stimulus quality is consistent with the 
semantic nature of the giftcard stimuli we used. IFG is commonly activated in lexical tasks 94, and 
left-hemisphere lesions to this area famously produce impairments in language production and 
comprehension. In one of the few studies attempting to parse value into separable components, 
Lim et al 113 offered participants t-shirts that varied in their aesthetic and semantic properties. 
They found correlations with aesthetic value in the fusiform gyrus and semantic value in the 
superior temporal gyrus, whilst vmPFC activity correlated with the value of both attributes. This 
suggests that the extraction of quality may occur in concert across brain areas specialized for 
the analysis of different stimulus features, in the same way that feedforward models of visual 
inputs eventually produce value estimates in deep reinforcement learning networks 114,115. This 
suggests that the representation of stimulus quality in IFG may be specific to the use of 
semantically rich stimuli such as those employed here.   
5.5.2 Correlates of quantity in the brain  
Conversely, our observation of quantity coding in the IPS  (Figure 5.5B) is precisely as predicted 
from the literature 100. A wide variety of animals display the ability to make ethologically relevant 
decisions using number, from lions 116, to crows 117 . Even new-born chicks are capable of 
tracking the number of an imprinted object that is placed behind a screen 118. In macaques, such 
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judgments rely upon a network of frontal and parietal regions containing neurons tuned to 
different numbers, including the number zero 66-68.  
Studies in humans have made use of model-based decoding analyses 96 and repetition 
suppression designs 84-86 to provide evidence that similar tuning curves for number exist in the 
human intraparietal sulcus (IPS), although our modelling results suggest that these findings are 
less conclusive than previously appreciated (see below). Our results imply that the same IPS 
circuitry subserves number representation in value computation. This is consistent with the 
recent observation that when number and value are decorrelated, the IPS tracks quantity and 
not value 119. This clarifies disparate reports of the role of parietal cortices in value-based 
decision making, suggesting that when financial stimuli are used 8,120,121, evaluation occurs within 
a financial framework (such as the BDM) 122,123, or if stimuli merely differ in magnitude 124, 
parietal responses to quantity may be misconstrued as representing value or its comparison. 
Conversely, we find that the IPS specifically represents the quantity of an available option, and 
that the strength of numerical representations in IPS correlates both with choice predictability 
and ACC quantity coding. This suggests that neurons in the IPS are contributing to the 
representation of stimulus value in the ACC, and that this representation is subsequently used 
to guide choice. 
5.5.3 Integration of quality and quantity in the ACC 
We found that activity in the ACC was consistent with representation of integrated value, 
displaying not only correlations with quantity and quality but their interaction (Figures 5.5C and 
5.6A). This was further supported by a traditional analysis in which integrated value was used as 
a parametric modulator. Beckmann et al 125 parcellated the cingulate cortex according to 
connectivity. The region we identify as carrying a integrated value signal corresponds to their 
region 4, which shows strong connectivity to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and is commonly 
implicated in value-based tasks. The region showing repetition suppression effects may be more 
situated in their region 5, which has a notably higher connectivity to the parietal cortex. This 
raises the possibility that the repetition suppression we observe in this region is inherited from 
tuned numerical representations in parietal cortex 67. 
 179 
The ACC is frequently identified in both human 35,126,127 and animal experiments 19,23,97,101,128 
investigating value-based choice. The more dorsal region in which we find signatures of 
integrated value is associated with tasks in which participants can assign value to particular 
actions 125. This is the case in our experiment, since giftcards were displayed either on the left or 
the right hand side of the screen, such that assessing the value of a particular giftcard was the 
same as assessing the value of a left/right button press. Dorsal ACC appears to be particularly 
engaged by foraging type tasks, in which the pertinent comparisons are between options 
presented sequentially 35-37,126. Given that our experiment was closely modelled on such tasks, 
the involvement of the ACC is as predicted. 
Our finding that the cingulate integrates information about quality and quantity to form a 
multiplicative value representation of the current stimulus is also interesting in light of a related 
literature which has documented the role of the cingulate in the representation of values 
associated with ‘model-based’ cognition 129,130. This somewhat catch-all term describes flexible 
computation of value associated with a certain stimulus, and is typically contrasted with ‘model-
free’ cognition, in which stimulus or action values are cached and updated only through 
repeated experience 131.  The multiplication of quantity and quality we observe in the ACC is 
consistent with the idea that the cingulate provides an internal model which produces estimates 
of quantities relevant to behavior 30,132,133. In our case, utility was maximized by combining 
quality and quantity in a multiplicative manner, and this is what the ACC appears to do, in a 
manner that reflects the coding of quality and quantity in the frontal and parietal lobes 
respectively (Figure 5.6 C,F).  
We did not observe activity in the ventromedial PFC, the part of the cortex most frequently 
associated with valuation 134. This chimes with recent observations suggesting that sequential 135 
or speeded 82,135 choices do not engage vmPFC. Whether evaluation alone is an effective engager 
of vmPFC is also unclear. Early reports suggested that the vmPFC was part of an automatic 
valuation system 15, but recent work suggests otherwise 16. vmPFC also fails to represent a value 
signal in effort-based decisions in humans 139-141. The few studies that report value-related 
activity in macaque vmPFC do so in the context of free viewing 136,137 raising the possibility that 
the vmPFC is particularly engaged when values must be compared via repeated eye movements 
22 . The observation that the vmPFC is also crucial for episodic memory and imagination 138-140 , 
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and the predominance of saccade-frequency theta oscillations in mPFC 141-143, suggests a more 
general role for the vmPFC in providing short-term plasticity which allows features – of a scene, 
an episode, or a choice – to be sewn together over several seconds. This may explain why our 
task, which required participants to evaluate a single stimulus at a single point in space, did not 
evoke noticeable vmPFC activity.  
5.5.4 Repetition suppression: hints and limitations  
We used a repetition suppression design, allowing us to reveal coding schemes hidden to 
conventional BOLD analyses. We found that parts of the cingulate cortex displayed repetition 
suppression to integrated value, with activity that scaled with the absolute difference in value 
between trials (Figure 5.8A). This region was slightly posterior to the peak activity associated with 
monotonic integrated value, though it did extend into the area identified in the conjunction 
analysis of quality, quantity, and their interaction (Figure 5.8B).  Although our original intention 
was to follow the precedent from the numerosity-coding literature and provide evidence of non-
monotonic tuning for value 84-86,144, subsequent modelling revealed that such repetition 
suppression effects are not an unambiguous signature of non-monotonic codes, and could arise 
from mixed-linear coding under divisive adaptation (Figures 5.9 & 5.10).  
Our analysis emphasises the importance of careful experimental design for strong 
interpretations of repetition suppression effects 145. Recent successes suggest that RS is most 
effectively used when the format of the code is known a priori 81 , to test the relationships 
between representations 78, or to observe changes in representations over time 80. In the present 
experiment, careful post-hoc modelling suggested that the signals we observed could be 
explained as a function either of code or adaptation form, the latter being poorly understood 
and likely to vary across the brain 145. 
Nevertheless, our results are indeed consistent with non-monotonic coding, providing a hint that 
theoretically-attractive population coding of value 64  might be present in the cortex. We will 
revisit this in the next chapter, using single-cell recordings to overcome the limitations imposed 
by non-invasive recordings in humans. To foreshadow our results in that chapter, we find direct 
evidence for non-linear coding in ACC, confirming the sensitivity, if not the specificity, of our 
repetition suppression design. 
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5.5.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, we find that a distributed network comprising the intraparietal sulcus, inferior 
frontal gyrus, and posterior cingulate & superior temporal sulcus contribute to the computation 
of integrated value in the ACC. The strength of signals in the ACC reflected the degree to which 
they were represented in brain areas coding for quality (IFG) and quantity (IPS), and stronger 
brain correlations with quantity were associated with more predictable choices. We further 
demonstrate that parts of the ACC also show repetition suppression to integrated value, 
consistent with the idea that tuning for value is non-monotonic in parts of the cortex. Our 
findings demonstrate how value is assembled from its component parts, and emphasise the 
potential for repetition suppression as an assay of population encoding scheme.  
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 Chapter 6: Diversity of value-tuning in primate 
prefrontal cortex 
The data reported in this chapter were collected by Nish Malalasekera, Laurence Hunt, and Steve 
Kennerley, to whom I am very grateful.  
6.1 Abstract 
In the previous chapter we showed that fMRI signal in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) during 
a foraging-type task showed repetition suppression consonant with non-linear value-tuning. This 
suggested that the ACC might be a candidate for probabilistic population codes for value. 
However, neural modelling suggested that this signal was not an unambiguous signature of non-
linear tuning.  In this chapter we ask a similar question using a more direct readout of neural 
selectivity. Taking extracellular electrophysiological recordings from macaque monkeys, we look 
for evidence of non-linear coding in single cells in four areas of the prefrontal cortex; the ACC 
and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortices (vmPFC). We find evidence of non-linear tuning in the ACC and the OFC, providing the 




As discussed in section 1.4.6, probabilistic codes provide a powerful way to represent entire 
probability distributions over some variable, rather than a point estimate1. The PPC model as 
proposed by Ma 2 further allows evidence integration in a Bayesian fashion by summation of 
codes providing optimal learning with a simple linear operation. This emerges from the 
representation of precision in the amplitude of population responses, such that more precise 
(less uncertain) representations are naturally favoured (see Figure 1.7). This is in stark contrast 
to the ‘summary statistic’ representations typically found in the neuroeconomic literature, in 
which single neurons are often found to represent the parameters of a reward distribution, such 
as its mean and variance (see section 5.2.2). Apart from the difficulty of binding these pieces of 
information for the purpose of computation, this format places clear constraints upon the 
probability distribution that neurons can represent.  The form of the distribution must be pre-
specified, in order for representation by summary statistic to be useful. By contrast, PPCs can be 
used to represent complex and arbitrary probability distributions 3, such as those encountered 
in the real world (see section 1.4.6). 
 In this chapter we seek further evidence of non-linear value representations that might underlie 
PPCs for value. Building upon the observation in the previous chapter that repetition 
suppression in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) is consistent with non-monotonic tuning for 
value, we start by reviewing the prevalence of non-linear tuning in the brain, before discussing 
why ACC and OFC are particularly plausible sites for population coding of value. We then present 
data recorded from macaque prefrontal cortex which provides direct evidence for non-linear 
coding of value.  
Population codes typically decompose the range of stimuli to be represented into the firing rates 
of multiple cells, such that any one cell is responsive to a subset of possible stimulus values.  For 
instance, cells tuned to orientation in visual cortex respond to a restricted range of line 
orientations, displaying narrow Gaussian tuning curves  4 (Figure 6.1A)*. A given stimulus thus 
                                                        
* Figure 6.1A and 6.1B portray idealized tuning curves from a neural network model of object localization, 
but provide a useful visualization of tuning curves observed elsewhere, such as in V1 
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evokes activity in the subset of cells with preferred tuning near the presented orientation (Figure 
6.1B). Such non-linear, and typically Gaussian, tuning is widely documented in other brain 
regions, such as higher 5 visual areas, auditory cortices 1,6, and motoric frontal areas 2,7. Tuning 
for number is observed in the intra-parietal sulcus and PFC 3,8,9 (see Figure 6.6), which suggests 
that tuned codes for highly-processed information can be found in areas also involved in choice 
4,10. Linear coding certainly appears to be the exception, rather than the norm, in the brain. 
Given a recent flurry of reports that PFC coding is more diverse 5,11,12, distributed 12, and labile 13 
than previously appreciated, we wondered whether the traditional linear description of value 
sensitivity in PFC 14-23 (Figure 6.1C) is an oversimplification. 
We hypothesized that ACC and OFC were particularly likely to display more varied tuning to 
value than the linear functions previously described. Firstly, both regions are sensitive to 
uncertainty 22,24-28, suggesting that they are plausible candidates for probabilistic population 
codes in which uncertainty is explicitly represented 2. The OFC in particular is also implicated in 
decisions involving confidence 29,30, which is a readout of decisional-uncertainty 31. Similarly, both 
regions play a crucial role in value learning. OFC is more specialized for cue-value coding 32-35 , 
with ACC more concerned with estimating the values of actions, including engage/disengage 
decisions 36-38. In both cases, representing current beliefs as probability distributions rather than 
point estimates brings substantial advantages 31,39, allowing learners to update their beliefs 
according to their uncertainty 24. Again, this recommends a probabilistic population coding 
scheme 1,2. Finally, the fMRI data presented in the previous chapter hinted at non-monotonic 
coding in the ACC, whilst previous data from the OFC has suggested that some reward-sensitive 
cells are most responsive to cues of intermediate value 40,41, as might be expected of a 




Figure 6.1 | Gaussian tuning for orientation and linear tuning for value (A) Graphical 
representation of orientation tuning in V1. Each curve is a single cell. (B) Evoked activity to a line 
oriented at 100 in the population of cells represented in panel A. Both adopted from 42. (C) A 
neuron in ACC responding linearly to cues indicating increasing value across three domains 
(reward probability, reward size, and cost to obtain reward). Adapted from 15. 
We also report data recorded from LPFC and vmPFC, although our predictions regarding these 
regions were weaker. Analysis in these brain regions was therefore exploratory and reported for 
completeness. Recent work suggests that single cells in vmPFC might be responsible for value 
comparison 43 rather than the representation and updating of values, and are associated with a 
different class of biophysical models 44. LPFC has been linked with myriad functions, from a well-
documented role in support of working memory 45 to a characterization as a domain-general 
decision region 46. Neither is as consistently implicated in the learning and updating of value 




The data discussed here were presented previously in 47, and were collected by Nish 
Malalasekera, Laurence Hunt, and Steve Kennerley.  
6.3.1 Experimental design 
Two monkeys (M and F) completed an information gathering task (Figure 6.2A). On each trial, 
subjects made a decision between a left and a right option, indicating their decision using a 
joystick. Each option comprised two cues, which corresponded to the magnitude and probability 
of the juice reward associated with that option. There were 10 cues, corresponding to 5 levels of 
value each for magnitude (0.15AU, 0.35AU, 0.55AU, 0.75AU, 0.95AU) and probability (10%, 30%, 
50%, 70%, 90%) (Figure 6.2B). Preliminary analysis confirmed that animals distinguished between 
all 5 levels, and treated the two attributes as equivalent 47. Information was revealed 
sequentially, and triggered by sustained fixation (Figure 6. 2A). On half of the trials, the first two 
cues were associated with the same option (‘Option trials’). On the other half, the second cue 
was of the same attribute (magnitude or probability), but for the other option (‘Attribute trials’).   
After the first two cues were fixated, the animal could choose either to gather further 
information or make a choice. After choice, all information about both options was revealed, 
before the selected option was highlighted and the corresponding juice reward delivered via oral 
tube (Figure 6.2A). For the purpose of the current analysis, we focus upon the neural responses 
to the presentation of the first cue (Figure 6.4). 
6.3.2 Neural recordings 
Neural activity was recorded simultaneously from ACC, LPFC, OFC, and vmPFC using tungsten 
electrodes (Figure 6.3). Over multiple sessions, this yielded several hundred cells for each brain 





Figure 6.2 | Experimental design (A) Information gathering task. On each trial, monkeys made 
a left or a right choice based upon sequentially revealed information about the magnitude and 
probability of juice reward associated with each option. Information was sampled using 
saccades and the final choice was made using a joystick. See text for details. (B) Example picture 
cues. Each cue provided information about either the probability or magnitude of reward. 
Adapted from Malalasekera (2015) 47. 
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For clarity regarding recording location, we quote directly from Malalakasera (2015)47, in which 
the data were originally presented: 
‘Neuronal data was recorded from four target regions; ACC, LPFC, OFC, vmPFC. We considered 
ACC to be the entire dorsal bank of the anterior cingulate sulcus from AP 27-37. LPFC 
recordings spanned both dorsal and ventral banks of the principal sulcus but were 
concentrated towards the former. All neurons recorded lateral to the medial orbital sulcus 
and medial to the lateral orbital sulcus were considered OFC. Finally, vmPFC was considered 
to be a continuous region which was ventral of the genu of ACC and medial to the medial 
orbital sulcus. Electrophysiological and depth observations (i.e., gyral and sulcal landmarks, 
white matter zones) obtained from each electrode during the electrode lowering process were 
used to estimate the location of each recorded neuron with reference to previously obtained 
MRI images.‘ 
Data were recorded at 40KHz. Units were isolated by manual off-line spike sorting (Plexon 
Offline Spike-Sorter, Dallas).  
6.3.3 Analysis of firing rate 
We downsampled spiking data to 1KHz, and epoched activity from -500:500ms relative to the 
onset of Cue 1. In order to calculate firing rate, we used a sliding window of 200ms, with a stride 
of 10ms, taking the mean inside each window to calculate the firing rate for that bin. This 
produced a firing rate vector of 81 bins for each trial, with Cue 1 presentation occurring in the 
40th bin. For example firing rate plots, see Figure 6.4. 
In order to accommodate differences in firing rates across neurons, we normalized firing rate on 
each trial by that neuron’s mean and standard deviation of firing rate. This was computed by 
smoothing with a 199ms window and then calculating the mean and average firing rate across 
all time points and all trials. 
6.3.4 ANOVAs for value sensitivity 
At various points in the analysis we used ANOVAs to test whether a given cell is sensitive to 
value. This is a departure from the conventional approach for assessing value sensitivity, which 




Figure 6.3 | Recording locations Estimated recording locations, with each dot corresponding to 
a single neuron. Numbers denote millimetres anterior to the Anterior-Posterior line. Adapted 
from Malalasekera (2015) 47. 
 
We took the mean firing rate on each trial, focusing on an outcome window from 100:500ms. We 
then used a one-way ANOVA to assess whether variance in firing rate was related to the value of 
the cue presented on each trial. As a control period, we use the time window prior to cue 
presentation (-500:0ms). 
6.3.5 Binomial testing 
In all single-neuron analyses, we used a threshold of p=0.05 to define whether a statistical test 
was significant for a given neuron. We then tested the fraction of cells in each brain area which 
surpassed this threshold using a binomial test with an expected probability of 0.05. 
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6.3.6 Linear and Weibull fitting 
In Figure 6.5 we pre-process the data in various ways to remove linear (Figure 6.5A-C), 
monotonic (Figure 6.5D-F), or attribute-specific (Figure 6.5G-I) components of value. We 
performed these increasingly strenuous tests to check whether the residuals in each case still 
retained information about value, allowing us to characterize activity as non-linear, non-
monotonic, and attribute-general. In all cases we started with an evoked firing-rate vector, 
calculated as above, and trial-labels either for value (1-5) [linear and monotonic tests] or all cues 
(1-10) [attribute residual test]. 
For linear fitting, we performed a regression, describing Firing Rate (FR) on each trial as a 
function of a constant, the value of the presented cue, and an error term: 
FR = b0 + b1Value + ε 
Equation 6.1 
We then used the residual vector, ε, as an input to an ANOVA in which we assessed whether the 
residuals retained information about value. 
In order to fit a variety of monotonic functions, we made use of the cumulative Weibull 
distribution: 
𝐹𝑅 𝑥 = 	𝐴(𝐶 − 2O ·] z) 
Equation 6.2 
This required non-linear fitting, performed using the matlab function lsqcurvefit. We found that 
this fitting was somewhat temperamental, resulting in fits that varied substantially according to 
the starting position of the optimization. We therefore initialized the optimization 10 times for 
each neuron, picking starting parameter values from a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1. We then used the best-fitting curve, as assessed by the sum of squared 
error for each iteration. As with the linear analysis, we then used the residuals from this analysis 
as an input to an ANOVA testing for traces of non-monotonic value sensitivity in each neuron. 
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6.3.7 Dot-product analysis of residuals for magnitude and probability  
We wanted to check whether the non-linear components of value coding were correlates of 
value or cue-specific idiosyncrasies. We reasoned that if a cell’s linear residuals are truly value 
coding, then they should look similar when computed separately for each attribute (magnitude 
or probability) i.e. residuals for each attribute should be correlated. 
We repeated the linear regression above but including separate terms for magnitude and 
probability trials and their associated value. We then took the average residuals (across trials) for 
each value, for magnitude and probability, resulting in two vectors of length 5. We then took the 
dot product between the two to assess the similarity of non-linear value representations in each 
attribute. We compared the true dot-product to a null distribution obtained by shuffling each 
attribute independently and taking the dot product between the shuffled vectors of 5. 
6.3.8 Regression modelling of cue responses 
In order to characterize tuning curves, we used a multiple regression to quantify the neural 
responses to each cue at every timepoint. In analyses in which we focus upon responses to 
value, irrespective of attribute, we used a nTrials x 5 predictor matrix. Each row contained a 
single 1, denoting the cue-value presented on that trial. For analyses in which probability and 
magnitude cues are treated separately, we used a nTrials x 10 matrix, following the same 
method.  
We thus obtain a series of bs, describing each neuron’s response to each cue at each timepoint. 
In Figure 6 and 7 we plot betas from value and an attribute-specific regressions, summarizing 
each neuron’s response by taking the mean b across the outcome period (100:500ms). These  b’s 
also form the input to the Gaussian and linear fitting procedures and population decoding 
procedures (below). 
6.3.9 Distance plotting 
Following a procedure first outlined in 8, we used sorting by peak response to visualize tuning 
curves. We used the results of the value ANOVA (see above) to select cells which showed some 
sensitivity to value. We then took the regression coefficients (bs) derived from the value 
regression described above and normalized them such that all cells had a minimum b of 0 and a 
maximum of 1. 
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In Figure 6.6D,6.6E, and 6.6G, we sort these cells according to their preferred value: the value 
which received the largest b in the value regression analysis. To produce Figure 6.6D, we binned 
responses by each value’s position relative to the preferred cue. For example, if a neuron 
preferred value 1, then 2 would be assigned as +1, 3 as +2, 4 as +3, and 5 as +4. A neuron 
preferring value 3 would be distributed as -2 (value 1), -1 (value 2), 0 (value 3), +1 (value 4), and 
+2 (value 5). In this manner, we obtain a visualization aligned to each neuron’s preferences, 
where values which are close to the most preferred are central, and increasing distance from the 
middle corresponds to values that are increasingly distant from the preferred value. In Figures 
6.6G we repeat the procedure, but exclude cells preferring either value 5 or value 1, thus 
removing cells which might be positive or negative linear coders of value. In both cases we use 
sign-rank tests to assess whether values that are increasingly distant from the mean show 
decreasing responses.  
For Figure 6.6E, we again sort cells by their preferred value. We then simply plot the average 
tuning curve for all cells preferring that value. The same procedure is used in 6H & I, but we use 
b’s derived from an attribute-specific regression, and assess attribute-general coding by using 
one attribute to sort the cells (by preference e.g. prefer magnitude=1, prefer magnitude=2 etc.), 
and then plotting the responses to the other stimulus. This gives a visual approximation to the 
mutual information between the two tuning curves. 
Figure 6.7 combines the approaches described above to produce cross-attribute distance plots. 
Here we allocate cue responses to bins according to one attribute, and plot the responses to the 
other.  
6.3.10 Comparison of Gaussian and linear fits 
In order to formally compare Gaussian and linear characterizations of tuning curves, we fit bs 
from the cue-value regression with linear: 𝐹𝑅 𝑥 = 	𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 
Equation 6.3 
and Gaussian tuning curves: 
𝐹𝑅 𝑥 = 	𝑎𝑒O(·O¾)»¿  
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Equation 6.4 
where x is value, 1:5.  
We assessed the fit for each neuron using Sum Squared Error (SSE). In order to compensate for 
the higher number of parameters in the Gaussian than the linear model, we compared the 
difference in fits (SSELinear-SSEGaussian) to a null distribution of SSE differences composed by 
shuffling trial labels 1000 times and fitting the resultant bs (Figure 6.8A). We then compared the 
difference in SSE obtained using the true bs to the distribution obtained using randomised ones 
(Figure 6.8A iv).   
6.3.11 Population decoding 
We used Support Vector Machines (SVMs) to estimate population information content in the 
absence of linear information. SVMs are classifiers which treat examples as points in high-
dimensional space, with dimensions defined by the features (the different things which have 
been measured). In our case, each trial can be considered a point in a high-dimensional space 
with one dimension per neuron. SVM’s attempt to find a ‘hyperplane’ which maximally separates 
different classes – in our case, cues of different value 48. In order to achieve this, an SVM is 
trained on a series of examples, each of which consists of a class label (value 1:5) and 
measurements from a set of features (in this case, the activity evoked by that cue in a series of 
different neurons). Having trained on part of the dataset, the SVM can then be tested on the 
remaining data, and accuracy calculated by comparing the predicted labels with the true labels 
in the test set.  
In order to obtain trial x feature matrices suitable for analysis with SVM, it was necessary to 
equalize the number of trials recorded from each neuron for each cue. We set a target number 
of trials per cue (20). Cells with fewer than 20 trials for any cue were discarded, and neurons-cue 
combinations with more than 20 trials were clipped to that length, such that only the first 20 
trials were retained. This resulted in 197 neurons in ACC, 144 in LPFC, 195 in OFC, and 154 in 
vmPFC. 
We used a linear SVM with a cost parameter of 0.01, tested with 5-fold cross-validation, using the 
SVMtrain function from LibSVM (available from http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/)49. 
Accuracy was calculated as the average % correct classification over these 5 folds. 
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One potential difficulty is that neural populations which contain bountiful information about cue 
identity might give spuriously high classification according to cue value. This is clearly an issue 
with classification analyses, in which the only objective is to find a hyperplane that separates 
cues of different values.  To overcome this, we composed a null-distribution which incorporated 
cue identity classification, by shuffling the value of attribute and magnitude independently. This 
produced a situation in which cues of different values were labelled as having the same value 
(e.g. magnitude=4 and probability=3 are both labelled as value=1).  By comparing our true 
classification accuracy to this null we are thus asking whether the correct pairing of magnitude 
and attribute cues according to their value produces a superior classification to pairing at 
random. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Characterising value-tuning 
We observed a wide variety of response patterns to Cue 1, which we summarised by defining 
tuning curves for each neuron based upon the average response in the period 100-400ms post-
cue (see Methods). In Figure 6.4 we preview three distinct response profiles to cues of different 
values. Neuron 124 in ACC (top row) displays monotonically increasing responses to cues of 
increasing value, with responses that look similar across both attributes (magnitude and 
probability). Note that although responses are monotonic, they do not appear to be linear, being 
sigmoidal in form. Neuron 98 in OFC (middle row) shows positive linear tuning for value with 
probability cues, but negative linear tuning for value in the magnitude domain. Neuron 123, also 
in OFC (bottom row) displays a strikingly dissimilar profile: responses are most vigorous for cues 
of intermediate value, with evoked firing rates dropping off as values become more extreme. 
Importantly, responses look similar irrespective of attribute, implying that this cell is tuned for 
value. We next sought quantitative confirmation of substantial non-linear contributions to value-
tuning in PFC.  
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Figure 6.4 | Cue 1 responses Average firing rates for each magnitude cue (left column), and 
probability cue (middle column). The evoked response can be summarised in a tuning curve, 
with a single coefficient (b) describing the response to a given cue over the time period 
100:400ms post-stimulus (right column). Here we show several different possible tuning 
functions; linear tuning for both probability and magnitude, which might be described as value-
tuning (top right); anti-correlated linear tuning for probability and magnitude (middle right); and 
non-monotonic tuning for both magnitude and probability (bottom right). Error bars in tuning-
curve plots are SEM of betas across outcome period. 
 
6.4.2 PFC populations retain value-selectivity after linear regression 
Probabilistic population codes support gain-encoding of uncertainty if codes are non-linear 
(such as densely sigmoid or Gaussian) 2,3. Our first set of quantitative analyses (Figure 4.5) tested 
for this non-linear component, by removing linear and monotonic value signals, and assessing 
whether the resulting representation still contained information about Cue 1 value. 
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We first summarised the response of each neuron on each trial by taking the average firing rate 
for the outcome period (100-400ms). We then estimated a linear regression model describing 
the relationship between value (1:5) and responses for each neuron on each trial (Figure 6.5A). 
We then took the residuals from this analysis (Figure 6.5B) and subjected them to an ANOVA, 
asking whether the residuals still contained information about the value of the cue presented on 
each trial. As control, we performed exactly the same analysis upon activity estimated pre-Cue (-
400:0ms). 
We found that in ACC, LPFC, and OFC, a larger-than-chance population of neurons retained non-
linear selectivity (all p<0.001, binomial test) (Figure 6.5C). This was particularly prominent in OFC, 
where almost 30% of cells still carried information about cue-value after the removal of linear 
components. The pre-cue analysis confirmed that <5% of cells were significant using control 
data (Figure 6.5C). 
We next asked whether value-selectivity was retained after removing all monotonic components 
of value coding. This is important because slight deviations from linearity might arise through 
subtle misattribution of value in the learning process, perceptual biases, or the biophysical 
factors. The non-linearity result above tells us that coding is not perfectly linear; non-
monotonicity, however, implies a different coding scheme entirely.  
We therefore repeated the model-estimation and residual analysis above, but using non-linear 
fitting of Weibull functions in place of linear regression 50 (see Methods). We fit a Weibull to 
average firing rate for each value (Figure 6.5D), again generating a set of residuals (Figure 5E), 
which we then subjected to an ANOVA. Residuals from Weibull fits in OFC (p<0.001, binomial 
test) and LPFC (p=0.028, binomial test) retained value selectivity, whilst those for ACC (p=0.19, 
binomial test) and vmPFC (p=1) were no longer selective having removed monotonic 
components (Figure 6.5E). This suggests that non-linear tuning in ACC and LPFC is likely still 
monotonic. As before, the pre-cue analysis confirmed that <5% of cells were significant using 
control data (Figure 6.5E). 
One challenge associated with the present dataset is that each value is associated with only two 
cues, which raises the possibility than non-linear coding might arise from cue, rather than value, 
selectivity. If, for instance, a given neuron has a preference for a particular picture, this will result 
 203 
in a bump in the tuning curve which is poorly described by a linear fit. To guard against this 
possibility, we next repeated the linear fitting procedure separately for probability and 
magnitude. We then asked whether the dot product of the residuals in the two domains (Figure 
6.5G) was greater than we would expect by chance, as assessed by a permutation test where 
betas for probability and magnitude were independently shuffled (Figure 6.5H).    
We found that residuals for magnitude and probability were correlated in ACC (p=0.024), 
binomial test), but in none of the other brain regions (LPFC, p=0.137; OFC, p=0.42; vmPFC, 
p=0.36) (Figure 6.5I).  This suggests that deviations from linearity in ACC do reflect value coding, 
and argue against a cue-coding explanation for non-linear selectivity. The failing to find the same 
in OFC and LPFC suggests that non-linear components of value coding in these regions might be 




Figure 6.5 | Removing linear and monotonic value representations Panels ABDEGH 
demonstrate the methodology on a single neuron, whilst CFI are population summaries. We 
start by quantifying the response of a neuron to cues of value 1-5. We can then remove linear 
components of value (A), leaving us with residuals (B). For each neuron, we can then ask 
whether the residuals still discriminate between cues of different value. In all brain areas, a 
significant portion of cells retain selectivity after removing linear value components. Pre-cue 
analyses confirmed that no such selectivity was observed in the pre-cue period. (C). Going one 
step further, we can fit a Weibull to accommodate non-linear, monotonic tuning curves (D). The 
residuals from this process (E) also retain value information in OFC, and LPFC, but not in the pre-
cue period (F). To guard against the possibility that residuals are capturing single-cue selectivity, 
we can check whether linear residuals for magnitude and probability (G) are correlated (H). By 
comparison to a null distribution composed of betas derived from random permutations of 
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trials (I), we find that non-linear cue representations share structure in ACC (p=0.0244), 
suggesting that non-linear components do indeed reflect non-linear value-tuning rather than 
cue selectivity. Again, pre-cue analysis confirmed that no brain regions showed above-chance 
correlation before cue presentation. 
6.4.3 Visualizing non-monotonic tuning curves 
Plotting tuning functions for hundreds of neurons provides a challenge. A seminal paper 
describing tuning curves for number in the PFC 8 provided several useful visualisations (Figures 
6.6A-C), which we attempted to replicate. The first (Figure 6.6A) involves sorting cells by their 
preferred number and plotting their response to other cues as an increasing distance from the 
peak. By testing adjacent responses against one another, we can assess whether responses 
decrease as we get further away from the peak, as predicted from Gaussian tuning. Secondly, 
using the same sorting of cells by preferred number, one can plot average normalized tuning 
curves corresponding to cells with the same preferred number (Figure 6.6B). Finally, we can 
simply plot a histogram of preferred number over cells (Figure 6. 6C). 
Plotting a distance visualisation of response profiles for value-selective cells (classified by 
ANOVA) reveals a striking ‘pile’ appearance very reminiscent of the original 8 (Figure 6.6D). We 
tested for differences between adjacent values (excluding the comparison between peak and 
adjacent, which is biased by peak selection), and found that all but one of the differences (+3/+4) 
was significant (sign-rank tests, Z between 2.41-13.32, p from 0-0.0157). Plotting tuning curves 
sorted by preference (6.6E) and a histogram of preferred values (6.6F) also provided clear 
indications of non-monotonic tuning in the dataset. Interestingly, we observed similar 
distributions of preferences over values as previously reported over numbers 8, with larger 
populations of cells preferring end values than intermediate ones (Figure 6.6C and 6.6F). 
Although these plots are visually compelling and have previously been used to evince Gaussian 
tuning 8,9, we were concerned about two possible confounds, arising from the contribution of 
monotonic and cue-specific coding.    
Firstly, distance analyses can be generated from monotonically tuned neurons alone. If there are 
both positively and negatively tuned neurons in the population, both of the sides of the distance 
plot will be monotonically decreasing as we move away from the preferred value. The ‘pile’ could 
thus be composed from two juxtaposed linear tuning curves, one negative and the other 
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positive. To ensure this was not the case in our dataset, we repeated the distance analysis 
having excluded end-preferring neurons (those with preference for value=1 or value=5).  Both 
the appearance and the significance of the analysis was largely preserved (p between 0.0268 
and 0.04), with the comparison of +2 to +3 at trend level (p=0.10). 
 
Figure 6.6 | Visualizing tuning curves (A) Nieder et al 8, plot PFC responses to cues of varying 
number as function of distance from the number eliciting maximal activity. The drop off of 
response with increasing distance from preferred number implies Gaussian tuning. (B) Tuning 
curves for cells sorted by number preference and (C) distribution of number preferences in PFC, 
again from 8. We performed the same set of analyses to assess evidence for non-monotonic 
value-tuning. Both our distance (D) and tuning (E) plots are similar to those found by Nieder et 
al. The distribution of preferences over cells (F) is biased towards cells preferring 5, whereas 
Nieder et al find a bias towards cells preferring 1. (G) To ensure that the significance of our 
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distance analyses was not due to the presence of monotonic-coding cells, we excluded cells 
preferring cues 1 and 5 from the analysis. The resultant distance plot is similar, with statistical 
significance unaffected. Furthermore, sorting tuning curves for value-selecting cells based upon 
probability preference and plotting responses to magnitude (H), or vice versa (I), produces well-
ordered curves. This generalization of tuning between attributes is predicted if cells are 
representing value, as opposed to single attribute or cue coding. 
 
Secondly, we wanted to confirm that tuning curves are not attribute specific. If the tuning curves 
we visualize here correspond to non-monotonic representations of value, we ought to be able to 
predict tuning curves for magnitude from those for probability, and vice versa. To test this, we 
sorted by magnitude or probability and plotted tuning curves for the other attribute (Figure 6.6H 
& I). On average across brain areas, we found that tuning curves were preserved across 
attribute, arguing against an attribute or cue-specific interpretation.  
Closer inspection of distance plots for each brain area without end-coders (Figure 6.7) confirmed 
that cross-attribute tuning was present in all brain areas. However, there was some variation, 
with tuning clearest in ACC and LPFC and more disordered in OFC and vmPFC. In all brain areas, 
the highest average response to magnitude cues was predicted by the peak response to 
probability, and vice versa.  
 
Figure 6.7 | Cross-attribute distance plots by area Segregating cells by area and repeating the 
distance plots, excluding end coders (as in 6.6G). All areas show a degree of cross-attribute 
tuning, although it is more pronounced in ACC and LPFC than OFC and vmPFC. 
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6.4.4 Testing Gaussian vs. linear coding  
So far, we have seen that neurons in PFC retain information about value once linear and 
monotonic information has been stripped away, and that population visualizations resemble 
those of Gaussian-tuned neurons. In our next set of analyses we provide more direct evidence 
for this claim, by explicitly comparing the ability of Gaussian and linear functions to capture 
tuning curves for value. This approach has the distinct advantage of not requiring us to filter or 
censor the data in any way. Thus, we allow linear trends to be accommodated in the shape of 
Gaussians (for example, neuron 125 in Figure 6.8B), simply asking which model has a higher 
probability given the data. 
 
Figure 6.8 | ACC and OFC contain Gaussian-tuned neurons (A) We used permutation testing 
to assess whether neurons were better fit by linear (2 parameters) or Gaussian (3 parameters) 
tuning functions. (i) Fitting was performed upon betas derived from a multiple regression, 
summarizing each neuron’s response to each cue. We fit a single tuning curve across both value 
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domains (magnitude and probability). For each neuron, we shuffled trials (ii) and refit our tuning 
curves each time (iii). This provided a null distribution of differences in Sum Squared Error (iii), to 
which the true SSE difference was compared. (B) ACC and OFC contained sizeable populations of 
Gaussian-tuned neurons. (C) Example neurons. Notice that this approach recovers cells that are 
‘classically’ Gaussian (n33 and n97), as well as negatively tuned (n595) and non-linearly tuned 
(n125) neurons. 
 
To this end, we used multiple regression to summarise each neuron’s responses to the 5 cue-
values, and then fit linear and Gaussian tuning functions to the resultant regression coefficients. 
We used a permutation-test to assess whether the difference between the Gaussian and the 
linear fit was greater than we would expect by chance (Figure 6.8A). This involved random 
shuffling of trial labels, following which the same procedure was repeated, producing a set of bs 
(Figure 6.8Aii), which we then fit with Gaussian and linear functions (Figure 6.8Aiii). We then 
compared the difference in SSE obtained using the true bs to the distribution obtained using 
randomised ones (Figure 6.8Aiv).  
ACC and OFC contained substantial populations of cells (18.7 and 20.1% respectively, binomial 
test both p<0.001) whose tuning was better described as Gaussian than linear (Figure 6.8B). 
Several Gaussian-tuned neurons selected by this method are plotted in 6.8C. Our method 
detects both classical Gaussian profiles (n33, n97), whilst also picking up non-linear tuning that is 
well described as one-tail of a Gaussian (n125). Furthermore, we also identify cells that are 
negatively tuned to value (n595).  
 210 
 
Figure 6.9 | Control analysis: correlating probability and magnitude tuning Discarding cells 
which preferred either the maximum or minimum magnitude (i.e. monotonic coders), we asked 
whether preferences magnitude predicted those in probability, as would be expected in cells 
tuned to value. We calculated the fraction of the population in which the preferences matched, 
and compared to a permutation test in which the order of cells was randomly shuffled. (A) ACC, 
OFC, and vmPFC all show a significant concordance of non-monotonic magnitude and 
probability preferences. (B) Conditional histograms for all cells classified as Gaussian by the 
previous analysis. Panels 1-5 correspond to cells with peak response to magnitudes 1-5. Clear 
peaks in the corresponding probability preference imply value tuning. 
 
6.4.5 Confirming value-coding 
In order to reassure ourselves that the Gaussian-tuning identified in the previous section did not 
correspond to cue-specific responses, we assessed in more detail the degree of concordance 
between probability and magnitude tuning. We sorted cells by their preference in the magnitude 
domain, discarded those preferring 1 or 5, and then asked what percentage of cells had a 
matching peak in the probability domain. We then compared this fraction to a permutation test 
in which the order of cues was randomly shuffled. In ACC (p=0.0138), OFC (p=0.0392), and 
vmPFC (p=0.0406), shared-peaks were more common than expected by chance, with LPFC 
showing a trend in the same direction (p=0.12) (Figure 6.9A). This implies that cells which prefer 
magnitude cue value 2 are more likely to prefer probability cue 2 than those that prefer 
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magnitude cue 3 or 4.  To reinforce this point, we plotted conditional histograms for those cells 
identified as Gaussian-tuned in the previous analysis (Figure 6.9B), emphasising that non-




Figure 6.10 | Population decoding of value after linear information removal We used 
Support Vector Machines to assess the information content of pseudo-populations of neurons 
from each brain region, having removed linear value correlates via regression. Red vertical lines 
denote real performance, histograms are performance of random shuffles. (A) Cue value is 
decodable from neural populations in ACC and OFC. The null distribution is composed of cue-
shuffles for probability and magnitude independently, such that mere cue selectivity is 
accommodated by the null (hence high null-decoding in OFC). (B) We performed a 
complementary analysis in which we matched cues for value, and tried to decode cue identity. 
All brain areas showed successful decoding, with representation of cue identity in OFC markedly 
stronger than elsewhere. 
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6.4.6 Population representations of value in the absence of linear information 
The analyses above provide evidence that some single cells in the PFC, predominantly in ACC 
and OFC, possess non-monotonic tuning functions for value that are approximately Gaussian. 
However, decisions are likely formed through the co-ordinated action of populations of cells in 
each of these regions, rather than relying upon the representation of value in any one neuron. 
To this end, we turned to population decoding methods to assess the contribution of non-linear 
coding to value representations across hundreds of neurons. 
For each brain region, we assembled a ‘pseudo-population’ of cells, comprising all of the cells 
recorded in that region over all sessions. Such pseudo-populations do not represent the full 
richness of a true neural population, because cells were recorded at different times. Hence 
information contained in intercell correlations or temporal dynamics is lost13. Analyses of such 
pseudo-populations thus provide a useful lower-bound on the information represented in a 
given brain region. 
We asked whether value was decodable from each pseudo-population, having removed linear 
value codes. For each brain region we took all cells in which there were more than 20 trials for 
each cue, and regressed out linear value correlates. This resulted in pseudo-populations of 197 
neurons in ACC, 144 in LPFC, 195 in OFC, and 154 in vmPFC. We then trained a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) to distinguish between cues of different value, collapsing across attribute, using 
the LibSVM package 49. We compared performance to a permutation test in which the betas for 
magnitude and probability were independently shuffled, such that cues of different values (e.g. 
magnitude = 1, probability = 3) were assigned to the same value. This produced a null in which 
cue-selectivity was accommodated, preventing false positives due to cue-distinguishability. Both 
ACC (p=0.0020) and OFC (p=0.040) supported value-decoding in the absence of linear 
information (Figure 6.10). vmPFC was marginally significant (p=0.070), whilst LPFC (p=0.154) was 
not. Both ACC and OFC, therefore, contain non-linear population representations of value, in 
accordance with the analysis of single-cells performed above. 
By way of comparison, we also asked to what extent cue identity was encoded in each 
population, removing variability due to value. To do this we matched cues from each value level 
(magnitude 1 vs. probability 1, magnitude 2 vs. probability 2 etc.) and trained an SVM to 
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distinguish between them. Performance was then calculated by averaging over all values. A 
population only encoding cue value would thus be at chance in this analysis, because value 1 as 
indicated by cue 1 would be identical to value 1 as indicated by cue 6. We compared decoding of 
cue identity to random trial labels. Cue decoding performance in OFC far exceeded other brain 
regions, standing at an impressive 96% (p=0.002), compared with ACC=68.0% (p=.006), 
LPFC=68.5% (p=0.008), and vmPFC=65.5% (p=0.006). This suggests that cue identity coding is 
particularly prevalent in OFC, consistent with the idea that OFC maintains a representation of 
state space 51,52.  
6.5 Discussion 
Neural coding in numerous regions is compatible with the use of Probabilistic Population Codes 
1,2,31,39,53 to represent and manipulate uncertain information. Recent data  54,55 suggests that such 
codes might be used to make decisions about orientation and movement of visual stimuli. Given 
the established role of the prefrontal cortices in representing malleable and uncertainty-
modulated value estimates 28, we reasoned that population codes might provide a useful format 
for computations in value-based choice. To test this idea, we focused on a key predicate of PPCs, 
non-linear tuning. Using a variety of approaches, we found evidence of non-linear value tuning 
in the ACC and the OFC. 
6.5.1 Value tuning in the anterior cingulate 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the ACC plays a central role in the integration of information 
relevant for value-based choice28. The ACC maintains representations of value over a variety of 
timescales 56, and lesions abolish credit assignment in extended sequences of actions 38, 
suggesting that value representations are diverse and malleable in this part of the brain. 
Uncertainty is also known to modulate activity in the cingulate 24,57, with interindividual variability 
in the speed of belief updates linked to the strength of cingulate representations. The ACC thus 
appears a prime candidate for probabilistic population coding. 
We found abundant evidence that neurons in ACC code value in a non-linear fashion. ACC 
representations of value were resilient to the removal of linear information (Figure 6.5), with 
aggregate tuning curves resembling non-linear coders (Figure 6.7). A substantial number of 
neurons had tuning curves better fit by Gaussians than by linear models (Figure 6.8), and value 
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could be convincingly decoded from the ACC population having removed linear information 
(Figure 6.10). 
However, when we removed all monotonic correlates of value – thus accommodating sigmoidal, 
concave, and convex tuning curves - residuals in the ACC were no longer value coding. This 
suggests that the non-linear tuning observed in ACC is probably monotonic i.e. neurons only 
ever increase (or decrease) their firing rate with increasing value. Whilst this representation is 
still consistent with a probabilistic population code format 2, its interpretation requires care.  
Firstly, non-linearity might arise due to errors in the calculation of value, either due to imperfect 
learning by the animal or imperfect estimation of subjective value by the experimenter. Given 
the preponderance of linear value correlates in other brain regions, this seems unlikely. 
Similarly, biophysical explanations for this phenomenon seem unlikely given its absence in, for 
instance, vmPFC.  
Secondly, and more problematically, non-linear, monotonic representations of value might 
correspond to linear representations of a value-related variable. For instance, some regions of 
frontal cortex appear to represent the best choice given the current evidence 58. Given the ACC’s 
well-documented (albeit controversial) role in foraging 36,59-61, it is plausible that ACC neurons 
carry a signal about whether an option is better or worse than the average. This would produce 
sigmoidal tuning curves, with high value (4 & 5) and low value (1 & 2) coded similarly. Neuron 
125 (Figure 6.7B) appears to have such a tuning curve. Viewed through the lens of value, this 
representation would appear non-linear, and might be fitted better by a Gaussian than by a 
straight line. This touches upon a deeper philosophical issue to which we will return in due 
course, concerning our ability to make statements about representations and their form. To 
preview it here: a non-linear representation of the original attribute (value) is indistinguishable 
from a linear representation of a non-linear function of the original attribute (such as a choice 
probability).  
6.5.2 Value tuning in the OFC 
Recent characterizations of the OFC have focused upon its role in representing the state space 
associated with a choice 52,62. However, the rich literature on value-coding in the OFC suggests 
that this map of task space is also imbued with information about the value of those states 63,64. 
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Our data suggest that both of these representations are in part non-linear. Both the state space 
(cue identity) and value are decodable from the non-linear components of neural activity (Figure 
6.10).  
All of our analyses suggested a substantial non-linear component to OFC value representations. 
Moreover, representations of value in some cells in OFC are non-monotonic (Figure 6.5E), 
surviving the removal of a fitted Weibull function. The OFC hosted the largest number of 
Gaussian-tuned cells (20.1%, or 39 cells) of any brain region, and showed the highest retention 
of selectivity after the removal of linear information. Our analyses add to the growing 
appreciation that the OFC representation of value is richer and more diverse than previously 
appreciated 65,66.  
The entanglement of state and value representations in this task makes it difficult to conclusively 
fractionate the two. Each value was associated with only two cue identities, meaning that cue-
identity coding might easily be misinterpreted as value sensitivity (and vice versa). To address 
this in our analysis of residuals, we compared the linear residuals for magnitude and probability, 
calculated separately (Figure 6.5I). In the OFC, these residuals were not significantly correlated in 
a greater number of cells than expected by chance. This implied that non-linear OFC information 
might be unique to each domain, suggesting coding of cue identity. However, this is in conflict 
with our distance analyses (Fig 6.6 & 6.7), the correlation in peak tuning across attributes (Figure 
6.9) and the ability of SVMs to decode value in OFC when controlling for cue identity (Figure 
6.10), all of which point to value, and not state, representations. 
Where does this this discord come from? We note that correlations across 5 data points, which is 
what the cross-attribute residual test amounts to, are ambitious. Furthermore, the small range 
of values considered here means that only tuning curves centred on the middle value will be 
unaffected by removal of linear information; neurons preferring values 2 or 4 will be 
substantially altered. Both of these problems might be addressed by using a larger range of 
values, in association with a larger number of cues. Even more compelling would be to record 
data during learning, holding cue identity constant and varying value over time. Recent work in 
the DLPFC found that single neurons preferentially represent the fluctuating value associated 
with a specific stimulus 67, suggesting one flavour of identity-value multiplexing. 
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6.5.3 LPFC and vmPFC 
As anticipated, evidence for non-linear tuning in LPFC and vmPFC was comparatively weaker, 
although not absent. LPFC retained information about value after linear regression, but this was 
not decodable at a population level when controlling for cue identity. This, and the fact that peak 
value preference in magnitude and probability were not correlated, suggests that LPFC 
representations are largely cue-specific. Interestingly, the converse was true for vmPFC, which 
did not harbour single-cell representations of value after regression but showed a trend towards 
population-level representations (p=0.07), as well as a correlation between tuning for probability 
and magnitude.  
6.5.4 Conclusions: PPC’s in PFC? 
We found that neurons in ACC and OFC represent value in a non-linear format compatible with 
probabilistic population coding. Certainly, then, these regions might support a probabilistic 
population code, consistent with their roles in the accumulation of uncertain information and 
the representation of state space. 
However, the identifying feature of such codes is the representation of uncertainty, of which 
there is none in the current task. This limits our ability to test a key prediction of the model, 
namely that the gain of population responses fluctuate inversely with uncertainty 2. Studying the 
responses of these populations whilst animals learn the values associated with particular cues 
would allow us to test these ideas more directly, whilst obviating the identity-value confounds 
we struggled with here. Such data would also allow us to test other models of uncertainty-
coding, such as those based upon spike-rate variability over time 68. This would also allow us to 
link the responses we observe to the behaviour of the animal, arguably a critical step in 
characterizing a neural representation 69. 
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Figure 6.11 | Neural coding of pitch and volume From Bendor & Wang (2006). Cells in the 
auditory cortex of the marmoset are tuned to frequency and sound level. Conceptually, both 
variables are continuous and linear, but their neural representation is tuned and non-linear. 
 
6.5.5 What tuning curves should we expect for value? 
Our results emphasise that intuitively linear concepts need not have a linear neural 
instantiation. The overwhelming convention in the neuroscience of value-based choice is to 
assume that variables that go up and down are represented by neurons that fire more or less14-
23, an assumption also implicit in fMRI studies 70-77. A simple consideration of sensory systems 
suggests that this is an unhelpful supposition. Pitch, for instance, is a linear concept coded by 
populations of tuned neurons, as is loudness 78 (Figure 6.11).  Recent progress in understanding 
the neural code for the representation of space has emphasised how efficient neural codes can 
assume emphatically unintuitive forms 79,80. Grid cells represent space in a repeating hexagonal 
code which bears no semblance of a linear relationship with external frames of reference.  As 
models from sensory processing and decision-making become more popular in the study of 
value-based choice 81,82, we hope that the assumption of linearity falls by the wayside.  
A second conceptual distinction is between single-cell and population codes. As our ability to 
simultaneously measure the activity of many cells improves, it becomes increasingly hard to 
ignore the fact that population of neurons behave in complex ways that are completely 
inscrutable to single-neuron analysis 12,13,83. Grasping that nettle, we must acknowledge that 
tuning functions that seem sensible for a single cell – such as a linear code for value – don’t 
 218 
seem so effective if they are implemented by hundreds of thousands of neurons simultaneously. 
What seems sensible for one may be ludicrous for a thousand neurons. Grid cells again provide 
a salutatory lesson here: the activity of any one cell is weakly informative, but a population 
organized into modules provides a representational code of quite striking power 84. Similarly, the 
non-linear aspects of value-coding that we document here may seem unpalatable when 
considering the information imparted by the response of a single neuron, but functional and 
flexible when considered as a single thread in the fabric of a population response, such as that 
envisaged by PPC’s. To quote one of the seminal papers in the field, ‘An entire collection of cells 
is a terrible thing to waste on representing just a single value of some quantity’ 1. 
Our understanding of coding schemes in other regions of the brain has been deepened by 
considering the optimal representation of information from a theoretical perspective 85. Such 
information-theoretic approaches have stressed that tuning schemes ought to reflect the 
natural statistics of the environment, capturing the principle axes of variation whilst discarding 
redundant information 86. Convergent evidence suggests that aspects of the visual system obey 
such laws, with synthetic neural networks trained to perform high-level visual tasks frequently 
recapitulating aspects of tuning in V1 87. Recent work suggests that the grid-like representation 
of space may emerge simply from a convenient way to encode positions in a two-dimensional 
plane 80,88,89. Applying such ‘efficient-coding’ approaches to value representations presents (at 
least) two challenges 90. Firstly, we do not have a good understanding of the natural statistics of 
rewards in the environment, although recent foraging approaches have attempted to recapture 
some of the ethological validity arguably lost in neuroeconomic approaches. Secondly, value is 
inherently subjective, unlike the properties of visual scenes. It is a property of not only of the 
environment, but of the state of the organism in question. Estimating the natural statistics of 
value may therefore require us to estimate the natural statistics of physiological needs. 
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  Chapter 7: General discussion 
Our lives are delineated by the decisions that we make and coloured by the emotions that result. 
In this thesis I have attempted to shed light upon the way that different emotions arise, by 
characterizing them as the result of learning processes occurring in the brain (Chapters 2 and 
4). I have also described the feedback influence of emotions upon subsequent learning, detailing 
a subtle deficit in action learning following stress (Chapter 3). In the final two experiments I 
changed tack, focusing upon the representation of value, central to the models of learning and 
decision-making discussed in the preceding chapters. We saw how fMRI can be used to assess 
the construction of value at the level of the whole brain, documenting the role of the anterior 
cingulate in representing value estimates composed of constituents that appeared to be 
separately represented elsewhere in the brain (Chapter 5). Focusing in on the anterior cingulate 
and the orbitofrontal cortex, I then provided evidence that the way that neurons represent value 
might not be the same as the way that humans think about value, as a linear quantity (Chapter 
6).  As each chapter contains a relatively extensive discussion of the issues pertinent to that 
study, in this summary I will try and draw together some common threads and point out where 
there are holes in the patchwork. 
7.1 Optimality’s ever widening net 
The work presented here that deals with emotion is founded upon the idea that emotion is 
predictable and useful – that there is a logic behind fluctuations in happiness and stress that is 
expressed in their causes and consequences. This is a relatively recent perspective, reflecting the 
increasingly common assumption that the brain is best understood as a constrained solver of 
computational problems. In this case, we have touched upon the idea that mood might relate to 
trajectories of reward in the environment, and that stress might encourage us to avoid situations 
of great uncertainty. Another possibility which we have not discussed is that emotions can play a 
fundamentally social role, providing a convenient way to broadcast information about the 
environment and an organism’s interaction with it. In any case, we have come a long way from 
the Enlightenment notion of emotion as an impediment to clear thinking. 
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Similarly, the argument for probabilistic population codes put forward in Chapters 5 and 6 
stems from an analysis of how noisy information channels can best convey information 
consistent with Bayesian computation. This comes on the back of a decade or so of work 
establishing Bayes-optimal, or near-optimal, behaviour in a wide variety of tasks. Similarly, a 
great deal of effort has been expended detailing the rationality of choice and our deviations 
from it. As we shall discuss below, this emphasis on optimal solutions requires us to think very 
carefully about how our problems are formulated.  The description of the problem defines the 
optimal solution; recent work has emphasised how optimal solutions can appear sub-optimal if 
the problem is inadequately characterized 1.  Arguably, this has been an issue in the study of 
value-based decision-making: we have focused upon optimal solutions to isolated gambling 
problems without first asking whether these kind of choices are representative of real decisions.  
7.2 Value: economics, nature, and neural networks 
In the early sections of this thesis I described classic formulations of value, such as those 
undertaken by Pascal, Bernoulli, and others of an economic bent. The ideas of economics have 
had a profound impact upon the study of decision-making in neuroscience. The allure of 
economic descriptions is that they condense behaviour into a few clean numbers; their failing is 
that they provide a wholly unrealistic description of the problems that the brain has evolved to 
solve, and pay no attention to how an organism learns to solve those problems. One unhelpful 
mental model that we have inherited from economics is the idea that value is a monotonic 
quantity. Not only is this demonstrably untrue in behavioural terms, with humans routinely 
violating transitivity 1,2, but, as I have argued, it seems like an unhelpful assumption when 
considering the neural representations underlying value-based choice.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, a more reasonable approach might be to consider the kinds of 
problems the brain is trying to solve. In this view, the representation within the brain is always 
subservient to the computation the brain is trying to achieve, a philosophy naturally expounded 
by Marr’s three levels of analysis 3. Marr argued that we can understand an information in terms 
of computation (‘what is it trying to do’), algorithm (‘how the software work?’), and 
implementation (‘how does the hardware work?’). Through this lens, we can see that the idea 
that value representations ought to be linear results from a cross-contamination of 
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characterizations at the algorithmic and implementational levels: the assumption of linearity has 
leaked from software to hardware.  
Starting with the computational problem often dictates understanding the features of the 
problem as it typically occurs in nature. This approach has yielded great insight in the sensory 
domain, with an analysis of the natural statistics of images providing an excellent description of 
tuning properties in early visual cortex 4. As the problems we study become more remote from 
the sensory information on which they are based, this becomes more difficult. Not only are the 
necessary statistics harder to define - what are the natural statistics of reward? – but the current 
statistics might not reflect those that drove the evolution of the brain. A great deal of variance in 
dopaminergic activity today might be driven by Facebook likes, but understanding how the brain 
represents the ‘likeability’ of social media content is not a useful quest. Although such thinking 
has led to an increasing interest in foraging and time-limited problems 5,6, there remains much 
we don’t know about how best to characterize choice in an ethological way, and whether there 
remains a role for value in that description 7. 
Recent advances in neural networks provide another avenue through which to explore complex 
cognitive processes. Although there are problems associated with interpreting the relationship 
between brain data and models (see below), the hope is that by designing neural networks to do 
interesting value-based tasks, we can glean insight into how the brain achieves this and other 
feats of complex cognition 8. Drawing again on Marr’s three levels, we can see several ways in 
which neural networks might help us understand the brain. At an algorithmic level, neural 
networks might take forms which directly recapitulate the brain 9. At a computational level, they 
might provide some hints as to the problem features or technical complexities that we should be 
thinking about to understand the brain. For instance, recent networks have made use of 
adversarial architectures, with the performance of one network sharpened by its attempt to fool 
another 10. Arguably, this mirrors the competitive context in which brains develop, a topic which 
has received little attention in value-based decision-making. Nearly all of the decisions that an 
animal makes involve deciding whether it’s worth competing for a reward, be it sex, food, or 
shelter. This is particularly true in the complex social hierarchies in which the human brain 
evolved.  
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However, the analogy between synthetic and natural neural networks can only be stretched so 
far. It is important to acknowledge that constraints play a crucial role in the architecture of neural 
circuits, and the constraints faced by synthetic and real neural networks are likely to be very 
different.  Spatiotemporal 11 and energetic 12 considerations are known to play a profound role 
in the design and function of real neural networks. Conversely, much energy is expended in the 
design of artificial neural networks to format them in a manner appropriate for GPU processing 
13. The point at which the analogy between artificial and natural neural networks breaks down 
due to these differences remains to be seen. 
7.3 Models as bridges and sirens 
A dominant theme in this thesis has been that of models. Computational models provide us with 
the ability to make precise predictions about phenomena, bringing a quantitative bearing upon 
things that might at first sight not appear amenable to scientific enquiry, such as emotion. They 
can therefore offer us the ability to link disparate domains; as we saw in Chapters 2 and 4, 
models originally constructed to explain learning can be co-opted to describe emotional 
dynamics. Similarly, we can use models to bind together measurements, such as subjective and 
physiological assays of stress, by characterizing their dependence upon variables in our model. 
We can further reassure ourselves by fitting our models to separate individuals, and checking 
that interindividual variability in different measurement modalities is coherent. Models are 
indispensable to modern neuroscience, and rightly so. 
However, models also have the power to beguile. By bringing to bear machinery from disciplines 
unfamiliar to cognitive scientists, models can tempt us to characterize our data in a way that is 
overcomplicated, or obfuscatory. More worryingly, models can blind us to questions of 
specificity. For example, the first model of repetition suppression reported in Chapter 5 
supported the idea put forward in the literature, and justified by similar models, that repetition 
suppression signals of the type we observe are evidence of Gaussian tuning. However, closer 
investigation showed that these conclusions were contingent upon decisions made during 
model implementation that might not be immediately apparent to the reader. One suspects that 
this is frequently the case in cognitive neuroscience. Consequently, use of models to support 
interpretation of data might be considered proof of plausibility rather than empirical proof.  
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Additionally – and this is something of a marmite quality- models also force us to ask what we 
mean when we say we understand something. For instance, in Chapter 4 we show that a 
Bayesian hierarchical model provides a good description of learning in unpredictable 
environments. How much faith does this give us that the brain implements a hierarchical 
Gaussian filter? The problem might seem to be alleviated by collecting brain data, but difficulties 
persist. If fMRI signal – or neural firing rates – in some part of the brain bears a resemblance to 
either the predictions or the hidden variables in the HGF, does that constitute proof? Phrased 
another way, it is usually challenging to design an algorithm to solve the task at hand that 
displayed no relationship to behaviour and the brain. This has been emphasised by recent 
reports that deep neural networks produce patterns of representational similarity that echo 
those observed in parts of the visual system 9,14,15. By and large, the more a neural network’s 
internal representations resemble those of the brain, the better job they do of classifying 
images. Optimistically, one would say that we have discovered evidence that the brain uses deep 
neural networks to recognize images. Pessimistically, one would counter that we’ve merely 
shown that informational processes that do a good job of turning images into certain labels pass 
through similar intermediate states, a worry expressed by the reticent title of a recent paper 
‘Deep Supervised, but Not Unsupervised, Models May Explain IT Cortical Representation’ 
[emphasis mine] 15. The promise of modelling is that it allows us to achieve a mechanistic 
description of brain activity: but in most cases, doesn’t it really just allowing us to describe our 
model, describe the brain, and then draw parallels?  As we become more ambitious in our 
attempts to understand the brain, we may have to remind ourselves of George Box’s classic 
maxim – ‘all models are wrong, but some models are useful’ – and consider how we should 
assess the usefulness of a model in neuroscience. 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
The picture that the work in this thesis paints of the brain is one of numerous feedback loops, 
acting in parallel. I have emphasised how emotion provides both an input and an output to 
learning and how value might be assembled and represented in the cortex in a format 
compatible with rapid updating. Although all the work reported here took part in a trial-based 
fashion, my hope is that future work develops more sophisticated models of learning and 
emotion with dynamics that more closely resemble those that we experience on a day to day 
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basis. It will be fascinating to see whether our models will withstand the rough and tumble of 
realistic environments with naturally behaving agents. 
This research suggests promising routes to understanding slower fluctuations in emotion – such 
as life satisfaction or chronic stress- in relation to the faster processes characterised here. Given 
the importance of these variables to long-term health and the ever-increasing burden imposed 
by psychiatric disorders of emotion, the importance of this mission can hardly be overstated. 
Assessing whether the computational models that usefully characterize emotions in the 
laboratory will prove a clinically relevant tool is an exciting and pressing challenge. 
7.5 References 
1. Summerfield, C. & Tsetsos, K. Do humans make good decisions? Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 19, 
27–34 (2015). 
2. Tsetsos, K. et al. Economic irrationality is optimal during noisy decision making. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 113, 3102–3107 (2016). 
3. Marr, D. Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of 
visual information. (1982). 
4. Barlow, H. B. Possible principles underlying the transformations of sensory messages. In Sensory 
Communication 217–234 (1961). 
5. Kolling, N., Behrens, T. E. J., Mars, R. B. & Rushworth, M. F. S. Neural mechanisms of foraging. 
Science 336, 95–98 (2012). 
6. Kolling, N., Wittmann, M. & Rushworth, M. F. S. Multiple neural mechanisms of decision making 
and their competition under changing risk pressure. Neuron 81, 1190–1202 (2014). 
7. Cisek, P. & Kalaska, J. F. Neural mechanisms for interacting with a world full of action choices. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience 33, 269–298 (2010). 
8. Marblestone, A. H. & Wayne, G. Toward an integration of deep learning and neuroscience. Front. 
Comput. Neurosci. (2016). 
9. Yamins, D. L. K. & DiCarlo, J. J. Using goal-driven deep learning models to understand sensory 
cortex. Nature Neuroscience 19, 356–365 (2016). 
10. Goodfellow, I. et al. Generative Adversarial Nets. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 
2672–2680 (2014). 
11. Rivera-Alba, M. et al. Wiring Economy and Volume Exclusion Determine Neuronal Placement in 
the Drosophila Brain. Current Biology 21, 2000–2005 (2011). 
12. Attwell, D. & Laughlin, S. B. An energy budget for signaling in the grey matter of the brain. J. Cereb. 
Blood Flow Metab. 21, 1133–1145 (2001). 
13. Schmidhuber, J. Deep learning in neural networks: an overview. Neural networks : the official 
journal of the International Neural Network Society 61, 85–117 (2015). 
14. Yamins, D. L. K. et al. Performance-optimized hierarchical models predict neural responses in 
higher visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, 8619–8624 (2014). 
15. Khaligh-Razavi, S.-M. & Kriegeskorte, N. Deep supervised, but not unsupervised, models may 
explain IT cortical representation. PLoS Comp Biol 10, e1003915 (2014). 
 
 
 229 
 
